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*well
for your review* *JK*

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CONFIDENTIAL

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Memorandum for the Intelligence Advisory Committee

Subject: NIE Survey of Dissemination and Use

The attached revised page 33 of the Survey of NIE Dissemination
and Use (IAC-D-94/1, 10 July 1956) supersedes the corresponding
page in the text now in your possession.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-94/1
Draft
8 June 1956

D R A F T

SURVEY OF NIE DISSEMINATION AND USE

Prepared by the
Board of National Estimates
Central Intelligence Agency

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IAC-D-94/1

Draft

8 June 1956

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Survey of NIE Use

1. Attached is a draft of the Survey of NIE Use prepared by the Board of National Estimates pursuant to IAC-D-94 and item 4, IAC-M-186.

2. The draft Survey has been prepared in cooperation with the IAC agencies and is based in large part on information provided by them. The Board is circulating a draft prior to submitting its Survey to the IAC to ascertain whether, in the opinion of the contributors, the present draft is factually accurate.

3. The Board would appreciate meeting with your representatives to discuss your comments. The meeting has been scheduled for 1000, Friday, 22 June, in Room 115, Administration Building.

[Redacted]
Secretary

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IAC-D-94/1
Draft
8 June 1956

PREFACE

This Survey of NIE Dissemination^{1/} and Use was initially suggested by the Board of National Estimates, which believed that in the light of four years' experience with the production of National Intelligence Estimates, it was worthwhile to conduct an informal survey of the use which the various consumers made of NIE's. The Director of Central Intelligence proposed that the Board undertake such a survey and report its findings to the IAC (IAC-D-94). The IAC concurred in this procedure on 1 March 1955 (IAC-M-186, 1 March 1955).

The survey was conducted by the Board of National Estimates in cooperation with the IAC agencies, in two stages. The first stage was a written questionnaire to all offices and agencies receiving NIE's which was designed to reveal the extent to which these estimates received further dissemination within each agency. The results are summarized in Part I. (See Tab A for a list of those participating.)

The second stage was a series of interviews with a representative sample of final consumers^{2/} to ascertain what use they actually made

1/ Dissemination is used herein to mean the delivery of the printed NIE, i.e., direct dissemination.

2/ "Final Consumer" and "end users" are used to mean a senior or responsible officer at the receiving agency who can use national intelligence in the discharge of his duties. These terms do not include those officers mainly concerned with the initial receipt, transmission, storage, or recall of NIE's by the receiving agency.

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on NIE's. Members and representatives of the Board of National Estimates interviewed more than 75 representatives end-users in all receiving departments, offices, and agencies except the Department of the Navy, and the Department of Defense. (See Tab B for list of those interviewed.) ONI and the Joint Intelligence Group preferred that sample inquiries or interviews addressed to those consumers to whom they disseminated NIE's be conducted by them. (See Tab C for a list of offices contacted.) Because of differing methods and this division of responsibility for the second stage, the results did not prove wholly comparable. In addition to the interviews in Washington, letter inquiries were sent by the appropriate IAC agencies to representative consumers outside of Washington. (See Tab D for list of those contacted by letter.) The results of the second stage of the survey are summarized in Parts II and III.

The following limitations on the survey should be borne in mind:

- a. The survey was not designed to obtain opinions regarding the adequacy of NIE content or judgments on possible changes to make NIE more useful.
- b. The number of valid over-all generalizations that can be made are limited by the variations in the survey coverage of the agencies and departments, the different types of NIE's, and the uses to which they are put.

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The primary goal of the survey was the limited one of establishing the distribution pattern of NIE's and of shedding light on the kinds of uses to which they are put.

The cut-off date for information on which this report is based is
20 April 1956.

CONCLUSIONS

1. An average of 249 NIE's* are distributed on a regular basis to the White House, the National Security Council, the Operations Coordination Board, and the major departments and agencies with national security responsibilities. Many of these are further distributed to major commands and missions outside Washington, both overseas and in the US. Selected NIE's go to the US Information Agency, the Federal Civil Defense Agency, the Department of Commerce, and selected [redacted]

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[redacted]
2. In most of these agencies, nearly all NIE's are distributed to offices with over-all responsibilities in the national security field, and selected NIE's are disseminated to lower echelons with narrower responsibilities on a need-to-know bases. NIE's also

* Number of Top Secret NIE's distributed is less. See note #1 on page 2.

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receive substantial indirect dissemination in most agencies through being incorporated, attributed or unattributed, in staff briefings memoranda, or in materials assembled for work on specific problems.

3. Top level executives (the President and Department or Agency heads) see only the relatively few NIE's which are selected for them by their screening officers, and then they usually read only the conclusions, briefs, or selected portions. The exceptions are most likely to be those NIE's dealing with crisis situations requiring urgent and high level policy decisions.

4. However, NIE's are extensively read by second and third echelon officials in the White House staff and in the NSC and CCB staffs, which require coordinated national intelligence in dealing with national security problems which transcend the interests of a single agency or department.

5. NIE's are also used in major departments and agencies by various staffs responsible for national security planning and execution. The extent of use tends to vary according to the applicability and timeliness of a given NIE to the problem at hand, the

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user's access to alternative or complementary sources of intelligence, and the degree to which the users are concerned with problems transcending the interests of their respective departments or agencies.

6. However, aside from possible indirect dissemination, it appears that some NIE's do not reach all of the departmental policy or planning levels or other key officials who might find them useful. Some of those interviewed indicated that they had not seen particular NIE's which appeared pertinent to their responsibilities. In some instances, this appeared to result from the failure of those in their immediate offices to pass the NIE's on to their chiefs; in others, the criteria for distribution appeared to be overly restrictive.

7. Although a number of NIE's are used in working on specific planning and policy problems, they are more generally used for background purposes. In addition, the distribution of the collective judgments of the intelligence community at nearly all levels of the government performs a function that is important, though quantitatively difficult to measure, in facilitating both the formulation and execution of national security policy.

8. The majority of NIE users interviewed indicated that the format and problem coverage of NIE's are generally adequate for their purposes,

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though many expressed dissatisfaction with certain aspects of some NIE's. The survey obtained such expressions of opinion only as a by-product, and there is not sufficient evidence to serve as a basis for recommending changes.

9. Some of the limitations on NIE use mentioned in the survey include:


- a. Some NIE's are too long to permit their being read in full by top level executives, and even by some interested executives in the support echelons.
- b. On the other hand, the generality of some NIE's limits their usefulness, especially to lower echelons responsible for detailed foreign policy planning and execution.
- c. Some NIE's are not relevant or timely enough for use in working on specific policy problems.
- d. Some officials feel that if NIE's placed more emphasis on the consequences of US courses of action they would be of more use in weighing the advantages or disadvantages of various alternative courses open to the US.

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PART IDISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

1. Initial Dissemination. CIA undertakes the printing and initial dissemination of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) once they have been approved by the IAC. Normally, 316 copies of each Secret NIE ^{1/} are printed. Of this total, some 67 are retained within CIA for central reference, vital document storage, and reserve. The remaining 249 ^{2/} copies are initially disseminated as follows: ^{3/}



TOTAL - 249

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After IAC approval and sanitization, if appropriate, CIA also makes direct dissemination of selected NIE's [redacted]


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[redacted] (See paragraph 5)

2. Onward Dissemination. The / copies of each NIE are delivered en bloc to the receiving agencies, which are responsible for onward dissemination to selected officials or officers in Washington, elsewhere in the US and outside the country. In all the receiving agencies which have an intelligence staff, that component receives the NIE's initially, retains a certain number for its own use, and forwards the remainder to selected recipients according to the problem, area, or subject addressed. The intelligence component is

FLOW OF NIE's



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* All breakdowns are based on total number of copies of Secret NIE's normally printed. All figures are approximate.

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also responsible for enforcing any special restrictions on NIE onward dissemination. No standard distribution list for NIE's is used by any of the receiving agencies, but certain officers are always on the list for all NIE's. In the receiving agencies without a full-time intelligence staff, NIE's usually go to a designated officer who performs the onward dissemination and general control functions.

1/ Only 296 copies of Top Secret NIE's are ordinarily printed. Even fewer copies of special request or special classification NIE's are printed. For consistency in text and statistical breakdowns, the base figure of 316 is used in this report.

2/ The total number of copies distributed varies because JIG and CIA receive extra copies of certain NIE's, and because FCDIA receives copies of selected NIE's. Under "special I.C. approval," 4 copies are sent to USIA, and one copy of every NIE sanitized for release [REDACTED] SHAPE via the Army ACSI. These, the NIE's distributed [REDACTED] and other special releases, are drawn from the reserve stock in CIA.

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
3/ The figures in this and the following charts are averages. The number of copies disseminated of any given NIE may vary considerably depending on its subject matter.

the members of the NSC,

4/ Includes 1/ the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the NSC Secretariat and Staff.

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3. Retention in Intelligence Staffs. Of the 21.9 copies of each NIE normally delivered to the receiving agencies in Washington, about 93 copies are retained in the intelligence areas or staffs. The average number of copies retained is as follows:



TOTAL - 93

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In addition to those copies retained by the intelligence staffs of the IAC agencies, a few copies are retained by the small intelligence staffs of various non-IAC recipients. For example, the copy sent to the White House is normally retained by the Staff Secretary for Intelligence, two copies are kept in the Intelligence staff of the Operations Coordinating Board, one in the International Cooperation Administration, and one in the IAC Indications Center.

4. NIE Delivery to Potential End-Users in Washington.

Ordinarily, 99 copies are forwarded to potential end-users in Washington. An examination of the distribution of these copies provides additional information of a general nature on who uses NIE's and what uses are actually made of them. An average of 74 of these copies are sent to potential end-users in the IAC agencies, including 7 copies in the Department of State, 15 copies in the Department of Defense, 23 copies in the Department of the Army, 10 copies in the Department of the Navy, 12 copies in the Department of the Air Force, 2 copies in the Atomic Energy Commission, 1 copy in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 4 copies in CIA. Nearly all the 25 copies forwarded to potential end-users outside the IAC agencies go to officers in the area of the government primarily

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To Potential End-Users in Washington

NSC
(16)

Army
(23)

Defense
(15)

Air
(12)

FBI
(1)

AEC
(2)

OCB
(2)

White House & Special Assistants
(5)

State (7)

Navy (10)

CIA
(4)

ICIA
(2)

TOTAL - 99

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concerned with the final stages of policy formulation. Of these, 5 copies go to the White House and the President's Special Assistants, 18 go to the National Security Council and the NSC Operations Coordinating Board, and 2 go to the International Cooperation Authority. Thus, of the 99 copies forwarded to potential end-users in Washington, ^{departments} about three-fourths go via IAC members to officers in their respective/ who are concerned with either the formulation or the execution of US foreign policy. Nearly all the rest of the NIE's go to officers in the area of the government primarily concerned with the final stages of US foreign policy formulation and decision.

5. NIE Dissemination Outside Washington. Normally, 57 copies of NIE's are forwarded to US missions or headquarters outside Washington, most of them outside the country. About 45 copies are ordinarily sent to US officers who are stationed in overseas installations or who represent the US in international organizations; the remainder are sent to military commands in the US outside of Washington. These NIE's are forwarded by the responsible IAC agency according to the area and the problem covered. Of the total so delivered, the Department of State normally sends about 9

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To US Missions and Headquarters Outside Washington

CIA
(12)

State
(9)

Air
(12)

Army
(17)*

Navy
(7)


TOTAL - 57 *

* Most of the copies sent by the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force go to major commands and headquarters. Many of those sent by the Department of the Army go to Attachés. Ordinarily, NIE's sent overseas to one departmental representative are available to representatives of other services in the area.

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copies, the Department of the Army, about 17, the Department of the Navy, 7, the Department of the Air Force, 12. CIA normally forwards 2 copies to the US Supreme Commander at SHAPE, 3 copies to CIA operational representatives, and about 7 to other representatives.

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5/ These copies are drawn from the 67 retained by CIA for central reference, vital document storage, and reserve.

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PART II

RECEIPT, READERSHIP, AND USE

A. The White House and the President's Special Assistants

7. Six copies of NIE's are received by the White House staff. Copies of each are routed to: (a) the Staff Secretary for Intelligence, (b) the Office of the Special Assistant for Psychological Affairs, and (c) the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament Matters. The Office of the Special Assistant for Economic Affairs receives only those NIE's relating to specific and assigned problems.*

8. The President himself sees only those NIE's which are selected for him by the Staff Secretary for Intelligence or those which he asks for after having been briefed on their contents. In the majority of cases the President relies on the briefings of NIE's, either oral or written, prepared by the Staff Secretary for Intelligence. The President regards NIE's as important to him in several respects. Primarily, NIE's are valuable because they represent the best possible resolution at the intelligence level of differences among most departments and agencies participating in initial formulation and execution of US foreign policy, i.e., completed staff work. The President also regards as useful those NIE's which deal with specific foreign policy problems on which he

* The Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Matters is considered a part of the NSC, inasmuch as the Special Assistant is Chairman of the NSC Planning Board.

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is currently working. Finally, the President makes use of the small number of NIE's which contain new information, a new approach, or some new ideas and interpretations. The President makes little use of NIE's for personal background, because of access to other materials and his considerable knowledge of many areas and problems discussed in NIE's.

9. The Special Assistants for Psychological Affairs,* for ordinarily Disarmament Matters, and for Economic Affairs are not/first-hand recipients of NIE's. NIE's are first used in varying degrees by the ranking officer in each office. Thus, the impact that NIE's have on the Special Assistants depends almost entirely on the extent to which their subordinates use the NIE's in doing the necessary staff work for their principals and the President.

10. The ranking officers on the staffs of the White House Special Assistants read the conclusions of virtually all NIE's received. In this way, they learn the collective judgment of the intelligence community on the important problems of the day and are in a position to determine whether further use can be made of the NIE. The extent to which they do so to read the Discussion depends

* This was office of Mr. Nelson Rockefeller. Mr. William Jackson's office which has assumed related duties, has not been consulted.

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upon a variety of factors and generalizations are difficult. How thoroughly an NIE will be read and used often depends on such intangibles as the amount of time available when the NIE arrives, how much or little the receiving officer happens to know about the subject, and the receiving officer's estimate of his superior's interest and requirements. However, the most important factor determining how thoroughly an NIE is read by White House staff officers is its subject matter and its applicability, both in substance and timeliness, to the work of the reader.

11. Thus, the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament Matters and the President's Staff Secretary for Intelligence use NIE's more extensively than the Offices of the Special Assistants for Psychological Affairs and Economic Affairs. Few NIE's directly treat the problems with which the latter offices are concerned, and they are only of "some" * use for background purposes. On the other hand, a wide range of NIE's (some of them specifically requested) are the only source of agreed intelligence judgment and information essential to the work of the Assistant for Disarmament Matters.

B. The National Security Council and Planning Board.

12. This section deals with the receipt of NIE's and their use in the

* The use rating was "great, considerable, some, little, or none."

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upon a variety of factors and generalizations are difficult. How thoroughly an NIE will be read and used often depends on such intangibles as the amount of time available when the NIE arrives, how much or little the receiving officer happens to know about the subject, and the receiving officer's estimate of his superior's interest and requirements. However, the most important factor determining how thoroughly an NIE is read by White House staff officers is its subject matter and its applicability, both in substance and timeliness, to the work of the reader.

11. Thus, the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament Matters and the President's Staff Secretary for Intelligence use NIE's more extensively than the Offices of the Special Assistants for Psychological Affairs and Economic Affairs. Few NIE's directly treat the problems with which the latter offices are concerned, and they are only of "some" * use for background purposes. On the other hand, a wide range of NIE's (some of them specifically requested) are the only source of agreed intelligence judgment and information essential to the work of the Assistant for Disarmament Matters.

B. The National Security Council and Planning Board.

12. This section deals with the receipt of NIE's and their use in the

* The use rating was "great, considerable, some, little, or none."

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production of NSC papers, and will not describe the use made of NIE's by the individual members of the NSC. Sixteen copies are received by the National Security Council and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Matters. The Special Assistant, the Secretary of the NSC, and the Deputy Secretary all receive copies of all NIE's. The majority of the NSC staff members also regularly receive copies of all NIE's. Selected NIE's are brought to the attention of the Council members.

13. All recipients in the NSC Secretariat regularly read the conclusions of all NIE's and in the majority of cases read the text as well. The NIE's which receive the closest attention are those which deal with a problem with which the Planning Board or the NSC is currently engaged.

14. Apart from the use made by members of the NSC and its Planning Board within their respective departments (covered below), it should be noted that the NSC and the Planning Board do use the NIE's directly. The Director of Central Intelligence frequently uses NIE's in his weekly oral briefing of the NSC. NIE's are used by the CIA representative Planning Board meetings. NIE's are also the intelligence contributions to NSC policy papers, on occasion being incorporated in part verbatim in the NSC text.

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The nature of its work requires that the intelligence it uses be fully coordinated national intelligence. Several NIE's are prepared expressly for the NESCC. For these reasons, the NIE's which deal with Soviet capabilities for attack on the US are carefully and thoroughly read and frequently referred to by all members of the NESCC staff during the preparation of the annual NESCC report.

C. The Operations Coordination Board

17. This section deals with the receipt and use of NIE's by the OCB secretariat and staff. NIE use by the OCB members themselves will be treated under the appropriate departmental or agency section. The OCB secretariat and staff receives 4 copies of all NIE's. The Executive Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Chief of the Intelligence Staff each receive a copy, and all officers working on special projects receive NIE's which deal with the problem they are working on. All recipients read the conclusions of all NIE's and in the great majority of cases the full text as well. The Executive

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Secretary reads the full text of those NIE's which bear on problems on which OCB is currently working. He often reads extensively in other NIE's as well as a means of clarifying his own thinking about the range of foreign policy problems for which OCB is or may become responsible.

18. NIE's contribute significantly to the effectiveness of the work of the OCB secretariat by providing useful background information, by making available the collective judgment of the intelligence community for use in preparing OCB progress reports, and to a lesser extent by supplying judgments and information not available elsewhere. However, NIE's are not as extensively used by the OCB as they are by the NSC/Secretariat. The principal reasons for this are: (a) the major portion of OCB's work and papers is organized on a country basis and therefore a number of the functional or generalized NIE's are of little direct use, (b) OCB progress reports are issued periodically and there is not always an up-to-date NIE available at the time when it could be used to greatest advantage, (c) frequently OCB reports require more detailed information than is contained in the average NIE, (d) OCB receives more intelligence from sources other than NIE's than does the NSC Secretariat.

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D. The Department of State

19. The Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) forwards an average of 7 copies of each NIE to various users throughout the Department, the number varying with the subject matter. The Secretary of State and the Under Secretary receive directly very few NIE's. These are selected by the Executive Secretariat which has the responsibility for determining which documents and papers that come through normal channels are sent on for the personal attention of the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Occasionally a particularly important NIE on an urgent problem will be brought to by the Assistant Secretary for an area, their personal attention by another member of their staff, /by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, or by the Director of Central Intelligence. Ordinarily the Secretary and the Under Secretary receive the substance of appropriate NIE's as part of their morning briefings, which also include materials other than intelligence information. In short, the Secretary usually makes use of NIE's as another source of information in handling a particular problem of the moment. An NIE seldom if ever is brought to his attention for publication unless it deals with a problem on which he is engaged at the moment.

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20. The Director, Policy Planning Staff, receives all NIE's. Initially, he reads only selected NIE's and selectively in them. Subsequently, he reads conclusions and text of almost all NIE's and devotes particular attention to those which pertain to particular foreign policy problems he is engaged on. He considers NIE's as essential for personal background and for working on specific foreign policy problems.

21. NIE's are routed to other areas in the Department largely on a geographic basis. For example, the Chief of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs receives only those NIE's which concern his area. Valid generalizations concerning the extent to which NIE's are read are difficult because of such varying factors as: (a) other demands on the recipient's time when the NIE's are received; (b) the applicability of the NIE to the problems confronting the reader at the moment; and (c) the degree of the recipient's prior knowledge of the subject of the NIE. In comparison with users in the military agencies, the State Department readers/tend to rely less on NIE's for personal information. This is so in part because their responsibilities are more on a geographic rather than a functional basis and in part because they receive a constant daily

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flow of information about their area of concern. Nevertheless, NIE's are thought to be of "considerable" * value at all levels of the ar offices in working on specific foreign policy problems, particularly in the preparation of drafts for the NSC Planning Board, which are of the same level of generality as NIE's. NIE's also have considerable value as a reference to the collective judgment of the intelligence community.

E. The Department of Defense

22. The Survey at the Department of Defense and JSC level was conducted by the Joint Intelligence Group on the basis of written questionnaires. The returns give a far less thorough picture of NIE receipt, readership, and use than was obtained by interview for other departments and agencies. The Joint Intelligence Group forwards an average of 3 NIE's to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Little information was forthcoming on the end use of these NIE's. An average of 12 NIE's are distributed to non-intelligence users in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

23. We have little information as to which individuals in the various offices of the Joint Chiefs read NIE's. The JIG questionnaire

* The rating range was "great, considerable, some, little, or none."

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indicates, however, that (a) only the conclusions are usually read in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
the
for Special Operations, in Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and in the Office of the Chairman, JCS; (b) the entire estimate is "sometimes" read in the office for NSC Affairs and in the Joint Logistic Plans Group; and (c) the entire text is "usually" read in the office of NSC Affairs and in the Joint Strategic Plans Group.

24. Answers to the JIG questionnaire indicate that NIE's are read primarily for personal background and information, with only three of the seven offices responding indicating that NIE's were consistently used for working on specific problems. The answers give no clear indication of the reasons for this. For example, one office which replied that it consistently used NIE's for working on a specific problem also replied that the substance of NIE's was not adequate for its purposes. The most frequently mentioned limitation on NIE's was that they were too general.

25. In addition to their direct use by end recipients, NIE's are extensively used by the Joint Intelligence Group in the preparation of the political and economic portions of JIC estimates and of various JIG briefings and memoranda.

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F. Department of the Army

26. Of the 50 copies of NIE's sent to the Department of the Army, an average of 23 are forwarded by AC of S, Intelligence (G-2), to offices and individuals in Washington directly responsible for those aspects of Army plans and operations which concern or are affected by developments abroad. Each NIE so forwarded has a one-page summary prepared by G-2 which includes the NIE's major conclusions, the more important supporting data and analysis, and, where pertinent, comments on the relationship of the NIE to Army plans, programs, or policies.

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27. One difficulty in assessing the impact of NIE's in the Department of the Army stems from the variety of ways in which their contents are brought to the attention of the top Department officials. For example, the substance of a newly published NIE is almost always included in the weekly briefing by G-2 which is attended by the top officials of the Department. Appropriate NIE's are also included in "black books" which are prepared for various officials either for their background information or for their use in dealing with a particular problem. Finally, in providing intelligence support for Department officials, including the weekly briefings mentioned above, G-2 will often rely heavily on NIE's even though the end product does not specifically indicate such reliance.

28. The following Army officials receive and read with varying degrees of thoroughness the majority of NIE's: Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, Assistant Secretary for Civilian-Military Affairs, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. In all cases, the NIE's are first screened by G-2, and then by personal staff subordinates. In most cases, appropriate portions are checked or side-lined. The thoroughness with which an NIE is read by the

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principals appears to depend upon a number of factors which include:
(a) their individual working habits and interests; (b) the timeliness and applicability of a given NIE to problems currently confronting them; (c) their need for joint community judgments, i.e., in preparing for NSC meetings or intelligence conferences or papers with other countries; and (d) the extent to which their attention is flagged by their screeners. Although the survey material is inadequate to permit firm generalizations, as a general rule NIE's have the greatest impact at this level in the Army when they deal with important matters affecting over-all Army plans and policy (the impact of nuclear parity), treat subjects affecting the Army which are particularly controversial (the fall of Dien Bien Phu), or affect plans for the disposition of Army resources (Yugoslavia, Baghdad Pact, Korea).

29. NIE's are more extensively used in G-3 than in any other office of the Department of the Army. It is here that relevant NIE's are often used as an integral part of the process of preparing Army plans. Frequently, predictions in NIE's form the basis for the assumptions upon which Army plans are prepared. The level of generality in an NIE is adequate in most cases for the work done

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in G-3, and where it isn't supplementary detailed information can be obtained from G-2. All G-3 desk officers automatically receive all NIE's which pertain to the problems they are assigned.

30. In summary, the chief uses to which NIE's are put in the Department of the Army seem to be as a reference to the collective judgments of the intelligence community, as a convenient source of personal background information on a variety of subjects affecting Army policy and programs, and as a useful tool for working out specific Army or national foreign policy problems.

G. The Department of the Air Force

31. AFOIN regularly forwards 12 NIE's to Air Force offices in Washington. These include the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, as well as the major components charged with planning and operational responsibilities in the field.

32. The Secretary of the Air Force is shown only a limited number of NIE's. Those are selected for him largely on the basis of providing him with the collective judgment of the intelligence community on joint military planning matters which have direct and important implications for the Air Force.

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33. A small number of NIE's are brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, when in the opinion of AFOIN, they pertain to Air Force matters, allude to particularly interesting political developments, or contain interesting dissents. They read those portions of NIE's which are brought to their attention largely for personal background and so that they may be aware of collective judgments on matters of concern to them. The Director, AFOIN, perceives no evidence that any NIE has been of direct use to them in dealing with their responsibilities, making decisions, or establishing a position in dealing with other officials. However, NIE's have been useful in supplementing their information. The Director, AFOIN, believes that NIE's would be more useful to the Air Force leadership if they more clearly identified things that are causative in certain situations in such terms as to give action people the best chance to decide whether they should prepare against these things, destroy or reduce them, increase them, or take no action. NIE's are also used in connection with Joint Strategic Plans and in preparing special studies to be referred to the Chief of Staff.

H. The Department of the Navy

34. On an average, ONI forwards 10 copies of all NIE's to non-intelligence echelons, including the offices of the Secretary

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of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Politico-Military Policy Division, and the Strategic Plans Division. In all these offices, NIE's are screened by persons in a subordinate position before further distribution is made.

35. The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations make very little direct use of NIE's. In general, the SECNAV and CNO rely primarily for their intelligence on their departmental staffs. In most cases, these staffs use NIE's in preparing intelligence material for the SECNAV and CNO and attributed briefs of newly published NIE's are included in the twice-weekly ONI briefings. However, the are told SECNAV and CNO only occasionally / what portions of their briefings stem directly from NIE's, and then only when the briefing concerns a special problem on which they are working. Only rarely are NIE's themselves forwarded to the SECNAV and CNO and then only after screening or with portions marked for reference. When so forwarded, the entire estimate is usually read, with particular reference to the noted portions. The principal criteria for selecting NIE's for forwarding directly to the SECNAV and the CNO are relevance to current problems where the collective judgment of the community is important and which have a direct bearing on national decisions importantly affecting Navy interests, policies, and programs.

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36. The Political-Military / Policy Division and the Strategic Plans Division are the major users of NIE's in the Department of the Navy. The Directors of the Divisions do not initially see all NIE's, although most eventually reach them, with appropriate sections sidelined or with staff comments. In general, the Division Directors read only the conclusions and the side-lined portions of the text of those NIE's which they receive.

37. The extent to which NIE's are initially used and read in the two divisions depends primarily on their relevance to the work immediately at hand. The conclusions are almost invariably read upon receipt by all users. The NIE's are subsequently used in varying degrees in connection with reviewing plans, preparing memoranda on current developments, and drafting intelligence annexes of area studies. Although NIE's appear to have considerable value in providing information for personal background, their more important use is in bringing the collective judgment of the intelligence community to bear on working out the Navy's position on specific foreign policy questions. These uses include: (a) providing a basis for joint action; (b) providing a check against individual judgments; (c) furnishing an over-all point of view; and (d) permitting

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a more rounded evaluation of proposed national policy. In general, NIE's serve a useful purpose in support of work on over-all, long-range problems or on questions of national policy, but are much less useful in their application to specific or detailed naval problems.

I. The Federal Bureau of Investigation

38. Two copies of all NIE's produced are received in office of the representative of the FBI on the I.C. He prepares a summary to attach to the copy forwarded to the Director. The other copy is normally routed to the espionage unit and to the office of domestic intelligence. The Director of the FBI is forwarded NIE's primarily for briefing and background purposes. The other principal use of NIE's to the FBI is to facilitate the coordination of domestic and foreign intelligence activities.

J. Atomic Energy Commission

:39. The Atomic Energy Commission receives four copies of all NIE's. The Chief of the Intelligence Division screens all NIE's received and determines their further distribution within the Commission. NIE's fall into three general categories as far as AEC use is concerned. Those NIE's or portions thereof dealing with AEC matters

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are of limited use largely because the AEC itself is a major participant in their preparation. Those which deal with countries with which the US has atomic energy agreements or upon whom the US relies for atomic energy resources are of considerable value to the AEC in formulating its programs and policies in the foreign field. Finally, those NIL's of a more general character are used primarily in the AEC for general background information of responsible officials who have some concern with foreign policy problems.

K. International Cooperation Administration

40. ICA receives three copies of all NIE's. They are screened by the Special Assistant to the Director for OCB and NSC matters and selected by him for further appropriate dissemination. Normally, NIE's are forwarded to the Director's office (usually side-lined or briefed), to the Director of Plans, the appropriate area chief, and to others involved in NSC or OCB support.

41. In addition to providing personal background information, NIE's are used principally as (a) starting points by country desk officers for NSC status reports and various reports to the OCB; (b) as bases for evaluating the mutual security programs in various countries; and (c) as summary briefings for ranking officials preparing to visit foreign countries. NIE's generally do not treat economic

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matters in sufficient detail to be of much use in working out detailed economic programs for individual countries. Neither does any single NIE or a series of NIE's provide the synthesis of foreign economic problems that would be most useful in evaluating or preparing an over-all US foreign economic program.

L. United States Information Agency

42. USIA receives four copies of those estimates approved for release by the IAC (in practice almost all NIE's). On arrival, NIE's receive almost automatic distribution to those responsible for the subject matter treated, with copies of all NIE's going to the Director's office and to the Chief of the Intelligence Division. NIE's are of only minor direct use in the work of USIA. They are read primarily for personal background and information purposes. Some recipients find the collective community judgments contained therein as useful checks on their own thinking. Occasionally, the long range forecasts in NIE's are used as a basis for determining the priority of USIA effort assigned to particular countries, areas, or problems.

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M. Central Intelligence Agency

43. Four copies are distributed to the Office of the Director, one to each of the following: The Director, who is the intelligence advisor to the NSC; The Deputy Director; The Deputy Director (Intelligence), who is the intelligence advisor to the NSC Planning Board; and to the NSC Planning Board Assistant. These officials participate actively in the work of the NSC, which makes use of NIE's in deliberations and in drafting policy papers. (See paragraphs 12-15 for NSC use.) In addition, eight copies of NIE's Washington, where they are used in are distributed for use in the DD/P area of CIA headquarters in /

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varying degrees by planning and area offices. Recipients rate NIE's as valuable for personal background and information, particularly because they contain the collective judgment of the intelligence community. NIE's are also useful in alerting planners to the possible need for preemptive operations in areas that may become critical. Finally, NIE's are variously used as a basis for over-all planning, developing regional plans, making various types of progress reports, and preparing requirements for intelligence collection.

N. Distribution and Use Outside of Washington

44. The information on the use of NIE's outside of Washington was obtained, with one exception,* by the use of written questionnaires. The information so obtained is not as complete, both in substance and in the proportion of replies to number of recipients, as was possible in the case of Washington users.

Department of State

45. The Special Assistant, Intelligence, distributes an average of 9 NIE's to State Department posts overseas, using as principal criterion the relevancy of a given NIE to the duties of the post. NIE's are read with interest and thoroughness by the top level officers in all the their overseas missions. However, impact and usefulness are by and

* SAC responded to the AFOIN questionnaire, and also was interviewed.

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large considerably less than it is in Washington. Most missions report that the principal value of NIE's is for background information, as a useful briefing document for incoming personnel or official visitors, and as a guide to thinking in Washington.

Department of the Army

46. The Department of the Army normally distributes about 17 copies of NIE's outside of Washington, most of them overseas. The number of NIE's sent overseas varies with the subject matter of the NIE. The following views on the use of NIE's are based solely on replies to a G-2 questionnaire by USMACOM and the Far East and the Caribbean Command.* Command, / NIE's are available to a limited number of high level officials outside the intelligence divisions. The principal use of NIE's in these commands is as important sources of background material -- often unavailable elsewhere -- for use by the intelligence and operational support divisions in performing their normal intelligence briefing/functions.

* Most NIE's are sent to Army Attachés assigned to US missions and the use of NIE's made by them is incorporated in paragraph 45.

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Department of the Air Force

47. The Air Force ordinarily sends an average of 12 copies of NIE's to 4 overseas commands and to 8 command headquarters in the US outside of Washington. The following is based upon responses to an AFOIN questionnaire by ADC , the Macken Air Command, the Northeast Air Command, and upon an interview with SAC. In both the interior and overseas commands, NIE's are used extensively in the preparation of command estimates of the enemy situation and often contain information not available elsewhere. The Strategic Air Command found NIE's particularly valuable as being the principal source of the strategic thinking and collective intelligence judgments evolving in Washington. SAC also makes considerable use of NIE's as a source of personal background information and for organizational planning.

Department of the Navy

48. The Department of the Navy disseminates an average of 7 NIE's to overseas commands. NIE's are extensively used by the intelligence divisions of these commands as a basis for providing over-all guidance to the policy and planning echelons either directly or as part of locally prepared intelligence estimates. Several of the commands indicated that NIE's constitute their ~~most~~ important, if not their only, source of fully coordinated / national intelligence and guide to strategic thinking in Washington.

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PART III

REACTIONS TO NIE CONTENT, FORM AND LANGUAGE

49. As a supplement to the main thrust of the NIE Survey, we asked a number of questions on various aspects of NIE's. In addition, the Survey itself naturally evoked a number of informal responses going beyond the main scope of the Survey. The most significant of these reactions are summarized below.

50.. Applicability of NIE's to Specific Working Problems. The question of the application of NIE's to specific tasks evoked perhaps the most complicated set of comments. Any generalization on this subject is made difficult by the fact that NIE's are read by a fairly large group of US officials who work on a wide variety of problems and who deal with these problems at many different levels of specificity. As an example, one NIE reader may be concerned with the formulation of a policy to guide US relations with friendly and neutral nations of the Far East for the next five years; another may be concerned with the planning and execution of the economic aid program for Indochina for the next 12 months. The wide range of subjects covered by NIE's as a series also make it difficult for end-users to appraise the applicability of the NIE's as a whole to their specific working problems.

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51. Considering all NIE recipients as a group, the large majority indicated no serious difficulties in applying the general judgments of NIE's. However, there was a sharp split in this appraisal between those concerned primarily with final policy formulation and decision, i.e., the White House Staff, the President's Special Assistants, the NSC Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board, on the one hand, and those in the departments and agencies who are primarily concerned with policy application and execution. All of those in the Policy Formulating area indicated some degree of difficulty with selected NIE's; the majority indicated general difficulty on-the-average. Many of the comments by these respondents indicated that in their thinking they equated the adequacy of the level of generality with the adequacy of NIE content, i.e., the level of generality appeared to increase in some rough proportion to the rate at which the estimators ran out of information. The difference in the attitudes of the White House respondents and those in departments and agencies may be due to some extent to the fact that the former, not being as immersed in a day-to-day flow of intelligence, feel more need for background detail or analysis. In contrast, those respondents in the departments and agencies are more fully briefed on foreign developments as part of their regular duties. White House

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respondents may tend to view the NIE as their basic document from the intelligence community on any given problem addressed. The departmental officer, by contrast, is not so dependent upon detailed NIE back-up. In most instances, he can call upon his departmental intelligence unit to provide more detailed treatment, and quite often, he does.

52. Degree of Duplication between NIE's and other Intelligence.

A majority of the respondents found half or more of the NIE's received by them generally duplicative of other intelligence. The remainder felt that less than half (or none) duplicated other intelligence received. It was of course apparent during the interviews that few respondents had the same personal tastes or the same flavor of intelligence papers across their desks, which would largely determine the extent to which they found NIE's duplicatory of other intelligence. The typical comment made was that NIE's served primarily as a convenient source of data and thinking pertaining to a given subject. The main value of an NIE was in its providing a convenient summary and the collective judgments of the "full-time intelligence people who follow such matters."

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53. On the question of which parts of an NIE were most often found to be duplicative, only about half the respondents replied. These indicated that judgments, analysis and argumentation, and the basic data were duplicated in varying degrees by other publications received. Comments by these respondents indicated that they did not expect newness or originality in an NIE, but that those, when there, were valuable. Duplication of NIE content was mentioned as occurring in (a) special request intelligence papers; (b) studies published by agencies contributing to NIE's; (c) cables and telegrams; and (d) newspapers and magazines.

54. General vs. Specific NIE's. The question of whether NIE's should cover broad general subjects or be more specific in their subject matter proved difficult to answer. This difficulty appeared to derive to some extent from the respondent's not having previously given any detailed thought to this problem and from his understandable reluctance to appear to limit the freedom of choice of these guiding national intelligence production. Only about half the respondents mentioned this subject and nearly all who did suggested some increase in the number of "specific" NIE's. By specific was meant (a) those concentrating on a

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particular aspect of, say, the Soviet problem, such as the Soviet guided missile program, in contrast to the general Soviet paper; (b) those concentrating upon selected aspects of an area, such as economic problems in the Near East, as contrasted to an NIE providing a general round-up of all the factors in that area; (c) those concentrating upon a single country as opposed to those dealing rather equally with all countries in an area; and (d) those concentrating upon selected aspects of a problem in a country, such as, Berlin rather than a broad gauge review of the German problem.

55. In general, the preference for these "specific" kinds of NIE's seemed to come from respondents with well-defined geographic or functional responsibilities. Also, many respondents emphasized that the desired increase in "specific" NIE's should not be accomplished by reducing the number of NIE's now dealing with other specific subjects. Several respondents acknowledged that the type of NIE suggested would be more closely tied to a given situation, and therefore would probably have a briefer lifespan than the more general type of NIE. The only two respondents requesting more "general" NIE's were concerned with world-wide policy planning and general economic coverage.

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56. Dissents. Attitude patterns on this question were consistent among the DDCI recipients. Nearly all respondents, regardless of their area or specific duty were satisfied with the clarity of dissents in the majority of DDCI's. More than one-third felt the difference was "always" clear; more than half felt the difference was "usually" clear. Only two felt about half the dissents were not clear. A large number of respondents favored the inclusion of the reasoning to support the dissent, though they recognized that controlling its length presented a difficult problem.

57. The evaluation of the usefulness of dissents was not quite so unanimous as the opinion on clarity. Nevertheless, the majority of respondents indicated that the dissents were of "some", "real" or "very great" value. Only six indicated the dissents to be of little value to them. The general thinking of the majority was that such a device increased the confidence of the reader; i.e., where dissents were used, the reader felt that he was receiving both sides of a controversial issue, and where dissents did not appear he could assume there were no / serious differences of opinion among the DDCI agencies. Even those readers who had no specific interest in the content of most of the dissents favored their use "in principle."

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58. Length. The length and coverage of individual NIE's was another aspect in which there was general agreement. Although only a little more than three fourths of the respondents expressed views, nearly all of these . felt that the majority of NIE's were adequate in length and subject coverage. However, not a single respondent felt that all NIE's he read were adequate in length and coverage. Two felt that only half or less of the NIE's were unsatisfactory in those respects. Two others felt NIE's were generally "too long." At first glance, this appears to be a heavy vote of confidence and an expression of satisfaction with present length and coverage of individual NIE's. It should be pointed out, however, that there was no attempt to define what degree above one-half was represented by the term "the majority." It was merely defined for the respondents as more than one-half.

59. Estimative Language. The respondents were asked to express their opinion as to the clarity of the general estimative language, and particularly the "odds terms" used to convey a range of probability for various predictions. The majority of readers felt that both were understandable. The readers gave the "Alls-tums" a slightly

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higher clarity rating than the general language, even though many respondents were not fully aware of either the meaning of the individual "odds-terms" used by the estimators to express the range of probability or the attempt to use these terms with consistency from one NIE to another. When asked to check his own interpretation of the odds terms with the estimator's use, the respondent usually agreed on the general order of probability, but boggled slightly at trying to pin these terms to a mathematical spread. However, the large majority both of those who were aware of the specific intent of the odds-terms and of those not so aware agreed that the general meaning of the terms was clear to them. Three-fourths felt the terms were "understandable" and the remainder felt the terms were either "clear" or "extremely" clear. Only two respondents felt the odds-terms caused difficulty. A few respondents commented that the odds-terms should only be considered in the context of the general estimative language. Several suggested that the odds-terms be printed inside the NIE cover.

60. Judging the general estimative language was an extremely difficult task for most respondents. The decisions by appellate courts were most often used for comparison. The large majority felt the language was understandable, but no one thought it was "extremely clear." About one-fifth thought

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and
the language was "clear"/ about three-fourths thought it
"understandable". A few considered the language to be difficult
to understand. Some comments were received that estimative
expression is a new task for the written language and that the
accomplishment to date is rather remarkable considering the short
time the estimators have been in business.

61. Timeliness. This aspect of NIE's was also rather
difficult for respondents to assess. About one-third of the
respondents expressed no views on this problem. If the respondent
considered the difficulties involved in producing a timely national
estimate, he almost always came up with the feeling that NIE's
were "about as timely as could be expected". To avoid this,
respondents were asked to consider NIE timeliness entirely in
terms of its application to their problems. This, of course, did
not work well in regard to general NIE's and may have led
to much emphasis upon the "spot" or "crash" NIE's. No one felt
that NIE's were "always" ahead of the problem addressed. About
half of the respondents felt NIE's "more often than not" were
ahead of the problem. A few felt NIE's were "ahead of the problem"

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about half the time and a few also felt NIE's were "behind the problem" more often than not.

62. Organization and Format. The organization and format of NIE's received almost unanimous approval. A large majority felt the organization and format were "good"; a few felt they were "excellent". Only one respondent rated them as only "fair". Although no detailed questions were asked regarding aspects of NIE format, some respondents suggested that selected graphics would aid in absorbing masses of information, especially economic data. Others felt that it was somewhat easier to read copy with lines running across the page rather than in two columns. The Conclusions were considered especially valuable as a means of "getting at the meat" of the NIE. Those who did criticize the conclusions were concerned more with the content than with the form. The most often-mentioned suggestion was that the conclusions should be more of a summary of the entire text. Some suggestions were made that the connection between the conclusions and the supporting text be made more apparent. Along this line, the numbering of the supporting paragraphs after each conclusion was considered especially useful by those respondents who ordinarily read only selected portions of the text.

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TAB A

List of Agencies Which Provided Distribution
Data for the NIE Survey

The National Security Council
The Operations Coordinating Board
The Department of State
The Department of Defense
The Department of the Army
The Department of the Navy
The Department of the Air Force
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The National Security Agency
The United States Information Agency
The Office of Defense Mobilization
The International Cooperation Administration
The Central Intelligence Agency

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TAB B

List of Respondents* for NIE Survey

Interviewed by CIA/NE

WHITE HOUSE

Col. Andrew Goodpastor
Staff Secretary for the President

Gen. Theodore C. Parker
Office of Mr. Nelson Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President for
Psychological Affairs

Lt. Col. Paul H. Cullen and Mr. Edward Galbreath
Office of Mr. Joseph Dodge, Special Assistant to the President
for Economic Affairs

Mr. Robert Matteson
Acting Director, Staff for Mr. Stassen
Special Assistant to the President
for Disarmament Matters

NSC-NSC PLANNING BOARD

Mr. Dillon Anderson
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Matters and Chairman of the
NSC Planning Board

Mr. James S. Lay and Mr. S. Everett Gleason
NSC Secretariat

* NOTE: Titles and ranks used are those in effect at the time of
the interview.

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NSC NET EVALUATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF

Major Gen. Gordon B. Rogers
Deputy Director

25X1 [redacted] CIA, and Service representatives on
the Subcommittee Staff

CCB

Mr. Elmer Staats
Executive Secretary

Mr. J. E. MacDonald
OCB Staff Representative

Mr. Neilson Debevcise
Intelligence Staff

Dr. Horace Craig
Chief of Intelligence Staff

STATE

Mr. Robert Bowie
Director, Policy Planning Staff

Mr. Robert Barnes
Director, Executive Secretariat

Mr. Walter Radius, Staff Assistant to the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Economic Affairs

Mr. C. Burke Elbrick
Deputy Assistant Secretary
European Affairs

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STATE (continued)

Mr. Cecil B. Lyon
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

Mr. Jacques Reinstein
Director, Office of German Affairs

Mr. Fraser Wilkins
Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs

Mr. Kenneth T. Young
Director, Office of Philippine and
Southeast Asian Affairs

Mr. William Crawford
Deputy Director, Office of
Eastern European Affairs

Mr. Walter McCnaughy
Chief, Office of Chinese Affairs

Mr. Walter Stoessel
Chief, USSR Staff

DEFENSE (JCS)

See Tab C

ARMY

Hon. Wilber M. Brucker
Secretary of the Army

Col. F. C. Weyand
Aide to Secretary of the Army
and

Col. Cuyler L. Clark
Assistant Aide to Secretary of the Army

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ARMY (continued)

Col. Donald B. Harriott
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Civilian-Military Affairs

Brig. Gen. W. C. Westmoreland
Secretary of General Staff

Col. William Price for Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Plans and Research

Brig. Gen. David W. Gray
Deputy Chief, G-3, Plans

NAVY

See Tab C

AIR

Col. Andrew Kinney
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary of the Air Force

Mr. Trevor Gardner
Assistant Secretary for
Research and Development

Brig. Gen. Harvey T. Alness
Deputy Director, Plans

SAC, Offutt Field, Omaha

Panel LL-17 officers, headed by Col. Robert N. Smith,
Chief Intelligence Staff, representing the Commanding
General, Operations, Plans, and Intelligence

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AEC

Cdr. Charles E. Nelson
Special Assistant to Chairman AEC for
NSC Planning Board

Mr. John F. Hall
Director, Division of International Affairs

Mr. Edward R. Gardner
Deputy Director, Division of
International Affairs

Mr. Clark Vogel
Assistant Director for Plans,
International Affairs

Dr. Charles Reichardt
Chief, Intelligence Division

FBI

Mr. Neffert Kuhrtz
Liaison and IIC Participant
at Production Level

USIA

Mr. Frank L. Dennis
Deputy Assistant Director
for Program and Operations,
Representative to NSC Planning Board

Mr. George Heller
Deputy Assistant Director for FE Affairs

Mr. Lewis T. Olson
Chief, Intelligence Production Division

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
ICB

Mr. John Tobler
Assistant to the Director for
NSC, OCB and CFP Liaison

COMFERENCE

Mr. Milton A. Berger
Chief, China Hong Kong Section,
Far East Division

CIA-DD/P



NOTE: More than 75 NIE end-users participated in the interviews.

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TAB C

List of Respondents for NIE Survey

Contacted by

Departmental Intelligence Elements

DEFENSE (JCS)

A general questionnaire was circulated by JIG to the following offices or officers, and a summary of the responses was forwarded to the CIA/NIE Task Force.

Office of Special Operations

Gen. G. B. Irskine, USMC, Ret.
Assistant to Secretary of Defense

Office of NSC Affairs

Gen. C. H. Bonesteel, III, USA.
Defense Member NSC Planning Board

Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Office of the Special Assistant to JCS for NSC Affairs

Joint Strategic Survey Committee

Joint Strategic Plans Group

Joint Logistics Plans Group

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NAVY

Personal interviews were conducted for the NIE Survey by ONI. A summary of the results was forwarded to the CIA/NIE Task Force. The following officers or offices were included.

Office of FECNAV

Office of CNO

Strategic Plans Division

Politico-Military Policy Division

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TAB D

List of NIP Survey Respondents

Outside Washington

Queried by Letter

Department of State

US Embassy, Djakarta, Indonesia
John Gordon Main
Charge d'Affaires

US Embassy, Taipei, Taiwan
Karl Lott Rankin
American Ambassador

US Embassy, Saigon, Vietnam
G. Frederick Reinhardt
American Ambassador

US Embassy, Moscow, USSR
Walter N. Walsley
Charge d'Affaires

US Embassy, Paris, France
C. Douglas Dillen
American Ambassador

US Embassy, Rome, Italy
John D. Jernegan
Charge d'Affaires

US Embassy, Rio de Janerio, Brazil
William C. Trimble
Charge d'Affaires

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The Department of the Army

US European Command
Heidelberg, Germany

Far East Command
Zama, Honshu, Japan

Caribbean Command
Fort Amador, Canal Zone

The Department of the Navy

Commander in Chief,
Atlantic

Commander in Chief,
Pacific

Commander in Chief
US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic
and Mediterranean

The Department of the Air Force

Commander,
Air Defense Command
Colorado, USA

Commander,
Alaska Air Command
Alaska

Commander,
Northeast Air Command
APO, New York, New York


IAC-D-95/7.1
31 March 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Third Annual Report of

IAC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing

At the time we circulated the Third Annual Report of the IAC ad hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing (AHIP) we did not include Enclosure "C" to that report (IAC-D-95/7, para. 2). We are now forwarding Enclosure "C," which should be attached to that report. The AHIP report has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting of 1 April, for noting.



Secretary

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Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500110001-3

S-E-C-R-E-T

ENCLOSURE "C"
AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

SUMMARY STATUS OF IAC MEMBER AGENCY PROJECTS
ON INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS

<u>IAC AGENCY</u>	<u>SHORT TITLE</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. AIR FORCE	MINICARD	EASTMAN KODAK	Several years ago AFCIN let a \$2,500,000 research contract to the Eastman Kodak Co., for the development of a system known as MINICARD. The system will permit AFCIN to handle, index, store, and retrieve information in intelligence documents using electronic and micro-photographic means. All MINICARD equipment has been delivered and is in the final stages of being installed. Acceptance tests are scheduled for mid-April. If successful, Air Force intends to order supplemental sets of equipment for other Directorates.
	438L Target Sub- system	GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.	A \$350,000 contract has been let to the Computer Division of General Electric Company at Phoenix, Arizona for a systems and design study of AFCIN-3 - Director of Targets. The study will involve a detailed analysis of how information is received, researched, and stored. Equipment manufacture is an optional further development of the contract.

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ENCLOSURE "C"
AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

<u>IAC AGENCY</u>	<u>SHORT TITLE</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
2. CIA*	MINICARD	EASTMAN KODAK	A \$330,000 contract has been let to the Eastman Kodak Company for duplicate pieces of MINICARD equipment under development under Air Force contract. CIA and the Air Force plan to experiment with a compatible system of MINICARD exchange. Equipment is currently being installed and tested.
	WALNUT	IBM	A \$550,000 contract has been let to the IBM Corporation for a systems study of CIA's operational records - handling, indexing, storage, and retrieval. Equipment manufacture is not part of the contract.
3. ARMY	ACSI-MATIC	RCA	A \$700,000 contract has been let to the Radio Corporation of America. It calls for a systems evaluation of the entire Army intelligence process, at the departmental level, from the receipt of information through the production and dissemination of finished intelligence. Equipment manufacture is not part of the contract.
4. STATE	-	-	The Department has undertaken an internal survey of its records and files problem with a view to considering changes in operation prior to the move into the Department's new building.
5. NAVY	-	-	No contract in force at present.

* Explosive HTAUTOMAT

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ENCLOSURE "C"
AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

<u>IAC AGENCY</u>	<u>SHORT TITLE</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
6. NSA	-	-	No contract in force at present.
7. USIA	-	-	Plans no immediate outside contracts for the study or installation of mechanical aids in its library or documents collection.

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31 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : IAC-A-316, item 3

1. The business to be covered under item 3 of the IAC agenda for the 7 April meeting consists of two independent but related matters:

a. The Third Annual Report of the IAC ad hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing was prepared two months early to provide the IAC with a current picture of the work of the Subcommittee at a time when the IAC is being asked to consider means of implementing para. 16 of the new NSCID No. 1.

b. The draft PCTD reflects the view of the AD/CR and of representatives of the IAC agencies that a standing subcommittee of the IAC is a necessary prerequisite step to further action necessary to implement para. 16.

2. The simplest way to get a standing committee would be for the IAC to convert the present ad hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing. This has the disadvantage of leaving us with terms of reference which, in my opinion, are too narrow, if para. 16 of NSCID is to be dynamically implemented.

3. I hope we can get across to the IAC members that, with a committee having broader terms of reference, they should review carefully what representation they want on the committee. In at least three cases, the past level of representation - level in terms of the location of the individual in his organization - would not be appropriate for the new committee. (This point is well illustrated by the fact that, after two months to get agency views on various drafts, two agencies called me to say they were unaware of this proposal until "today.")

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Paul A. Morel
 Assistant Director
 Central Reference

cc: BD/I
 Secretary, IAC
 Secretary, AHIP

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IAC-D-95/7
25 March 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Third Annual Report of

IAC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing

1. The attached Third Annual Report of the IAC ad hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting (probably 1 April), for noting. At the same meeting we propose to ask the IAC to consider the draft DCID No. 1/4 referred to in paragraph 1 of this report, which incorporates terms of reference for a new standing committee of the IAC on documentation. This draft DCID is being circulated separately (IAC-D-105/22).

2. Please note that Enclosure "C" (Status of IAC Member Agency Projects) is not forwarded with the attached report. The Chairman of AHIP advises that this enclosure will be completed and made available to IAC members at an early date.



Secretary

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AHIP-AH-3
25 MARCH 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

AD-HOC SUB-COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION PROCESSING

THIRD ANNUAL REPORT

REPORTING PERIOD

1 This is the Third Annual Report of the IAC ad hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing. It is submitted to the IAC about two months ahead of schedule because of concurrent action taken by the Chairman, in consultation with committee members, proposing that the Director of Central Intelligence issue a DCII creating a standing subcommittee of the IAC to be known as the Committee on Documentation (see IAC-D-95/7). It is intended that the proposed Committee on Documentation supersede the present ad hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing (AHIP).

CHAIRMANSHIP

2 The chairmanship of AHIP changed in September 1957, and was announced by Mr. Dulles to the IAC on 17 September (IAC M-307, Item 4 a). The present chairman was thus privileged to succeed Colonel [redacted] who had ably guided the work of the committee since its inception in May, 1955.

COMMITTEE ACTIVITY

3 During the period reported on, AHIP has continued to be active. The committee itself met 13 times, and its working groups held a total

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AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1968

of all meetings. The problems and accomplishments of these working groups are dealt with fully in their individual reports and minutes, and in the minutes of the parent committee. These activities have been summarized in Enclosure "A", and will not be further commented on in this report.

BRIEFINGS

4. The Committee was assisted in its efforts to keep abreast of developments in its fields of interest and responsibility by a number of very useful presentations and briefings (see Enclosure "B" for list of principal briefings).

IAC ACTION

5. During the past year, the single most important action taken by the IAC in the field of documentation was its approval on 8 October of a "Policy Statement on Reproduction of Intelligence Originated in Another IAC Agency" (IAC-D-95/5). In turn, AHIP adopted and issued on 17 December instructions designed to implement this policy (AHIP-D-3/2). In these measures the intelligence community took a major step making possible prompt access to a large body of information by authorized researchers and operating officials wherever located and whenever needed.

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25 March 1958

PROBLEMS AND OBJECTIVES

6. The problem of acquiring and effectively utilizing intelligence information is real and it is major. It is part and parcel of the overall information problem facing all important elements of our national life. The Academic Community and Industry share with the Government almost frenzied concern about how to assure prompt and ready access to information by those who need to know.

7. Many organizations are working on this problem. Studies, some financed by the big foundations, are under way and increasing in number. Broad approaches have been proposed by professional groups. Your chairman and various members of the committee have had increasing demands made upon their time to attend meetings and review plans. The recent meeting held by the American Documentation Institute to consider a plan for establishing national centers for the coordination of scientific information, and the meetings held by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies (of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council) are but examples. In government, the National Science Foundation, the Office of Technical Services of the Department of Commerce, and the Library of Congress are among those agencies which are actively trying to cope with aspects of the problem.

8. Within the intelligence community, more and more time and money is being spent to arrive at improved means for handling information.

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AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

This concern is in part reflected in the summary of projects which various member agencies of the IAC are actively pursuing with private companies which design data processing equipment (see Enclosure "C"). The fact that it was possible to prepare such a summary represents some gain in the coordination of these activities within the intelligence community. Another piece of favorable evidence is the fact that the chairman of AHIP was invited by the Army to sit on the Army Board reviewing the progress of its contractor - RCA.

9. Encouraging as this is, more is required if indeed there is to be coordination in the development of compatible information processing systems within the intelligence community. The problem will always be with us - it is one on which agencies will spend increasing sums, already large, in efforts to arrive at solutions. Pursued independently, solutions arrived at by one agency unnecessarily risk being of little or no help to others, and conceivably might even create new problems. Thus steps are required to strengthen the community approach to information problems of its individual members.

10. Two things stand out as basic:

- a. The subcommittee needs assurances that it will be made cognizant of arrangements concluded between various elements of the community and contractors for the design of data processing systems.

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Paul A. Borel
Chairman

ENCLOSURES

- 1) - Summary of Activities of Working Groups
- 2) - List of Principal Briefings
- 3) - Status of IAI Member Agency Projects

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Enclosure "A"
AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

SUMMARY REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES
OF WORKING GROUPS OF THE
IAC AD-HOC SUB-COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION PROCESSING
FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 1957 THROUGH MARCH 1958

Various working groups of AHIP held a total of 44 meetings since the last annual report. It is through these working groups that AHIP has pursued its studies and investigations of the many facets of the information handling problem. The general mode of operation has been for AHIP to formulate the problem, organize a working group, approve its terms of reference, receive and act on its report and then dissolve the group as soon as its mission is accomplished.

During this reporting period, eight working groups were active in the following areas of concern to AHIP. Citations refer to the reports of the working groups completed in the present reporting period.

Common Intelligence Report Format

Equipment Research

Document Security Indications (WGDSI-R-1, 10 May 1957)

Area Classification Coding

Union List of Intelligence Serial Publications (WGULISP-R-1, 6 Dec. 1957)

IAC Inter-Library Relationships (SGILS-R-1, 27 Jan. 1958)

Intelligence Subject Code (WGLSC-R-1, 27 Nov. 1957)

Citation of Document Enclosures (WGCDE-R-1, 11 Dec. 1957)

Common Intelligence Report Format: Chairman, [redacted]

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As estimated in the preceding annual report, prospects for IAC-wide standardization of document format were poor owing to long usage by the agency members of individualistic formats, index files and storage.

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Enclosure "A"
AI IP-AR-3
25 March 1958

equipment. As indications of changing climate, however, it was encouraging to note during this year that the members endorsed standardization of such format elements as security indication and enclosure citation; that two new document series established during 1957 employed the format developed by this Working Group during 1956-57; and that the ACI/RCA study of Army's intelligence system was devoting attention to this aspect of information processing.

Equipment Research: Acting Chairman, [redacted] CIA

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The Ad Hoc Committee on Information Processing and the IAC community suffered the loss of a valued colleague in the sudden death in January 25X1 1958, of [redacted] the chairman of this group.

AHIP is cooperating with the National Science Foundation on organizing a government-wide program for a central information and advisory service on federal government research and development activities in information processing. This program would complement the work of AIIP in this field. Bureau of Standards participation in both committees - intelligence and other Federal operations - is planned to increase cooperation and coordination among the specialized information retrieval systems.

Document Security Indications: Chairman, [redacted] CIA

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The final report of this Working Group was approved and the Group dissolved on 17 June 1957. AHIP accepted the recommendations of the report as a statement of standards and objectives in the field of security

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- 3 -

Enclosure "A"
AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

markings while recognizing that staff and procedural situations in the member agencies preclude conformance to the proposed standards on any rigid time schedule.

Area Classification Coding: Chairman, [redacted] CIA

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The Working Group submitted the code schedules of its proposed IAC area classification scheme in August 1957. The Air Force adopted the scheme for testing purposes for its Minicard operation and CIA also agreed to employ it when its Minicard equipment became available. The project enjoyed the unqualified cooperation of the major IAC activities concerned with area indexing and the results embody solutions to many area classification problems identified in earlier schemes.

Union List of Intelligence Serial Publications: Chairman, [redacted]

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[redacted] CIA

The Working Group published the first edition of the Union List in October 1957, and thereby provided the community for the first time with a complete list of intelligence serial publications of foreign intelligence interest produced at the headquarters of IAC agencies. The list is designed to serve as (1) a reference guide for sources of information, and (2) a check list for verifying publications requested on dissemination. As one indication of its potential usefulness in supporting intelligence research needs, the AHIP Standing Group on Inter-Library Relationships is now employing it as a guide to making an inventory of holdings of these series in IAC libraries.

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Enclosure "A"
AI.IP-AR-3
25 March 1958

IAC Inter-Library Relationships: Chairman, [redacted] CIA

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This Standing Group began operating in 1957 as a clearing house for information on the resources of IAC libraries, procedures for providing research access to intelligence literature and the standardization of copy and release procedures. The Chairman reported an immediate and effective response among IAC libraries to this program for integration of service practices.

Intelligence Subject Code: Chairman, [redacted] CIA

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In accordance with AHIP directives, representatives of this Working Group and a consultant in subject classification from the Library of Congress are engaged in a one-year project to revise CIA's Intelligence Subject Code. The revision is to take account of the ten years of experience with the Code in CIA and to provide expansions of its subject coverage in fields of particular concern to the Defense Agencies. The planning now underway at many points in the IAC for application of machines to information retrieval is particularly dependent on the successful development of a subject classification scheme.

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Enclosure "A"
AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

Citation of Document Enclosures, Chairman [redacted] CIA

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One of the persistent problems before the documentation systems of the IAC is the collection and dissemination of enclosures to State Department reports and despatches, Air Attaché reports, Naval Attaché reports, Army Attaché reports and CIA reports. Analysts do not see full documentation on any subject when the enclosure, which may be a book, document, periodical article, confidential report, conference notes or reports, is not available along with the report.

The AHIP took a preliminary step towards an orderly solution of the problem by establishing in May a Working Group on Citation of Document Enclosures. The Group submitted its final report and was dissolved in December 1957. Its final report sets forth a comparison of current practices among the IAC agencies regarding the citation of enclosures and recommends standard practices for the handling of citation elements and their entry on transmitting documents. Prospects for the adoption of the standards are favorable and should yield improved analyst access to scarce enclosures held by IAC libraries pending a broader solution to the problem of enclosure supply.

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Enclosure "B"
AMIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

LIST OF SPECIAL BRIEFINGS ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS

INCLUDED BY AMIP DURING 1957/58

- 25X1 1. [redacted] plans for investigating methods of handling intelligence information. [redacted] 25X1
- 25X1 2. [redacted] CIA, and Dr. George Petrie, IBM, on a proposed research and development project with IBM. [redacted] 25X1
3. AFCIN presentation of an Eastman Kodak film on Minicard, and a demonstration of Minicard equipment. 14 November 1957.
4. Mr. Walter Ellis, AFCIN, on the contract with General Electric to develop plans and equipment for subject control of documents in the Air Targets Division. 9 January 1958.
- 25X1 5. [redacted], CIA, on programs and prospects in the field of mechanical translation. 9 January 1958.
6. Captain John J. Kassouf, USA, Chairman, Graphics Research Coordinating Group, on the efforts of this Group to resolve problems in graphics and photographic research within the intelligence community. 20 February 1958.
7. Dr. Harold A. Wooster, Director of Research Communications, Office of Scientific Research, ARDC, on projects which he sponsors in the field of information retrieval theory, systems and devices. 20 February 1958.

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Enclosure "B"
AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

8. Messrs. Perrin F. Smith and Bennett Housman of IBM, on the development of a retrieval system for biographic information.

24 March 1958.

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ENCLOSURE "C"
AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

SUMMARY STATUS OF IAC MEMBER AGENCY PROJECTS
ON INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS

<u>IAC AGENCY</u>	<u>SHORT TITLE</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. AIR FORCE	MINICARD	EASTMAN KODAK	Several years ago AFCIN let a \$2,500,000 research contract to the Eastman Kodak Co., for the development of a system known as MINICARD. The system will permit AFCIN to handle, index, store, and retrieve information in intelligence documents using electronic and micro-photographic means. All MINICARD equipment has been delivered and is in the final stages of being installed. Acceptance tests are scheduled for mid-April. If successful, Air Force intends to order supplemental sets of equipment for other Directorates.
	L38L Target Sub- system	GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.	A \$350,000 contract has been let to the Computer Division of General Electric Company at Phoenix, Arizona for a systems and design study of AFCIN-3 - Director of Targets. The study will involve a detailed analysis of how information is received, researched, and stored. Equipment manufacture is an optional further development of the contract.

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ENCLOSURE "C"
AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

<u>IAC AGENCY</u>	<u>SHORT TITLE</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
2. CIA*	MINICARD	EASTMAN KODAK	A \$330,000 contract has been let to the Eastman Kodak Company for duplicate pieces of MINICARD equipment under development under Air Force contract. CIA and the Air Force plan to experiment with a compatible system of MINICARD exchange. Equipment is currently being installed and tested.
	WALNUT	IBM	A \$550,000 contract has been let to the IBM Corporation for a systems study of CIA's operational records - handling, indexing, storage, and retrieval. Equipment manufacture is not part of the contract.
3. ARMY	ACSI-MATIC	RCA	A \$700,000 contract has been let to the Radio Corporation of America. It calls for a systems evaluation of the entire Army intelligence process, at the departmental level, from the receipt of information through the production and dissemination of finished intelligence. Equipment manufacture is not part of the contract.
4. STATE	-	-	The Department has undertaken an internal survey of its records and files problem with a view to considering changes in operation prior to the move into the Department's new building.
5. NAVY	-	-	No contract in force at present.

* Exclusive HTAUTOMAT

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ENCLOSURE "C"
AHIP-AR-3
25 March 1958

<u>IAC AGENCY</u>	<u>SHORT TITLE</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
6. NSA	-	-	No contract in force at present.
7. USIA	-	-	Plans no immediate outside contracts for the study or installation of mechanical aids in its library or documents collection.

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IAC-D-95/6
23 October 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Policy on Reproduction of Intelligence

1. The following chronology of IAC action, bearing on the establishment of an IAC policy on the reproduction by one IAC agency of intelligence originated in another, is for information:

a. Second Annual Report of the ad hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing (IAC-D-95/3).

Action: IAC noted the report and approved section on "Reproduction Needs of Advanced Equipment for Information Storage and Retrieval" as a temporary procedural guide, subject to further review by AHIP and presentation of specific recommendations in this field for IAC consideration (IAC-M-295, item 2).

b. AHIP report dated 4 September 1957, prepared in response to above IAC direction, which report analyzed the "Third Agency Rule" problem and proposed an IAC policy statement on reproduction (IAC-D-95/4).

Action: IAC noted the report and requested a restatement of the policy to avoid possible interpretation that statutory responsibilities were being modified (IAC-M-307, item 4 b).

c. AHIP restatement of policy circulated to the IAC on 26 September (IAC-D-95/5).

Action: On 8 October, the IAC approved the policy, subject to the deletion of the word "machine" in para. a (IAC-M-310, item 4).


2. IAC action on each of the above documents is therefore now complete.

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**IAC-D-95/6
23 October 1957**

3. A copy of the statement of policy, as approved by the IAC (IAC-D-95/5, 8 October), is attached for the information of the intelligence community and for guidance to the ad hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing.



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Secretary

Attachment

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IAC-D-95/5
8 October 1957
(Final - IAC Approved)

Policy Statement on Reproduction of Intelligence

Originated in Another IAC Agency

In order for the member agencies to discharge their responsibilities more effectively, and without intent to limit such broader authority or responsibility as any may now have under law or NSC directive, the Intelligence Advisory Committee is agreed:

- a. That each member agency, for purpose of central processing, may reproduce for itself, foreign intelligence and intelligence information originally issued by another.
- b. That such reproduction may be performed for another member agency if the intelligence or information was originally given general distribution to all IAC member agencies, or was otherwise made generally available to them.
- c. That intelligence or information which by reason of sensitivity bears special classifications or is for limited distribution, or which bears a special warning prohibiting reproduction, shall not be so reproduced.

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IAC-D-95/5
8 October 1957
(Final - IAC Approved)

Policy Statement on Reproduction of Intelligence

Originated in Another IAC Agency

In order for the member agencies to discharge their responsibilities more effectively, and without intent to limit such broader authority or responsibility as any may now have under law or NSC directive, the Intelligence Advisory Committee is agreed:

- a. That each member agency, for purpose of central processing, may reproduce for itself, foreign intelligence and intelligence information originally issued by another.
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- c. That intelligence or information which by reason of sensitivity bears special classifications or is for limited distribution, or which bears a special warning prohibiting reproduction, shall not be so reproduced.

IAC-D-95/5
26 September 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Policy Statement on Reproduction of Intelligence

Originated in Another IAC Agency

1. Pursuant to IAC direction, the ad hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing has reconsidered the draft policy statement on the reproduction by an IAC agency of intelligence which originated in another (IAC-D-95/4; IAC-M-307, item 4 b).

2. A redraft of the policy statement is attached. The Subcommittee on Information Processing recognizes that, on approval, it would have to arrive at certain supplementary agreements in order to implement the policy.

3. The Committee recommends that the IAC approve the policy statement as redrafted.

4. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting now scheduled for 1 October, for review and action on the Committee's recommendation.



Secretary

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IAC-D-95/5
26 September 1957

Policy Statement on Reproduction of Intelligence

Originated in Another IAC Agency

In order for the member agencies to discharge their responsibilities more effectively, and without intent to limit such broader authority or responsibility as any may now have under law or NSC directive, the Intelligence Advisory Committee is agreed:

- a. That each member agency, for purpose of central machine processing, may reproduce for itself, foreign intelligence and intelligence information originally issued by another.
- b. That such reproduction may be performed for another member agency if the intelligence or information was originally given general distribution to all IAC member agencies, or was otherwise made generally available to them.
- c. That intelligence or information which by reason of sensitivity bears special classifications or is for limited distribution, or which bears a special warning prohibiting reproduction, shall not be so reproduced.

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
IAC-D-95/4
10 September 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Interagency Arrangements for Reproduction of

Intelligence Information

The attached report, prepared by the IAC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing (AHIP), pursuant to direction of the IAC on 25 June 1957, will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for review and action with respect to the recommendations contained therein.



Secretary

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

4 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
FROM : Chairman, IAC Ad-Hoc Sub-Committee on Information Processing
SUBJECT : Inter-Agency Arrangements for Reproduction of Intelligence Information

1. In its discussion of the Second Annual Report of AHIP the IAC asked for further review of "the extent of restrictions or limitations on reproduction of intelligence" by IAC Agencies.

2. AHIP accordingly submits herewith its review of the principal regulations bearing on such reproduction. Also cited, in extension of its Second Annual Report, is paragraph 2 of the complete AHIP agreement which specifies the procedure IAC Agencies may employ to exclude any reproduction whatsoever of sensitive or other limited-dissemination material. TOP SECRET materials are, of course, separately controlled and, therefore, are not affected by this AHIP policy.

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Enclosure:

Memo for Chairman, IAC dated 4 Sept. 1957 - "Reproduction of Material Originated in Another IAC Agency."

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4 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Reproduction of Material Originated in Another IAC Agency

Introduction

On ²⁵ June 1957 the Intelligence Advisory Committee noted and approved the following paragraph 2 of the Second Annual Report of the IAC Ad-Hoc Sub-Committee on Information Processing as a temporary procedural guide:

"In order to handle intelligence reference data by Minicard and other machines and equipment of advanced design, the member Agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee are agreed among themselves that each of them may perform reproduction for themselves, or for each other, of foreign intelligence and intelligence information, originally issued by any of them, provided that in every case the document was originally given general distribution to all IAC member agencies, or originally was placed on a reading panel for all IAC member agencies to select from if they chose so to do."

The approval was subject to further review by AHIP and presentation of specific recommendations in this field for consideration by the IAC at a subsequent meeting. In compliance with this direction the following Staff Study is submitted:

1. Problem

a. New machine techniques and equipment for the handling of large masses of intelligence data are now coming into use. The Killian Committee and other groups have recommended that every effort be made to adapt the most advanced types of equipment to the needs of intelligence. New devices and systems are being developed each year for the purposes of information storage, retrieval, and computation, and each year will see more of them in use in the IAC community.

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C-468, Y-1, D-2-B-91, A-1.

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... All these new types of equipment involve extensive reproduction of the data which are fed into them. In many types the raw data must first be coded and then handled electronically or magnetically in numerical or binary digital form. In others the data are reproduced photographically, and this is most notably the case with the Microcard system which is now being installed in ADGK and CIA. Each agency which makes use of advanced equipment will be required to reproduce reports originated by other agencies of the IAC community and, unless blanket permission is granted in advance, the resulting procedures will be cumbersome and impractical to implement.

2. Facts Bearing Upon the Problem

"Executive Order 11501, Safeguarding Official Information in the Department of the Defense of the United States, in Section 7, Accountability and Dissemination, reads as follows:

"Knowledge or possession of classified defense information shall be permitted only to persons whose official duties require such access in the interest of promoting national defense and only if they have been determined to be trustworthy. Proper control of dissemination of classified defense information shall be maintained at all times, including good accountability records of classified defense information documents, and severe limitation on the number of such documents, originated as well as the number of copies thereof reproduced. The number of copies of classified defense information documents shall be kept to a minimum to decrease the risk of compromise of the information contained in such documents and the financial burden to the Government in protecting such documents. The following special rules shall be observed in connection with accountability for and dissemination of defense information or material:

3. Classification of Defense Information

"(a) Information Originating in Another Department or Agency:

"Except as otherwise provided by section 102 of the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, c. 343, 61 Stat. 498, as amended 50 U.S.C. sect. 403, classified defense information originating in another department or agency shall not be disseminated outside the receiving department or agency without the consent of the originating department or agency. Documents and material containing defense information which are classified Top Secret or Secret shall not be reproduced without the consent of the originating department or agency."

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b. Section 102 of the National Security Act reads in part:

"(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council ----

"(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities."

c. A Working Group on Reproduction Needs of Advanced Equipment for Information Storage and Retrieval was designated by the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Information Processing. An extract from the Final Report of that Working Group dated 10 July 1956, Subject: Minicard and the Application of the "Third Agency Rule" is as follows:

"In order to handle intelligence reference data by Minicard and other machines and equipment of advanced design, the member Agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee are agreed among themselves that each of them may perform reproduction for themselves, or for each other, of foreign intelligence and intelligence information, originally issued by any of them, provided that in every case the document was originally given general distribution to all IAC member agencies, or originally was placed on a reading panel for all IAC member agencies to select from if they chose so to do.

"In order to continue to safeguard all sensitive or other limited-dissemination material falling within the spirit of the "Third Agency Rule", the member agencies are agreed among themselves that such material will bear a special warning stamp which will exclude its reproduction into the Minicard or any other cooperative data handling system at all times."

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The Department of State in a memorandum dated 8 October 1956, Subject: "Authorization for IAC Agencies to Reproduce Certain State Department Documents", accepted the proposal and added the following proviso covering the reproduction of documents:

- "1. That each IAC agency maintain a separate record of the SECRET documents and another of the documents of lower security classification which it reproduced for its own or for the use of the other IAC agencies. These records should not only identify the documents reproduced but should also specify the date and the number of copies reproduced and their distribution outside the reproducing agency.
- "2. That copies of these records be submitted for the information of the Department on a monthly basis."

d. A copy of Department of State "Administrative Circular No. 122 dated June 14, 1957" implementing this agreement is attached.

3. Discussion

a. Executive Order 10501 Section 7, (c), implies recognition of an exception regarding the dissemination and reproduction of classified defense information originating in another department or agency by the Central Intelligence Agency. In the past the Agency has followed the practice of obtaining the consent of the originating Agency prior to dissemination of that material to another department or agency. Such material has been microfilmed in order to accomplish the initial supply and subsequent retrieval necessary for intelligence production. Recognition of the ability to retrieve rapidly is evidenced by the large number of requests for the interchange of copies of documents by members of the community.

b. It is evident from the tenor of the National Security Act of 1947, the Executive Order 10501, and the NSCID's that there should be a free and continuing interchange of intelligence and information within the Intelligence Community.

c. To accomplish this in a dexterous manner requires that all the IAC Member Agencies be able to reproduce and disseminate the intelligence and information in their respective files as necessary in the interests of the national defense.

d. It should be noted that Executive Order 10501, Section 7, (c) requires the consent of the originating agency when reproducing Top Secret and Secret material, thus implying that there is no prohibition of reproduction of Confidential material, Administratively Controlled material or Unclassified material.

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4. Recommendations

- a. That the IAC approve as permanent procedure the AHIP agreement as set forth in its Second Annual Report and restated below as 1.
- b. That the paragraph shown below as 2 be included in the approval of this policy:
 1. "In order to handle intelligence reference data by Minicard and other machines and equipment of advanced design, the member agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee are agreed among themselves that each of them may perform reproduction for themselves, or for each other, of foreign intelligence and intelligence information, originally issued by any of them, provided that in every case the document was originally given general distribution to all IAC member agencies, or originally was placed on a reading panel for all IAC member agencies to select from if they chose so to do."
 2. "In order to continue to safeguard all sensitive or other limited-dissemination material falling within the spirit of the "Third Agency Rule", the member agencies are agreed among themselves that such material will bear a special warning stamp which will exclude its reproduction into the Minicard or any other cooperative data handling system at all times."

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Chairman, AHIP

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Attachment

Dept. of State copy of "Administrative Circular No. 122 dated June 14, 1957"

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

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Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Administrative Circular No. 122
June 14, 1957

SUBJECT: Authorization for IAC Agencies to Reproduce Certain State Documents

1. Under provisions of Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of Executive Order 10501, November 5, 1953, the Department hereby authorizes any agency which is a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) to reproduce for its own use, or for the use of another IAC agency: (1) Intelligence Reports published by the Department's Intelligence Area which do not bear either or both a restrictive distribution or access indicator, and (2) Department of State documents such as telegrams, despatches and instructions the highest classification of which is SECRET and which bear a notation on their face that they were supplied on original distribution to the Department's Office of Libraries and Intelligence* (OLI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Army, Navy, and Air. Documents in this latter category which do not show (or the face thereof) distribution to all of these agencies may not be reproduced by a recipient agency without the specific prior approval of the Department of State.
2. In accordance with the provisions for proper accountability in Executive Order 10501, the Department will require:
 - a. That each IAC agency maintain a separate record of the SECRET documents and another of the documents of lower classification (including administratively controlled documents which are not subject to Executive Order 10501) which it reproduces for its own use or for the use of the other U.S. agencies. These records should not only identify the documents reproduced, but they also should specify the date and the number of copies reproduced and their distribution outside the reproducing agency.
 - b. That copies of these accountability records be submitted on a monthly basis for the information of the Department directed to the attention of the Chief, Division of Records Management, (RM).

(L/R)

State - II, Wash., D. C.

*Office of Libraries and Intelligence-Acquisition, (OLI)

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
IAC-D-95/3.1
27 June 1957
Limited Distribution

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

State Department Administrative Circular No. 122

References: (a) IAC-M-295, item 2
(b) IAC-D-95/3, 11 June

Attached for your information is a copy of State Department Administrative Circular No. 122 which Mr. Cumming made available to the Secretariat at the IAC meeting of 25 June for subsequent distribution to the members. As you will recall, this circular is designed to implement certain procedures adopted by the IAC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing (AHIP) which were discussed at that IAC meeting, and which the IAC agreed to review again after the presentation of further specific recommendations in this field by AHIP (IAC-M-295, item 2).



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Secretary

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IAC-D-95/3.1

27 June 1957

Limited Distribution

Department of State
Washington, D. C.Administrative Circular No. 122
June 14, 1957**SUBJECT: Authorization for IAC Agencies to Reproduce Certain
State Documents**

1. Under provisions of Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of Executive Order 10501, November 5, 1953, the Department hereby authorizes any agency which is a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) to reproduce for its own use, or for the use of another IAC agency: (1) Intelligence Reports published by the Department's Intelligence Area which do not bear either or both a restrictive distribution or access indicator, and (2) Department of State documents such as telegrams, despatches and instructions the highest classification of which is SECRET and which bear a notation on their face that they were supplied on original distribution to the Department's Office of Libraries and Intelligence* (OLI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Army, Navy, and Air. Documents in this latter category which do not show (on the face thereof) distribution to all of these agencies may not be reproduced by a recipient agency without the specific prior approval of the Department of State.
2. In accordance with the provisions for proper accountability in Executive Order 10501, the Department will require:
 - a. That each IAC agency maintain a separate record of the SECRET documents and another of the documents of lower classification (including administratively controlled documents which are not subject to Executive Order 10501) which it reproduces for its own use or for the use of the other IAC agencies. These records should not only identify the documents reproduced, but they also should specify the date and the number of copies reproduced and their distribution outside the reproducing agency.
 - b. That copies of these accountability records be submitted on a monthly basis for the information of the Department, directed to the attention of the Chief, Division of Records Management (RM).

(L/R)

State - FD, Wash., D. C.

*Office of Libraries and Intelligence-Acquisition. (OLI)

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**IAC-D-95/3
11 June 1957**

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Second Annual Report of

IAC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing

**Attached is a memorandum to the Chairman, IAC, from the
Chairman, IAC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing
(AHIP), enclosing a copy of the Second Annual Report by AHIP.
This report will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting,
for noting.**



Secretary

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27 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
FROM : Chairman, IAC Ad-Hoc Sub-Committee on Information Processing
SUBJECT : Second Annual Report, dated 27 May 1957

1. The IAC Ad-Hoc Sub-Committee on Information Processing hereby submits its Second Annual Report for information and approval.
2. The Sub-Committee has had an active and productive year with 50 meetings having been held by the Sub-Committee and its working groups.
3. The problems of information processing such as, numbering systems, codes, forms, reproduction, etc., present a challenging area within the IAC because of the vast amount of materials involved. For instance, the Agency last year received [redacted] copies of Non-CIA cables and airgrams.
4. As shown in the enclosed report, we are making progress in increasing the efficiency and economy of information processing within the IAC agencies.

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Enclosure

As stated above.

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AHIP-AR-2
27 May 1957

IAC AD-HOC SUB-COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION PROCESSING
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT

I. Authority

The IAC Ad-Hoc Sub-Committee on Information Processing was established pursuant to IAC action of 19 May 1955 to coordinate the development and implementation of compatible systems for documentation and processing of information within the intelligence community. The Committee is composed of representatives of the IAC agencies and invites other interested agencies to participate in matters which concern them. Chairmanship is provided by CIA. The AHIP Committee met 14 times and its Working Groups met 36 times during the twelve months.

II. Accomplishments

A. Working Groups:

The major portion of the Committee's mission was pursued through AHIP Working Groups established to investigate and recommend action on specifically identified problems. Seven Working Groups were in existence during 1956-1957. Two carried over from the first year, namely those investigating

Common Intelligence Report Format

Equipment Research.

A Working Group on "Reproduction Needs of Advanced Equipment for Information Storage and Retrieval" was established, completed its assignment and was dissolved before the end of the year.

Three new Working Groups and one Standing Group were established during the year and were beginning or continuing their investigations as of this date, namely:

Working Groups:

Document Security Indications
Area Classification Coding
Union List of Intelligence Serial
Publications

Standing Group:

Inter-Agency Document Loan Services

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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AHIP-AR-2
27 May 1957Common Intelligence Report Format; Chairman, [redacted] CIA.

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The Chairman announced in March the standardization within CIA of a common information report format. The prospects for IAC-wide standardization of document format, however, remain poor. The member agencies are committed through long usage to individualistic formats, index files and storage equipment representing substantial financial and other investments. Achievement of common practice will come, it now appears, through slow evolution or through the development and general adoption of a single superior system of perhaps electronic indexing and storage.

Equipment Research; Chairman, [redacted] CIA.

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During the year, the Chairman arranged for inter-agency briefings and/or equipment demonstration including:

Minicard.

Magnavox plans for a magnacard (film, magnetic tape) document storage and retrieval system.

Magnavox development of an automatic disseminator.

Actifilm - roll film to film card printer.

Closed circuit TV film scanning equipment.

Developmental film to paper printing equipment.

Plus briefer reporting on visits to development laboratories throughout the country.

Reproduction Needs of Advanced Equipment for Information Storage and Retrieval; Chairman, [redacted] NSA.

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AHIP records of 11 January 1957 reported, in part, the following: "In order to handle intelligence reference data by Minicard and other machines and equipment of advanced design, the member Agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee are agreed among themselves that each of them may perform reproduction for themselves, or for each other, of foreign intelligence and intelligence information, originally issued by any of them, provided that in every case the document was originally given general distribution to all IAC member agencies, or originally was placed on a reading panel for all IAC member agencies to select from if they chose so to do."

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AHIP-AR-2
27 May 1957

Document Security Indications; Chairman, [REDACTED] CIA.

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Eight recommendations relating to size, color, location and method of application of security indications have been developed by the Working Group and are now receiving final internal coordination by the member agencies.

Area Classification Coding; Chairman, [REDACTED] CIA.

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In recognition of prospective Minicard requirements and of various limitations in the Intellofax classification of pinpoint areas and of political blocs with shifting membership, this Working Group was established to conduct an inventory of area coding systems and to develop a new area code for IAC document indexing purposes. The Group has met sixteen times prior to the present date and is now nearing completion of a comprehensive area scheme.

Union List of Intelligence Serial Publications; Chairman,

[REDACTED] CIA.

25X1

This Group has completed and placed in the hands of an editor a draft publication listing all U.S. intelligence periodical publications and series published by IAC agencies in the Washington area. The compilation will be useful to analysts, librarians and dissemination personnel in the identification and control of these categories of intelligence literature.

Inter-Agency Document Loan Services; Chairman, [REDACTED], CIA.

25X1

This Working Group was established at the April meeting of AHIP to promote common procedures in inter-agency library document traffic. A principal benefit anticipated from this AHIP action is the pooling of specialized knowledge on procedures for identification, and control of the many hundreds of varieties of intelligence and open literature publications handled in IAC libraries.

III. Miscellaneous Activities

- a. In keeping with the Committee's responsibilities for publicizing existing systems, three meetings were devoted to tours of CIA's Biographic and Industrial Registers and to a briefing on the film-punched card library system recently established in the Signal Corps Intelligence Agency.

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AHIP-AR-2
27 May 1957

b. Adaptation and use of CIA's Intelligence Subject Code (ISC):

1. SHAPE Headquarters, Paris, decided in the late summer of 1956 on the adoption of the ISC for its document subject control purposes and in October [redacted] of CIA and Major John Sidenberg of AFOIN flew to Paris to assist in the initial arrangements for its use. 25X1
2. Army intelligence completed a draft revision of the 200 Section which is currently under review by the Chief of CIA's Analysis Branch.
3. OMNI is completing the final draft of the 300 Section, now enlarged to include Marine Corps requirements.
4. AFOIN has substantially completed the staffing and training of coding of Air documents for Minicard. [redacted] of CIA has been detailed to AFOIN approximately half-time over the past twelve months to advise on the above program. 25X1

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- d. The Army intelligence representative briefed the Committee on various occasions concerning a projected RCA contract for a survey of Army intelligence systems.

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
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*IAC-D-
95/2*

18 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Item 3 - Agenda of IAC for 19 June 1956

1. Item 3 on the Agenda is the First Annual Report of the IAC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing, (AHIP).
2. The Report describes problems which the AHIP committee has worked on during the past year.
3. No action by the IAC is needed at the present time on any matter referred to in the Report, and I suggest that the IAC merely note its receipt of the Annual Report.
4. Representatives of all participating IAC agencies have read and concurred in this First Annual Report.



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James M. Andrews
Assistant Director
Central Reference



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IAC-D-95/2
11 June 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

First Annual Report of the
IAC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing

The attached First Annual Report of the IAC Ad Hoc Sub-
committee on Information Processing, dated 23 May 1956, will
be placed on the agenda of an early meeting of the IAC for noting.



Secretary

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IAC-D-95/2
11 June 1956

IAC AD-HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFORMATION PROCESSING
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT

23 May 1956

I. Authority

The IAC Ad-Hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing was established pursuant to IAC action of 19 May 1955 to coordinate the development and implementation of compatible systems for documentation and processing of information within the intelligence community. The Committee is composed of representatives of the IAC agencies and invites other interested agencies to participate in matters which concern them. Chairmanship is provided by CIA.

II. Accomplishments

A. Study of existing document processing systems. The Subcommittee reviewed the document processing systems in the member organizations. These systems were found to vary widely in objectives, techniques and level of service afforded users.

B. Endorsed the CIA Library INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT CODE. The following members endorsed the CIA Library's Intelligence Subject Code for adaptation and use by the intelligence community in indexing documents: AFOIN, ACSI, ONI and NSA. In order to make the Intelligence Subject Code usable for the other agencies, pertinent sections of the Code are being adapted:

1. AFOIN has completed its revision of the 400 section. CIA Library approved and is now reprinting.
2. ONI has submitted its revision of the 300 section to CIA Library for approval.
3. ACSI has appointed a committee which is completing recommendations for the revision of the 200 section.

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11 June 1956

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[Redacted]

personnel on a consultative basis for projects of interest to the Subcommittee. One such project was presented by the Army member for assistance in data-handling problems encountered by the library of personality investigative files at Fort Holabird, Md. The Subcommittee approved the Army request and the Center has been requested to work with the Army.

D. Working Groups. As the need arose, the Subcommittee established Working Groups to resolve problems in specific areas. The Working Groups, their assignments and progress are described below.

1. **Working Group on a Common Inter-library Loan Form.** Chaired by Air Force this Working Group was charged with the preparation of a coordinated, single inter-library loan form to be used in the intelligence community. Form presented to AHIP for approval and adoption by the intelligence community. AHIP approved 19 March 1956; Working Group dissolved.
2. **Working Group on a Common Numbering System.** Chaired by NSA, the Working Group was assigned the responsibility for devising a common numbering system for use in all IAC agencies for accessioning information reports and intelligence documents. The Working Group presented its recommendations on 27 October 1955 that blocks of numbers be assigned to each IAC member agency, the system be put into effect and that the problem of serials be assigned to a working group for further study. AHIP approved the recommendations on 8 November 1955 and agreed that 1 July 1956 be the tentative date for putting these into effect. Working Group on a Common Numbering System dissolved.

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11 June 1956

3. Working Group on Control Numbering of Serial Publications. To study the inclusion of serial publications into a common numbering system another Working Group, chaired by CIA, was appointed. The recommendations of the Working Group were approved by AHIP on 30 January 1956: a) that intelligence serial publications be included in the common numbering system; b) that inter-agency cooperation in processing serial publications in this manner commence on a selective basis, because the problem of subject control is not uniform; and c) that in any mechanized system of processing it is important to provide for recovery of serial publications by title and issue. Working Group dissolved.
4. Working Group on Common Intelligence Report Format (WGIR). Established in December 1955, and chaired by CIA, this Working Group was asked to develop recommendations acceptable to the IAC regarding standardization of format of published intelligence reports. It was suggested further that the following also be considered: a) standard report size, b) use of color, c) identical working and location for items of same meaning, d) physical uniformity of reports, and e) systematic citation of inclosures. Because of the complexity of the problems assigned to this Working Group, it has attacked the various aspects in stages and is not yet ready to issue its final conclusions. Progress reports have been and will continue to be submitted.
5. Working Group on Equipment Research. Chaired by CIA, this Working Group was established to provide the members of AHIP with coordinated and evaluated information on technological advances in data processing equipment. The Working Group consists of representatives from member agencies thoroughly qualified to evaluate such equipment.

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11 June 1956

E. Participation in External Meetings. During the course of the year, members participated in the following meetings of interest to them in the course of their responsibilities as members of this Subcommittee:

1. Air Research and Development Command, Baltimore, Md. 15-16 Sept. 55. The Air Force held this symposium on data handling to acquaint its research and development people with current problems confronting the intelligence community in this field. Through such knowledge the Air Research and Development Command expected to improve its interpretation of the long-range technical requirements for meeting this need. Several members of the Subcommittee contributed substantially to the Symposium.
2. Conference on the Practical Utilization of Recorded Knowledge, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, 16-18 January 1956. The conference brought together some 500 technicians, librarians, electronic specialists and documentation experts to exchange ideas and information on equipment for data-processing. Many members of the Subcommittee attended to utilize this opportunity to see what the extra-intelligence people were doing along these lines.
3. Special Meeting on the Use of Geographic Grid Coding in Machine Data Handling Systems, Pentagon, 26 March 1956. The Air Force member recommended to AHIP consideration of its system of geographic grid coding for adoption by the community. The system permits mechanical recovery of information according to specific geographic location. An Air Force-sponsored special meeting was held to describe the details of this Geo Ref system, which would be used in addition to the CIA Intelligence Subject Code. Members of AHIP were asked to comment in writing with the result that some adaptation of the basic idea appeared certain

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IAC-D-95/2
11 June 1956

of sponsorship by AHIP. It was clear, however, that testing of Geo Ref in connection with Minicard was essential and that this could well delay a final AHIP decision for another 6-12 months.

F. Minicard. Air Force and CIA have contracts with the Eastman Kodak Co. for the development of a system, known as Minicard, to retrieve information from large masses of intelligence data efficiently and quickly. Members of AHIP are keeping themselves currently informed on all phases of the Air Force and CIA experimentation with the Minicard equipment, some of which has been delivered to the Air Force in April 1956 with additional equipment scheduled for delivery during the rest of the year. Research and development continue on auxiliary equipment to be used with Minicard, such as closed-loop TV.

[Redacted]
Chairman

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IAC-D-95/1
27 September 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Status Report to the IAC on Information Processing

1. There is attached a Status Report to the IAC from the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Information Processing.
2. This matter has been placed on the Agenda of the IAC meeting on 4 October for noting and for such action as may be required.



Acting Secretary

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IAC-D-95/1

27 September 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, IAC
FROM: Chairman, AHIP
SUBJECT: AHIP Status Report
REFERENCE: IAC-D-95

1. The IAC Ad-Hoc Sub-Committee on Information Processing has had ten meetings since it was established pursuant to IAC action of 19 May 1955. Under the directive of the IAC the sub-committee agreed upon its terms of reference as follows:

to coordinate the development and implementation of compatible systems for documentation and processing of information within the intelligence community.

2. Activities and achievements of the Sub-Committee to date:

a) Document processing systems of each participating agency were described in detail.



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- c) Endorsement of the CIA Library's Intelligence Subject Code for adaptation and use by the intelligence community in indexing documents was received from AFCON, C-2, ONI, and NSA. State and USIA are studying the problem further.
- d) Most of the members of the Sub-Committee participated in a symposium on Data Handling, sponsored by Air Research and Development Command in Baltimore, 15-16 September 1955.

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3. Conclusions and Plans.

- a) The Sub-Committee has substantially completed its review of existing systems. These have been found to vary widely in objectives, techniques and level of service afforded users.
- b) The Sub-Committee has not yet examined in any detail the many proposed processing systems based on equipment now at the laboratory stage of research and development. However, a system known as Minicard which utilizes film and electronic controls to store and retrieve information now appears certain to receive extensive testing and application in some of the IAC agencies. Its practical application appears 3 - 5 years away.
- c) Under these circumstances the Sub-Committee considers as useful immediate projects:
 - 1) programs to familiarize the intelligence community with Minicard, including subject coding of documents and film management.
 - 2) exploration of interim measures to promote economy and efficiency in present IAC document systems.
- d) The Sub-Committee proposes to continue its long-range study of document handling systems and related projects.



Chairman

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4 May 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

SUBJECT : Briefing Note on the Establishment of an IAC
Sub-Committee on Information Processing

We believe that CIA should endorse establishment of an IAC Sub-Committee on Information Processing to give policy-level support and coordinated guidance to documentation programs in the member agencies.

CIA's own program is the most extensive in the community at the present time. Since 1947 we have engaged continuously in active search of new techniques and equipment which would facilitate the retrieval of information from large masses of intelligence data. CIA's INTELLOFAX system, which operates in OCD, serves all agencies of the intelligence community.

The adoption of uniform standards for indexing, filing, and finding documents produced by the member agencies is certain, in the long run, to result in more effective use of all collected intelligence information, and in conservations of space and manpower.

At the working level, CIA representatives have met frequently with members of other agencies to discuss community documentation programs. For example, there has been the closest cooperation, on an almost daily basis, between CIA and the Air Force in the development of a common system of indexing. Air Force has entered into an \$850,000 contract with Eastman Kodak Company ("MINICARD") for the manufacture of special filing and selection machines which when built will be compatible with CIA's system; OCD has under consideration a proposal to convert its INTELLOFAX equipment to MINICARD in the interest of achieving inter-agency benefits which will accrue from common processing and exchange of materials.

General Trudeau rightly suggests, however, that these working relationships have not produced IAC-wide decisions concerning an integrated community library system. We believe that the time is now ripe for such integration, policy-wise, and would expect IAC coordination to be of material assistance to the member agencies in arriving at such decisions with confidence, and in the knowledge that all alternatives had been fully explored before making the extensive commitments involved.

RECOMMENDATION. That the proposed Sub-Committee be established and that it be chaired by the CIA representative.

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Acting Assistant Director, C&D

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D R A F T

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUB-COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION PROCESSING
Proposed Terms of Reference

Objectives:

To coordinate the documentation and processing of information within the intelligence community in order to develop compatible and efficient systems of reference for improvement of internal reference and cross distribution.

Membership:

A member from each IAC agency who has broad perspective over the problems of the intelligence family as a whole, and who is authorized to speak for his agency on policy matters related to information processing.

11. A

General Duties:

Supporting, coordinating and promoting efforts by the member agencies to develop compatible improvements in the documentation and processing of information.

Typical Duties:

Formulates guiding policy based upon studies and reports submitted by member agencies.

Insures the sharing among agencies of available information related to solution of problems, including studies, researches, development contracts, proposed actions and agreements, seminars, demonstrations, and publications.

Assists in the coordination of joint efforts and interests, allocation of obtainable help, and designation of official liaison and contact points.

Monitors inter-agency agreements and recommendations based upon resolutions or proposals from member agencies.

D R A F T

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IAC-D-95

3 May 1955

C O P Y

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

22 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Documentation and Processing of Intelligence Information (U)

1. The Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is exploring means of improving intelligence library service and information processing. Other agencies have similar problems and are making similar efforts. All of us appreciate the value of working together, but at working levels the problems of an individual agency are paramount. It is recognized that uncoordinated working of the same ground by a number of agencies is at least partly wasteful and the operation of several incompatible systems by various agencies would be uneconomical and inefficient.
2. Independent, or partly coordinated, studies are in progress in several agencies. These point toward independent recommendations on basic system and method which will have far-reaching effect upon agency operations and relationships. Thus, it is evident that a documentation and processing problem exists which should be recognized formally and coordinated at the policy-making level in order to serve best the needs of the intelligence family of agencies.
3. It is recommended that the IAC establish a Sub-Committee on Information Processing for the purpose of giving policy-level support and coordinated guidance to the development of compatible improvements in the documentation and processing of information by member agencies.

/s/

ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
Major General, GS
A. C. of S., G-2

IAC-D-95

3 May 1955

IAC-D-95
3 May 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Documentation and Processing of
Intelligence Information

1. There is circulated herewith a memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, recommending the establishment of an IAC Sub-Committee on Information Processing.
2. This matter will be placed on the agenda for consideration at an early meeting of the IAC.

[Redacted Box]
Secretary

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IAC-D-95
3 May 1955

IAC-D-95
3 May 1955

C O P Y

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

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2. Independent, or partly coordinated, studies are in progress in several agencies. These point toward independent recommendations on basic system and method which will have far-reaching effect upon agency operations and relationships. Thus, it is evident that a documentation and processing problem exists which should be recognized formally and coordinated at the policy-making level in order to serve best the needs of the intelligence family of agencies.
3. It is recommended that the IAC establish a Sub-Committee on Information Processing for the purpose of giving policy-level support and coordinated guidance to the development of compatible improvements in the documentation and processing of information by member agencies.

/s/

ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
Major General, GS
A. C. of S., G-2

IAC-D-95
3 May 1955

IAC-D-94/1
10 July 1956
IAC-Approved
7 August 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Survey of NIE Dissemination and Use

References: IAC-D-94 and IAC-M-186, item 4

1. The attached Survey of NIE Dissemination and Use was prepared by the Board of National Estimates pursuant to IAC-D-94.

2. The Board recommended:


a. That the IAC note this report.

b. That each member of the IAC reexamine its pattern of NIE distribution with the end of continuing to improve the usefulness of NIE's to the policy, planning and executive branches of his agency.

c. That each IAC agency undertake to brief new key officials-(NIE consumers) within its department on the nature of the NIE and the means at the disposal of these officials for initiating NIE's responsive to specific intelligence problems they may have.

d. That the IAC agencies continue to work toward remedying the limitations noted in paragraph 9 of the Conclusions and submit for IAC consideration any proposals they may have for doing so.

3. On 7 August 1956, the IAC noted the Board's report and approved the above recommendations.



Secretary

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
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I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Memorandum for the Intelligence Advisory Committee

Subject: NIE Survey of Dissemination and Use

**The attached revised page 33 of the Survey of NIE Dissemination
and Use (IAC-D-94/1, 10 July 1956) supersedes the corresponding
page in the text now in your possession.**



Secretary

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

13 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT : IAC-D-94/1, Survey of NIE Dissemination and Use

The attached revised covering memorandum and revised pages 27, 28, 30 and 31 of the Survey of NIE Dissemination and Use (IAC-D-94/1, 10 July 1956) supersede the corresponding pages in the text now in your possession. On 7 August 1956, the IAC noted the report and approved the recommendations (IAC-M-251, item 10).



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Secretary

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IAC-D-94/1
10 July 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Survey of NIE Dissemination and Use

Reference: IAC-D-94 and IAC-M-186, item 4

1. Pursuant to IAC-D-94, the Board of National Estimates has completed the attached Survey of NIE Dissemination and Use. The Board recommends:

a. That the IAC note this report.

b. That each member of the IAC reexamine its pattern of NIE distribution with the end of continuing to improve the usefulness of NIE's to the policy, planning and executive branches of his agency.

c. That each IAC agency undertake to brief new key officials (NIE consumers) within its department on the nature of the NIE and the means at the disposal of these officials for initiating NIE's responsive to specific intelligence problems they may have.

d. That the IAC agencies continue to work toward remedying the limitations noted in paragraph 9 of the Conclusions and submit for IAC consideration any proposals they may have for doing so.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda for an early IAC meeting.



Secretary

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IAC-D-94/1
10 July 1956

SURVEY OF NIE DISSEMINATION AND USE


Prepared by the
Board of National Estimates
Central Intelligence Agency

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IAC-D-95
3 May 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Documentation and Processing of
Intelligence Information



1. There is circulated herewith a memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, recommending the establishment of an IAC Sub-Committee on Information Processing.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda for consideration at an early meeting of the IAC.

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Secretary

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IAC-D-95
3 May 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(1562)

IAC-D- 94/1
10 July 1956

PREFACE

This Survey of NIE Dissemination^{1/} and Use was initially suggested by the Board of National Estimates, which believed that in the light of four years' experience with the production of National Intelligence Estimates, it was worthwhile to conduct an informal survey of the use which various consumers outside the intelligence community itself made of NIE's. The Director of Central Intelligence proposed that the Board undertake such a survey and report its findings to the IAC (IAC-D-94). The IAC concurred in this procedure on 1 March 1955 (IAC-M-186, 1 March 1955).

The survey was conducted by the Board of National Estimates in cooperation with the IAC agencies, in two stages. The first stage was a written questionnaire to all offices and agencies receiving NIE's which was designed to reveal the extent to which these estimates received further dissemination within each agency. The results are summarized in Part I (see Tab A for a list of those participating).

^{1/} Dissemination is used herein to mean the delivery of the printed NIE, i.e., direct dissemination.

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The following limitations on the survey should be borne in mind:

a. It was not designed to obtain opinions regarding the adequacy of NIE content or judgments on possible changes to make NIE's more useful.

b. The number of valid over-all generalizations that can be made is limited by the variations in the survey coverage of the agencies and departments, the different types of NIE's, and the uses to which they are put.

The primary goal of the survey was the limited one of establishing the distribution pattern of NIE's and of shedding light on the kinds of uses to which they are put.

The cut-off date for information on which this report is based was 20 April 1956.

TAC-D-94/1
10 July 1956

CONCLUSIONS

1. An average of 249 NIE's^{3/} are distributed on a regular basis to the White House, the National Security Council, the Operations Coordinating Board, and the major departments and agencies with national security responsibilities. Many of these are further distributed to major commands and missions outside Washington, both overseas and in the US. Selected NIE's go to the US Information Agency, the Federal Civil Defense Agency, the Department of Commerce, and



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2. In most of these agencies, nearly all NIE's are distributed to offices with over-all responsibilities in the national security field, and selected NIE's are disseminated to lower echelons with narrower responsibilities on a need-to-know basis. NIE's also receive substantial indirect dissemination in most agencies through being incorporated, attributed or unattributed, in staff briefings memoranda, or in materials assembled for work on specific problems.

3/ Number of Top Secret NIE's distributed is less; see footnote 4 on page 10.

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10 July 1956

3. Most top-level executives (the President and Department or Agency heads) see only the relatively few NIE's which are selected for them by their intelligence and screening officers, and then they usually read only the conclusions, briefs, or selected portions. The exceptions are most likely to be those NIE's dealing with crisis situations requiring urgent and high-level policy decisions.

4. However, NIE's are extensively read by second and third echelon officials in the White House staff and in the NSC and OCB staffs which require coordinated national intelligence in dealing with national security problems which transcend the interests of a single agency or department.

5. NIE's are also used in major departments and agencies by various staffs responsible for national security planning and execution. The extent of use tends to vary according to the applicability and timeliness of a given NIE to the problem at hand, the user's access to alternative or complementary sources of intelligence, and the degree to which the users are concerned with problems transcending the interests of their respective departments or agencies.

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6. However, aside from possible indirect dissemination, it appears that some NIE's do not reach all of the departmental policy or planning levels or other key officials who might find them useful. Some of those interviewed indicated that they had not seen particular NIE's which appeared pertinent to their responsibilities. In some instances, this appeared to result from the failure of those in their immediate offices to pass the NIE's on to their chiefs; in others, the criteria for distribution appeared to be overly restrictive.

7. Although a number of NIE's are used in working on specific planning and policy problems, they are more generally used for background purposes. In addition, the distribution of the collective judgments of the intelligence community at nearly all levels of the government performs a function that is important, though quantitatively difficult to measure, in facilitating both the formulation and execution of national security policy.

8. The majority of NIE users interviewed indicated that the format and problem coverage of NIE's are generally adequate for their purposes, though many expressed dissatisfaction with certain aspects

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of some NIE's. The survey obtained such expressions of opinion only as a by-product, and there is not sufficient evidence to serve as a basis for recommending changes.

9. Some of the limitations on NIE use mentioned in the survey include:

a. Some NIE's are too long to permit their being read in full by top-level executives, and even by some interested executives in the support echelons.

b. On the other hand, the generality of some NIE's limits their usefulness, especially to lower echelons responsible for detailed foreign policy planning and execution.

c. Some NIE's are not relevant or timely enough for use in working on specific policy problems.

d. Some officials feel that if NIE's placed more emphasis on the consequence of US courses of action they would be of more use in weighing the advantages or disadvantages of various alternative courses open to the US.


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10 July 1956

PART I

DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

1. Initial Dissemination. CIA undertakes the printing and initial dissemination of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) once they have been approved by the IAC. Normally, 316 copies of each Secret NIE^{4/} are printed. Of this total, some 67 are retained within CIA for central reference, vital document storage, and reserve. The remaining 249^{5/} copies are initially disseminated as follows:^{6/}



*Includes the members of the NSC, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the NSC Secretariat and Staff.

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
After IAC approval and sanitization, if appropriate, CIA also makes
direct dissemination of selected NIE's [redacted]

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2. Onward Dissemination. The copies of each NIE are delivered en bloc to the receiving agencies, which are responsible for onward dissemination to selected officials or officers in Washington, elsewhere in the US and outside the country. In all the receiving agencies which have an intelligence staff, that component receives the NIE's initially, retains a certain number for its own use, and forwards

Flow of NIE's



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* All breakdowns are based on total number of copies of Secret NIE's normally printed. All figures are approximate.

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
the remainder to selected recipients according to the problem, area, or subject addressed. The intelligence component is also responsible for enforcing any special restrictions on NIE onward dissemination. No standard distribution list for NIE's is used by any of the receiving agencies, but certain officers are always on the list for all NIE's. In the receiving agencies without a full-time intelligence staff, NIE's usually go to a designated officer who performs the onward dissemination and general control functions.

-
- 4/ Only 296 copies of Top Secret NIE's are ordinarily printed. Even fewer copies of special request or special classification NIE's are printed. For consistency in text and statistical breakdowns, the base figure of 316 is used in this report.
 - 5/ The total number of copies distributed varies because JIG and CIA receive extra copies of certain NIE's, and because FCDA receives copies of selected NIE's. Under "special IAC approval," 4 copies are sent to USIA, and one copy of every NIE sanitized for [redacted] is forwarded to the USNMR at SHAPE via the Army ACSI. These, the NIE's distributed to foreign governments, and other special releases, are drawn from the reserve stock in CIA.
 - 6/ The figures in this and the following charts are averages. The number of copies disseminated of any given NIE may vary considerably depending on its subject matter.

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3. Retention in Intelligence Staffs. Of the 249 copies of each NIE normally delivered to the receiving agencies in Washington, about 93 copies are retained in the intelligence areas or staffs. The average number of copies retained is as follows:



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In addition to those copies retained by the intelligence staffs of the IAC agencies, a few copies are retained by the small intelligence staffs of various non-IAC recipients. For example, the copy sent to the President is normally retained by the Staff Secretary for Intelligence, two copies are kept in the Intelligence Staff of the Operations Coordinating Board, one in the International Cooperation Administration, and one in the National Indications Center.

4. NIE Delivery to Potential End-Users in Washington.

Ordinarily, 99 copies are forwarded to potential end-users in Washington. An examination of the distribution of these copies provides additional information of a general nature on who uses NIE's and what uses are actually made of them. An average of 74 of these copies are sent to potential end-users in the IAC agencies (see chart). Nearly all the 25 copies forwarded to potential end-users outside the IAC agencies go to officers in the area of the government primarily concerned with the final stages of policy formulation. Of these, 5 copies go to the White House and the President's Special Assistants, 18 go to the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board, and 2 go to the International Cooperation Administration.


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Thus, of the 99 copies forwarded to potential end-users in Washington, about three-fourths go via IAC members to officers in their respective departments who are concerned with either the formulation or the execution of US foreign policy. Nearly all the rest of the NIE's go to officers in the area of the government primarily concerned with the final stages of US foreign policy formulation and decision.

To Potential End-Users in Washington




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5. NIE Dissemination Outside Washington. Normally, 57 copies of NIE's are forwarded to US missions or headquarters outside Washington, most of them outside the country. About 45 copies are ordinarily sent to US officers who are stationed in overseas installations or who represent the US in international organizations; the remainder are sent to military commands in the US outside of Washington. These NIE's are forwarded by the responsible IAC agency according to the area and the problem covered. Of the total so delivered, the Department of State normally sends about 9 copies, the Department of the Army, about 17, the Department of the Navy, 7, the Department of the Air Force, 12. CIA normally forwards 2 copies to the US Supreme Commander at SHAPE, 3 copies to CIA operational representatives, and about 7 to other representatives.

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To US Missions and Headquarters Outside Washington



TOTAL - 57*

- * See paras. 44-48. Ordinarily, NIE's sent overseas to one departmental representative are available to representatives of other services in the area.

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PART II

RECEIPT, READERSHIP, AND USE

A. The White House and the President's Special Assistants

7. Six copies of NIE's are received by the White House staff.

Copies of each are routed to: (a) the Staff Secretary for Intelligence, (b) the Office of the Special Assistant for Psychological Affairs, and (c) the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament Matters. The Office of the Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Affairs receives only those NIE's relating to specific and assigned problems. —^{9/}

8. The President himself sees only those NIE's which are selected for him by the Staff Secretary for Intelligence or those which he asks for after having been briefed on their contents. In the majority of cases the President relies on the briefings of NIE's, either oral or written, prepared by the Staff Secretary for Intelligence. The Director

9/ The Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Matters is considered a part of the NSC, inasmuch as the Special Assistant is Chairman of the NSC Planning Board.

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of Central Intelligence also occasionally briefs on NIE's at NSC meetings. The President regards NIE's as important to him in several respects. Primarily, NIE's are valuable because they represent the best possible resolution at the intelligence level of differences among most departments and agencies participating in initial formulation and execution of US foreign policy, i. e., completed staff work. The President also regards as useful those NIE's which deal with specific foreign policy problems on which he is currently working. Finally, the President makes use of the small number of NIE's which contain new information, a new approach, or some new ideas and interpretations.

9. The Special Assistants for Psychological Affairs, ^{10/} for Disarmament Matters, and for Economic Affairs are not ordinarily first-hand recipients of NIE's. NIE's are first used in varying degrees by the ranking officer in each office. Thus, the impact that NIE's have on the Special Assistants depends almost entirely on the extent to which their subordinates use the NIE's in doing the necessary staff

10/ At the time this was office of Mr. Nelson Rockefeller.

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work for their principals and the President.

10. The ranking officers on the staffs of the White House Special Assistants read the conclusions of virtually all NIE's received. In this way, they learn the collective judgment of the intelligence community on the important problems of the day and are in a position to determine whether further use can be made of the NIE. The extent to which they go on to read the Discussion depends upon a variety of factors and generalizations are difficult. How thoroughly an NIE will be read and used often depends on such intangibles as the amount of time available when the NIE arrives, how much or little the receiving officer happens to know about the subject, and the receiving officer's estimate of his superior's interest and requirements. However, the most important factor determining how thoroughly an NIE is read by White House staff officers is its subject matter and its applicability, both in substance and timeliness, to the work of the reader.

11. Thus, the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament Matters and the President's Staff Secretary for Intelligence use NIE's more extensively than the Office of the Special Assistants for

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Psychological Affairs and Economic Affairs. Few NIE's directly treat the problems with which the latter offices are concerned, and most readers found them only of "some" 11/ use for background purposes. On the other hand, a wide range of NIE's (some of them specifically requested) are the only source of agreed intelligence judgment and information essential to the work of the Assistant for Disarmament Matters.

B. The National Security Council and Planning Board

12. This section deals with the receipt of NIE's and their use in the production of NSC papers, and will not describe the use made of NIE's by the individual members of the NSC. Sixteen copies are received by the National Security Council and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Matters. The Special Assistant, the Secretary of the NSC, and the Deputy Secretary all receive copies of all NIE's. The majority of the NSC staff members also regularly receive copies of all NIE's. Selected NIE's are brought to the attention of the Council members.

11/ The use rating was "great, considerable, some, little, or none."

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13. All recipients in the NSC Secretariat regularly read the conclusions of all NIE's and in the majority of cases read the text as well. The NIE's which receive the closest attention are those which deal with a problem with which the Planning Board or the NSC is currently engaged.

14. Apart from the use made by members of the NSC and its Planning Board within their respective departments (covered below), it should be noted that the NSC and the Planning Board do use the NIE's directly. The Director of Central Intelligence frequently uses NIE's in his weekly oral briefing of the NSC. NIE's are used by the CIA representative at Planning Board meetings. NIE's are also the intelligence contributions to NSC policy papers, on occasion being incorporated in part verbatim in the NSC text.

15. The importance of NIE's to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the NSC Secretariat derives primarily from their need for the collective judgments of the intelligence community. Just as their major preoccupation is with matters transcending the responsibility of one agency or department, so they

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require fully coordinated national intelligence. Similarly, the close relationship between the intelligence estimate of the situation and the US policy with regard to that situation causes the NSC staff to study closely and rely heavily on NIE's. In summary, the majority of users of NIE's in the NSC staff and secretariat consider them of great value because they express the intelligence community's collective judgment, provide useful background information, and are used directly in working on NSC policy papers.

C. NSC Net Evaluation Subcommittee

16. The NSC Net Evaluation Subcommittee relies almost exclusively on NIE's for its intelligence support. The nature of its work requires that the intelligence it uses be fully coordinated national intelligence. Several NIE's are prepared expressly for the NES. For these reasons, the NIE's which deal with Soviet capabilities for attack on the US are carefully and thoroughly read and frequently referred to by all members of the NES staff during the preparation of the annual NES report.

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D. The Operations Coordinating Board

17. This section deals with the receipt and use of NIE's by the OCB secretariat and staff. NIE use by the OCB members themselves will be treated under the appropriate departmental or agency section. The OCB secretariat and staff receives four copies of all NIE's. The Executive Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Chief of the Intelligence Staff each receive a copy, and all officers working on special projects receive NIE's which deal with the problem they are working on. All recipients read the conclusions of all NIE's and in the great majority of cases the full text as well. The Executive Secretary reads the full text of those NIE's which bear on problems on which OCB is currently working. He often reads extensively in other NIE's as well as a means of clarifying his own thinking about the range of foreign policy problems for which OCB is or may become responsible.

18. NIE's contribute significantly to the effectiveness of the work of the OCB secretariat. They provide useful background information, make available the collective judgment of the intelligence

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community for use in preparing OCB progress reports, and to a lesser extent supply judgments and information not available elsewhere. However, NIE's are not as extensively used by the OCB as they are by the NSC Planning Board and secretariat. The principal reasons for this are: (a) the major portion of OCB's work and papers is organized on a country basis and therefore a number of the functional or generalized NIE's are of little direct use; (b) OCB progress reports are issued periodically and there is not always an up-to-date NIE available at the time when it could be used to greatest advantage; (c) frequently OCB reports require more detailed information than is contained in the average NIE; (d) OCB receives more intelligence from sources other than NIE's than does the NSC secretariat.

E. The Department of State

19. The Special Assistant for Intelligence (R) forwards an average of seven copies of each NIE to various users throughout the Department, the number varying with the subject matter. He normally forwards a summary of each NIE to the Secretary of State and Under Secretary with the full estimate attached. Copies of the Advance

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Conclusions are frequently forwarded when the NIE is especially timely. In this form the Secretary and Under Secretary see the gist of a high proportion of NIE's. Occasionally a particularly important NIE on an urgent problem will also be brought to their personal attention by another member of their staff, by the Assistant Secretary for an area, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, or by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Secretary thus makes use of NIE's as another source of information in handling a particular problem of the moment. In some cases the Secretary and the Under Secretary also receive the substance of appropriate NIE's as part of their morning briefings.

20. The Director, Policy Planning Staff, receives all NIE's. Initially, he reads only selected NIE's and selectively in them. Subsequently, he reads conclusions and text of almost all NIE's and devotes particular attention to those which pertain to particular foreign policy problems he is engaged on. He considers NIE's as essential for personal background and for working on specific foreign policy problems.

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21. NIE's are routed to other areas in the Department largely on a geographic basis. The "R" Area sends to each Assistant Secretary those NIE's which concern his area. Valid generalizations concerning the extent to which NIE's are read are difficult because of such varying factors as: (a) other demands on the recipient's time when the NIE's are received; (b) the applicability of the NIE to the problems confronting the reader at the moment; and (c) the degree of the recipient's prior knowledge of the subject of the NIE. In comparison with users in the military agencies, the State Department readers in area offices tend to rely less on NIE's for personal information. This is so in part because State officials are already intimately familiar with the political, economic, and social analyses which form a large portion of NIE's and in part because they receive a larger daily flow of information about their area of concern. Nevertheless, NIE's are thought to be of "considerable"^{12/} value at all levels by most of the officers working on specific foreign policy problems, particularly in

12/ The rating range was "great, considerable, some, little, or none."¹³

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the preparation of drafts for the NSC Planning Board, which are of the same level of generality as NIE's. NIE's also have considerable value as a reference to the collective judgment of the intelligence community.

F. The Department of Defense^{13/}

22. The Joint Intelligence Group forwards an average of three NIE's to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Little information was forthcoming on the end use of these NIE's.

23. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An average of 12 NIE's are distributed to non-intelligence users in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have little information as to which individuals in the various offices of the Joint Chiefs read NIE's. The JIG questionnaire indicates, however, that (a) only the conclusions are usually read in the office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of

13 The Survey at the Department of Defense and JCS level was conducted by the Joint Intelligence Group on the basis of written questionnaires. The returns give a far less thorough picture of NIE receipt, readership, and use than was obtained by interview for other departments and agencies.

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Defense for Special Operations, in the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and in the office of the Chairman, JCS; (b) the entire estimate is "sometimes" read in the office for NSC Affairs and in the Joint Logistic Plans Group; and (c) the entire text is "usually" read in the office of NSC Affairs and in the Joint Strategic Plans Group.

24. Answers to the JIG questionnaire indicate that NIE's are read primarily for personal background and information, with only three of the seven offices responding indicating that NIE's were consistently used for working on specific problems. The answers give no clear indication of the reasons for this. For example, one office which replied that it consistently used NIE's for working on a specific problem also replied that the substance of NIE's was not adequate for its purposes. The most frequently mentioned limitation on NIE's was that they were too general.

25. In addition to their direct use by end recipients, many NIE's are extensively used by the Joint Intelligence Group in the preparation of the political and economic portions of JIC papers and of various JIG briefings and memoranda.

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26. Of the 50 copies of NIE's sent to the Department of the Army, an average of 23 are forwarded by AC of S, Intelligence (G-2), to offices and individuals in Washington directly responsible for those aspects of Army plans and operations which concern or are affected by developments abroad. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff receive a copy of all NIE's; each NIE so forwarded has a one-page summary prepared by G-2 which includes the NIE's major conclusions.

27. One difficulty in assessing the impact of NIE's in the Department of the Army stems from the variety of ways in which their contents are brought to the attention of the top Department officials. For example, the substance of a newly published NIE is almost always included in the weekly briefing by G-2 which is attended by top officials of the Department. The major conclusions of all NIE's are also included in "black books" which are prepared for various officials either for their background information or for their use in dealing with a particular problem. Finally, in providing intelligence support for Department officials, including the weekly briefings mentioned above,

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G-2 will often rely heavily on NIE's even though the end product does not specifically indicate such reliance.

28. The following Army officials receive and read with varying degrees of thoroughness the majority of NIE's: Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, Assistant Secretary of Civilian-Military Affairs, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. In most cases, the NIE's are first screened by personal staff subordinates, who will check or side-line appropriate portions. The thoroughness with which an NIE is read by the principals appears to depend upon a number of factors which include: (a) their individual working habits and interests; (b) the timeliness and applicability of a given NIE to problems currently confronting them; (c) their need for joint community judgments; i. e., in preparing for NSC meetings or intelligence conferences or papers with other countries; and (d) the extent to which their attention is flagged by their screeners. Although the survey material is inadequate to permit firm generalizations, as a general rule NIE's have the greatest impact at this level in the Army when they deal with important matters affecting over-all Army plans and policy (the impact of nuclear parity), treat subjects affecting the Army

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which are particularly controversial (the fall of Dien Bien Phu), or affect plans for the disposition of Army resources (Yugoslavia, Baghdad Pact, Korea).

29. NIE's are more extensively used in G-3 than in any other office of the Department of the Army. It is here that relevant NIE's are often used as an integral part of the process of preparing Army plans. Frequently, estimates in NIE's form the basis for the assumptions upon which Army plans are prepared. The level of generality in an NIE is adequate in most cases for the work done in G-3, and where it isn't supplementary detailed information is obtained from G-2. All G-3 desk officers receive all NIE's which pertain to the problems they are assigned.

30. In summary, the chief uses to which NIE's are put in the Department of the Army seem to be as a reference to the collective judgments of the intelligence community, as a convenient source of personal background information on a variety of subjects affecting Army policy and programs, and as a useful tool for working out specific Army or national foreign policy problems.

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H. The Department of the Air Force

31. AFOIN regularly forwards 12 NIE's to Air Force offices in Washington. These include the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, as well as the major components charged with planning and operational responsibilities in the field.

32. The Secretary of the Air Force is shown only a limited number of NIE's. These are selected for him largely on the basis of providing him with the collective judgment of the intelligence community on joint military planning matters which have direct and important implications for the Air Force.

33. A small number of NIE's are brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, when in the opinion of AFOIN, they pertain to Air Force matters, allude to particularly interesting political developments, or contain interesting dissents. They read those portions of NIE's which are brought to their attention largely for personal background and so that they may be aware of collective judgments on matters of concern to them. The Director,

AFOIN, finds that NIE's have not been of as much direct use as desirably they might be in dealing with the responsibilities of the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, in decision making, or establishing a position in dealing with other officials. NIE's have been useful in supplementing other information. The Director, AFOIN, believes that NIE's would be more useful to the Air Force leadership if they more clearly identified things that are causative in certain situations in such terms as to give action people the best chance to decide whether they should prepare against these things, destroy or reduce them, increase them, or take no action. NIE's are also used in connection with Joint Strategic Plans and in preparing special studies to be referred to the Chief of Staff.

I. The Department of the Navy

34. On an average, ONI forwards 10 copies of all NIE's to non-intelligence echelons, including the offices of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Politico-Military Policy Division, and the Strategic Plans Division. In all these offices, NIE's are screened by qualified staff members before further distribution is made.

35. The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations make direct use of only a limited number of NIE's. In general, they

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rely primarily for their intelligence on briefings by their departmental staffs. In most cases, these staffs use NIE's in preparing intelligence material for the SECNAV and CNO and attributed briefs of newly published NIE's are included in the twice-weekly ONI briefings. However, the SECNAV and CNO only occasionally are told what portions of their briefings stem directly from NIE's or other estimates, and then only when the briefing concerns a special problem on which they are working. Certain NIE's may be selected by their aides or forwarded by the various staff divisions as being of particular interest. When so forwarded, the entire estimate is usually read, with particular reference to the noted portions. The principal criteria for selecting NIE's for forwarding directly to the SECNAV and the CNC are relevance to current problems where the collective judgment of the community is important and which have a direct bearing on national decisions importantly affecting Navy interests, policies, and programs.

36. The Politico-Military Policy Division and the Strategic Plans Division are the major users of NIE's in the Department of the Navy. The Directors of the Divisions do not initially see all NIE's, although most eventually reach them, with appropriate sections

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side-lined or with staff comments. In general, the Division Directors read only the conclusions and the side-lined portions of the text of those NIE's which they receive.

37. The extent to which NIE's are initially used and read in the two divisions depends primarily on their relevance to the work immediately at hand. The conclusions are almost invariably read upon receipt by all users. The NIE's are subsequently used in varying degrees in connection with reviewing plans, preparing memoranda on current developments, and drafting intelligence annexes of area studies. Although NIE's appear to have considerable value in providing information for personal background, their more important use is in bringing the collective judgment of the intelligence community to bear on working out the Navy's position on specific foreign policy questions. These uses include: (a) providing a basis for joint action; (b) providing a check against individual judgments; (c) furnishing an over-all point of view; and (d) permitting a more rounded evaluation of proposed national policy. In general, NIE's serve a useful purpose in support of work on over-all, long-range problems or on questions of national policy, but are much less useful in their application to

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specific or detailed naval problems.

J. The Federal Bureau of Investigation

38. Two copies of all NIE's produced are received in the office of the representative of the FBI on the IAC. He prepares a summary to attach to the copy forwarded to the Director. The other copy is normally routed to the espionage unit and to the office of domestic intelligence. The Director of the FBI is forwarded NIE's primarily for briefing and background purposes. The other principal use of NIE's to the FBI is to facilitate the coordination of domestic and foreign intelligence activities.

K. The Atomic Energy Commission

39. The Atomic Energy Commission receives four copies of all NIE's. The Chief of the Intelligence Division screens all NIE's received and determines their further distribution within the Commission. NIE's fall into three general categories as far as AEC use is concerned. Those NIE's or portions thereof dealing with AEC matters are of limited use largely because the AEC itself is a major participant in their preparation. Those which deal with countries with which the US

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has atomic energy agreements or upon whom the US relies for atomic energy resources are of considerable value to the AEC in formulating its programs and policies in the foreign field. Finally, those NIE's of a more general character are used primarily in the AEC for general background information of responsible officials who have some concern with foreign policy problems.

L. The International Cooperation Administration

40. ICA receives three copies of all NIE's. They are screened by the Special Assistant to the Director for OCB and NSC matters and selected by him for further appropriate dissemination. Normally, NIE's are forwarded to the Director's office (usually side-lined or briefed), to the Director of Plans, the appropriate area chief, and to others involved in NSC or OCB support.

41. In addition to providing personal background information, NIE's are used principally as (a) starting points by country desk officers for NSC status reports and various reports to the OCB; (b) as bases for evaluating the mutual security programs in varicus countries; and (c) as summary briefings for ranking officials preparing

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to visit foreign countries. ICA respondent indicated that NIE's generally do not treat economic matters in sufficient detail to be of much use in working out detailed economic programs for individual countries.

M. The United States Information Agency

42. USIA receives four copies of those estimates approved for release by the IAC (in practice almost all NIE's). On arrival, NIE's receive almost automatic distribution to those responsible for the subject matter treated, with copies of all NIE's going to the Director's office and to the Chief of the Intelligence Division. NIE's are of only minor direct use in the work of USIA. They are read primarily for personal background and information purposes. Some recipients find the collective community judgments contained therein as useful checks on their own thinking. Occasionally, the long-range forecasts in NIE's are used as a basis for determining the priority of USIA effort assigned to particular countries, areas, or problems.

N. The Central Intelligence Agency

43. Four copies are distributed to the Office of the Director, one to each of the following: The Director, who is the intelligence

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adviser to the NSC; The Deputy Director; The Deputy Director (Intelligence), who is the intelligence adviser to the NSC Planning Board; and to the NSC Planning Board Assistant. These officials participate actively in the work of the NSC, which makes use of NIE's in deliberations and in drafting policy papers (see paragraphs 12-15 for NSC use). In addition, eight copies of NIE's are distributed for use in the DD/P area of CIA headquarters in Washington, where they are used in varying degrees by planning and area offices. Recipients rate NIE's as valuable for personal background and information, particularly because they contain the collective judgment of the intelligence community. NIE's are also useful in alerting planners to the possible need for preemptive operations in areas that may become critical. Finally, NIE's are variously used as a basis for over-all planning, developing regional plans, making various types of progress reports, and preparing requirements for intelligence collection.

O. Distribution and Use Outside of Washington

44. The information on the use of NIE's outside of Washington was obtained by the use of written questionnaires (except for SAC which responded to the AFOIN questionnaire, and also was interviewed).

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The information so obtained is not as complete, both in substance and in the proportion of replies to number of recipients, as was possible in the case of Washington users.

45. Department of State. The Special Assistant, Intelligence, distributes an average of nine NIE's to State Department posts overseas, using as principal criterion the relevancy of a given NIE to the duties of the post. NIE's are read with interest and thoroughness by the top-level officers (including military attachés) in all the overseas missions. However, most missions report that the principal value of NIE's is for background information, as a useful briefing document for incoming personnel or official visitors, and especially as a guide to thinking in Washington.

46. Department of the Army. The Army normally distributes about 17 copies of NIE's to Army Commanders in the ZI, major overseas commands, appropriate Army schools and military attachés, and commands for which the Army is executive agent. The number of NIE's sent overseas varies with the subject matter of the NIE. The following views on the use of NIE's are based on replies to a G-2 questionnaire by USEUCOM and the Far East Command, and the Caribbean Command.

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NIE's are available to a limited number of high-level officials outside the intelligence divisions. The principal use of NIE's in these commands is as important sources of background material--often unavailable elsewhere--for use by the intelligence divisions in performing their normal intelligence briefing and operational support functions.

47. Department of the Air Force. The Air Force ordinarily sends an average of 12 copies of NIE's to four overseas commands and to eight command headquarters in the US outside of Washington. The following is based upon responses to an AFOIN questionnaire by ADC, the Alaskan Air Command, the Northeast Air Command, and upon an interview with SAC. In both the interior and overseas commands, NIE's are used extensively in the preparation of command estimates of the enemy situation and often contain information not available elsewhere. The Strategic Air Command found NIE's particularly valuable as being the principal source of the top-level intelligence thinking and collective intelligence judgments evolving in Washington. SAC also makes considerable use of NIE's as a source of personal background information and for organizational planning.

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48. Department of the Navy. The Navy disseminates an average of seven NIE's to overseas commands. NIE's are extensively used by the intelligence divisions of these commands as a basis for providing over-all guidance to the policy and planning echelons either directly or as part of locally prepared intelligence estimates. Several of the commands indicated that NIE's constitute their most important, if not their only, source of fully coordinated national intelligence and guide to top-level intelligence thinking in Washington.

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PART III

REACTIONS TO NIE CONTENT, FORM AND LANGUAGE

49. As a supplement to the main thrust of the NIE Survey, a number of questions were asked on various aspects of NIE's. In addition, the Survey itself naturally evoked a number of informal responses going beyond the main scope of the Survey. The most significant of these reactions are summarized below.

50. Applicability of NIE's to Specific Working Problems. The question of the application of NIE's to specific tasks evoked perhaps the most complicated set of comments. Any generalization on this subject is made difficult by the fact that NIE's are read by a fairly large group of US officials who work on a wide variety of problems and who deal with these problems at many different levels of specificity. As an example, one NIE reader may be concerned with the formulation of a policy to guide US relations with friendly and neutral nations of the Far East for the next five years; another may be concerned with the planning and execution of the economic aid program for Indochina for the next 12 months. The wide range of subjects covered by NIE's

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as a series also makes it difficult for end-users to appraise the applicability of the NIE's as a whole to their specific working problems.

51. Considering all NIE recipients as a group, the large majority indicated no serious difficulties in applying the general judgments of NIE's. However, there was a sharp split in this appraisal between the White House Staff, the President's Special Assistants, the NSC Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board, on the one hand, and those in the departments and agencies on the other. The majority of the former group indicated some degree of difficulty with selected NIE's. Many of their comments indicated a feeling that the broader the level of generalization in the NIE the less likely that it was founded on known facts. The difference in the attitudes of the White House respondents and those in departments and agencies may be due to some extent to the fact that the former, not being as immersed in a day-to-day flow of intelligence, feel more need for background detail or analysis. In contrast, those respondents in the departments and agencies are more fully briefed on foreign developments as part of their regular duties. White House respondents may tend to view the NIE as their basic document from the intelligence community on any

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given problem addressed. The departmental officer, by contrast, is not so dependent upon detailed NIE back-up. In most instances, he can call upon his departmental intelligence unit to provide more detailed treatment, and quite often he does.

52. Degree of Duplication between NIE's and Other Intelligence.

A majority of the respondents found half or more of the NIE's received by them generally duplicative of other intelligence. The remainder felt that less than half (or none) duplicated other intelligence received. It was of course apparent during the interviews that few respondents had the same personal tastes or the same flow of intelligence papers across their desks, which would largely determine the extent to which they found NIE's duplicatory of other intelligence. The typical comment made was that NIE's served primarily as a convenient source of data and thinking pertaining to a given subject. The main value of an NIE was in its providing a convenient summary along the above lines as well as the collective judgments of the full-time intelligence people who follow such matters.

53. On the question of which parts of an NIE were most often found to be duplicative, only about half the respondents replied. These

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indicated that judgments, analysis and argumentation, and the basic data were duplicated in varying degrees by other publications received. Comments by these respondents indicated that they did not expect newness or originality in an NIE, but that these, when there, were valuable. Duplication of NIE content was mentioned as occurring in (a) special request intelligence papers; (b) studies published by agencies contributing to NIE's; (c) cables and telegrams; and (d) newspapers and magazines.

54. General vs. Specific NIE's. The question of whether NIE's should cover broad general subjects or be more specific in their subject matter proved difficult to answer. This difficulty appeared to derive to some extent from the respondent's not having previously given any detailed thought to this problem and from his understandable reluctance to appear to limit the freedom of choice of those guiding national intelligence production. Only about half the respondents mentioned this subject and nearly all who did suggested some increase in the number of "specific" NIE's. By specific was meant (a) those concentrating on a particular aspect of, say, the Soviet problem, such as the Soviet guided missile program, in

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contrast to the general Soviet paper; (b) those concentrating upon selected aspects of an area, such as economic problems in the Near East, as contrasted to an NIE providing a general round-up of all the factors in that area; (c) those concentrating upon a single country as opposed to those dealing rather equally with all countries in an area; and (d) those concentrating upon selected aspects of a problem in a country, such as, Berlin rather than a broad gauge review of the German problem.

55. In general, the preference for these "specific" kinds of NIE's seemed to come from respondents with well-defined geographic or functional responsibilities. Also, many respondents emphasized that the desired increase in "specific" NIE's should not be accomplished by reducing the number of NIE's now dealing with other subjects. Several respondents acknowledged that the specific type of NIE suggested would be more closely tied to a given situation, and therefore would probably have a briefer lifespan than the more general type of NIE. The only two respondents requesting more "general" NIE's were concerned with world-wide policy planning and general economic coverage.

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56. Dissents. Attitude patterns on this question were consistent among the NIE recipients. Nearly all respondents, regardless of their area or specific duty were satisfied with the clarity of dissents in the majority of NIE's. More than one-third felt the difference was "always" clear; more than half felt the difference was "usually" clear. Only two felt about half the dissents were not clear. A large number of respondents favored the inclusion of the reasoning to support the dissent, though they recognized that controlling its length presented a difficult problem.

57. The evaluation of the usefulness of dissents was not quite so unanimous as the opinion on clarity. Nevertheless, the majority of respondents indicated that the dissents were of "some," "great" or "very great" value. Only six indicated the dissents to be of little value to them. The general thinking of the majority was that such a device increased the confidence of the reader; i. e., where dissents were used, the reader felt that he was receiving both sides of a controversial issue, and where dissents did not appear he could assume there were no serious differences of opinion among the IAC agencies.

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Even those readers who had no specific interest in the content of most of the dissents favored their use "in principle."

58. Length. The length and coverage of individual NIE's was another aspect on which there was general agreement. Although only a little more than three-fourths of the respondents expressed views, nearly all of these felt that the majority of NIE's were adequate in length and subject coverage. However, not a single respondent felt that all NIE's he read were adequate in length and coverage. Two felt that only half or less of the NIE's were unsatisfactory in these respects. Two others felt NIE's were generally "too long." At first glance, this appears to be a heavy vote of confidence and an expression of satisfaction with present length and coverage of individual NIE's. It should be pointed out, however, that there was no attempt to define what degree above one-half was represented by the term "the majority." It was merely defined for the respondents as more than one-half.

59. Estimative Language. The respondents were asked to express their opinion as to the clarity of the general estimative language, and particularly the "odds terms" (almost certainly, probably,

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even chance, unlikely, etc.) used to convey a range of probability for various predictions. The majority of readers felt that both were understandable. The readers gave the "odds terms" a slightly higher clarity rating than the general language, even though many respondents were not fully aware of either the meaning of the individual "odds terms" used by the estimators to express the range of probability or the attempt to use these terms with consistency from one NIE to another. When asked to check his own interpretation of the odds terms with the estimator's use, the respondent usually agreed on the general order of probability, but boggled slightly at trying to pin these terms to a mathematical spread. However, the large majority both of those who were aware of the specific intent of the odds terms and of those not so aware agreed that the general meaning of the terms was clear to them. Three-fourths felt the terms were "understandable" and the remainder felt the terms were either "clear" or "extremely" clear. Only two respondents felt the odds terms caused difficulty. A few respondents commented that the odds terms should only be considered in the context of the general estimative language. Several suggested that the odds terms be printed inside the NIE cover.

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60. Judging the general estimative language was an extremely difficult task for most respondents. The decisions by appellate courts were sometimes used for comparison. The large majority felt the language was understandable, but no one thought it was "extremely clear." About one-fifth thought the language was "clear" and about three-fourths thought it "understandable." A few considered the language to be difficult to understand. Some comments were received that estimative expression is a new task for the written language and that the accomplishment to date is rather remarkable considering the short time the estimators have been in business.

61. Timeliness. This aspect of NIE's was also rather difficult for respondents to assess. About one-third of the respondents expressed no views on this problem. If the respondent considered the difficulties involved in producing a timely national estimate, he almost always came up with the feeling that NIE's were "about as timely as could be expected." To avoid this, respondents were asked to consider NIE timeliness entirely in terms of its application to their problems. This, of course, did not work too well in regard to general NIE's and may have placed too much emphasis upon the "spot" or "crash" NIE's. No one felt that NIE's were "always" ahead of the problem

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addressed. About half of the respondents felt NIE's "more often than not" were ahead of the problem. A few felt NIE's were "ahead of the problem" about half the time and a few also felt NIE's were "behind the problem" more often than not.

62. Organization and Format. The organization and format of NIE's received almost unanimous approval. A large majority felt the organization and format were "good"; a few felt they were "excellent." Only one respondent rated them as only "fair." Although no detailed questions were asked regarding aspects of NIE format, some respondents suggested that selected graphics would aid in absorbing masses of information, especially economic data. Others felt that it was somewhat easier to read copy with lines running across the page rather than in two columns. The Conclusions were considered especially valuable as a means of "getting at the meat" of the NIE. Those who did criticize the Conclusions were concerned more with the content than with the form. The most often-mentioned suggestion was that the Conclusions should be more of a summary of the entire text. Some suggestions were made that the connection between the

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Conclusions and the supporting text be made more apparent. Along this line, the numbering of the supporting paragraphs after each Conclusion was considered especially useful by those respondents who ordinarily read only selected portions of the text.

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List of Agencies Which Provided Distribution

Data for the NIE Survey

The National Security Council

The Operations Coordinating Board

The Department of State

The Department of Defense

The Department of the Army

The Department of the Navy

The Department of the Air Force

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The National Security Agency

The United States Information Agency

The Office of Defense Mobilization

The International Cooperation Administration

The Central Intelligence Agency

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TAB B to
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List of Respondents* for NIE Survey

Interviewed by CIA/NE

White House

Col. Andrew Goodpastor
Staff Secretary for the President

Gen. Theodore C. Parker
Office of Mr. Nelson Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President for
Psychological Affairs

Lt. Col. Paul H. Cullen and Mr. Edward Galbreath
Office of Mr. Joseph Dodge, Special Assistant to
the President for Economic Affairs

Mr. Robert Matteson
Acting Director, Staff for Mr. Stassen,
Special Assistant to the President for
Disarmament Matters

NSC-NSC Planning Board

Mr. Dillon Anderson
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Matters and Chairman
of the NSC Planning Board

Mr. James S. Lay and Mr. S. Everett Gleason
NSC Secretariat

* Note. Titles and ranks used are those in effect at the time
of the interview.

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TAB B to
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NSC Net Evaluations Subcommittee Staff

Brig. Gen. Gordon B. Rogers
Deputy Director

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[redacted] CIA
Col. Edward A. Herbes, USAF
Col. Worth L. Kindred, USA

OCB

Mr. Elmer Staats
Executive Secretary

Mr. J. E. MacDonald
OCB Staff Representative

Mr. Neilson Debevoise
Intelligence Staff

Dr. Horace Craig
Chief of Intelligence Staff

State

Mr. Robert Bowie
Director, Policy Planning Staff

Mr. Robert Barnes
Director, Executive Secretariat

Mr. Walter Radius, Staff Assistant to
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Economic Affairs

Mr. C. Burke Elbrick
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs

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State (continued)

Mr. Cecil B. Lyon
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

Mr. Jacques Reinsteine
Director, Office of German Affairs

Mr. Fraser Wilkins
Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs

Mr. Kenneth T. Young
Director, Office of Philippine and
Southeast Asian Affairs

Mr. William Crawford
Deputy Director, Office of
Eastern European Affairs

Mr. Walter McConaughy
Chief, Office of Chinese Affairs

Mr. Walter Stoessel
Chief, USSR Staff

Army

Hon. Wilber M. Brucker
Secretary of the Army

Col. F. C. Weyand
Aide to Secretary of the Army
and

Col. Cuyler L. Clark
Assistant Aide to Secretary of the Army

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Army (continued)

Col. Donald B. Harriott
Office of Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civilian-Military Affairs

Brig. Gen. W. C. Westmoreland
Secretary of General Staff

Col. William Price for Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Plans and Research

Brig. Gen. David W. Gray
Deputy Chief, G-3, Plans

Air

Col. Andrew Kinney
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary of the Air Force

Mr. Trevor Gardner
Assistant Secretary for
Research and Development

Brig. Gen. Harvey T. Alness
Deputy Director, Plans

SAC, Offutt Field, Omaha

Panel 14-17 officers, headed by Col. Robert N. Smith,
Chief Intelligence Staff, representing the Commanding
General, Operations, Plans, and Intelligence

TAB B to
IAC-D-94/1
10 July 1956

AEC

Cdr. Charles E. Nelson
Special Assistant to Chairman AEC for
NSC Planning Board

Mr. John A. Hall
Director, Division of International Affairs

Mr. Edward R. Gardner
Deputy Director, Division of
International Affairs

Mr. Clark Vogel
Assistant Director for Plans,
International Affairs

Dr. Charles Reichardt
Chief, Intelligence Division

FBI

25X1

[redacted]
Liaison and IAC Participant
at Production Level

USIA

Mr. Frank L. Dennis
Deputy Assistant Director
for Program and Operations,
Representative to NSC Planning Board

Mr. George Heller
Deputy Assistant Director for FE Affairs

Mr. Lewis T. Olom
Chief, Intelligence Production Division

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB B to
IAC-D-94/1
10 July 1956


ICA

Mr. John Tobler
Assistant to the Director for
NSC, OCB and CFEP Liaison

Commerce

Mr. Milton A. Berger
Chief, China Hong Kong Section,
Far East Division

CIA-DD/P



Note. More than 75 NIE end-users participated in the interviews.

TAB C to
IAC-D-94/1
10 July 1956

List of Respondents for NIE Survey

Contacted by

Departmental Intelligence Elements

Defense (JCS)

A general questionnaire was circulated by JIG to the following offices or officers, and the results were forwarded to the CIA/NE Task Force.

Office of Special Operations

Gen. G. B. Erskine, USMC, Ret.
Assistant to Secretary of Defense

Office of NSC Affairs

Gen. C. H. Bonesteel, III, USA
Defense Member NSC Planning Board

Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Office of the Special Assistant to JCS for NSC Affairs

Joint Strategic Survey Committee

Joint Strategic Plans Group

Joint Logistics Plans Group

Navy

Personal interviews were conducted by ONI. The results were forwarded to the CIA/NE Task Force. The following officers or offices were included.

Office of SECNAV

Office of CNO

Strategic Plans Division

Politico-Military Policy Division

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TAB D to
IAC-D-94/1
10 July 1956

List of NIE Survey Respondents Outside Washington

Queried by Letter

The Department of State

US Embassy, Djakarta, Indonesia
John Gordon Main
Charge d'Affaires

US Embassy, Taipei, Taiwan
Karl Lott Rankin
American Ambassador

US Embassy, Saigon, Vietnam
G. Frederick Reinhardt
American Ambassador

US Embassy, Moscow, USSR
Walter N. Walmsley
Charge d'Affaires

US Embassy, Paris, France
C. Douglas Dillon
American Ambassador

US Embassy, Rome, Italy
John D. Jernegan
Charge d'Affaires

US Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
William C. Trimble
Charge d'Affaires

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TAB D to
IAC-D-94/1
10 July 1956

The Department of the Army

US European Command
Heidelberg, Germany

Far East Command
Zama, Honshu, Japan

Caribbean Command
Ford Amador, Canal Zone

The Department of the Navy

Commander-in-Chief
Atlantic

Commander-in-Chief
Pacific

Commander-in-Chief
US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic
and Mediterranean

The Department of the Air Force

Commander
Air Defense Command
Colorado, USA

Commander
Alaska Air Command
Alaska

Commander
Northeast Air Command
APO, New York, New York

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DDI PROPOSED CHANGES TO IAC-D-94/1, PAGES 27-28

F. The Department of Defense^{13/}

22. The Joint Intelligence Group forwards an average of three NIE's to the Office of Secretary of Defense. Principal use is made by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, where the estimates are read with varying degrees of thoroughness dependent upon their nature and content.

Reason: Accuracy.

23. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An average of 12 NIE's are distributed to non-intelligence users in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JIG questionnaire indicates that (a) only the conclusions are usually read in the Office of the Chairman, JCS, and in the Joint Strategic Survey Committee; (b) the entire estimate is "sometimes" read in the Office of the Joint Logistics Plans Group, and (c) the entire text is usually read in the Office of NSC Affairs and in the Joint Strategic Plans Group.

Reason: Accuracy.

24. Delete 2nd sentence. Reason: Superfluous.

3rd sentence, 7th line insert some before "NIE's."

Reason: Accuracy.

13/ The Survey of the Department of Defense and JCS level was conducted by the Joint Intelligence Group on the basis of written questionnaires.

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ACSI SUGGESTED CHANGES TO IAC-D-94/1

Para 28. The following Among the Army officials who receive and read with varying degrees of thoroughness the majority of NIE's: Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, Assistant Secretary of Civilian-Military Affairs, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans Division, OAC of S G-3 were interviewed.


Para 29. NIE's are more extensively used in G-3 than in any other office of the Department of the Army except G-2. It is here that relevant NIE's are often used as an integral part of the process of preparing Army plans. Frequently, estimates in NIE's form the basis for the assumptions upon which Army plans are prepared. The level of generality in an NIE is adequate in most some cases for the work done in G-3, and where it isn't, supplementary detailed information is obtained from G-2.

IAC-D-94
15 February 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Proposal for a Survey of NIE Use

The attached memorandum to the Intelligence Advisory Committee from the Director of Central Intelligence, subject as above, will be placed on the agenda of an early meeting of the IAC for noting.



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Secretary

IAC-D-94
15 February 1955

IAC-D-94
15 February 1955

C O P Y

14 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Proposal for a Survey of NIE Use

1. In view of the fact that we have now had more than four years experience with the production of national intelligence estimates, I believe that it would be worthwhile to conduct an informal survey of the use which our consumers, the planners or policymakers, make of our NIE's. Such a survey would ascertain the extent to which and manner in which NIE's are used by the consumer as part of our continuing effort to make national intelligence estimates responsive to the consumer's needs.

2. I believe that such a survey would facilitate a review of the key questions of: (1) whether our NIE's are being circulated either on too restricted a basis or more widely than desirable; (2) who besides the NSC are the real ultimate consumers; (3) how extensively NIE's are actually used by these consumers; and, (4) the extent to which, as presently written, they meet these consumers' needs.

3. I propose to ask the Board of National Estimates to conduct an informal survey along the above lines, and to report its findings to the IAC, and would appreciate your comments on this approach.

/s/

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

IAC-D-94
15 February 1955

IAC-M-186 - 1 March 1955

Item 4. Proposal for a Survey
of NIE Use

(IAC-D-94, 15 February 1955)

Approved. The Chairman welcomed the assistance and participation of the IAC agencies in undertaking the survey. It was agreed that the general line of inquiry and a representative list of persons to be interviewed would be prepared by the Board of National Estimates in consultation with the IAC members, and that the Board would also clear with the appropriate IAC member before making actual contacts in his area of interest.

It was generally agreed that the survey would be helpful, and interest was expressed in assisting with its planning and implementation.

IAC-
M-
186
Item
4

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*F. W. Reinecke
Dec 29 1954*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 December 1954

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] (OIR)
 Lt. Colonel Paul S. Reinecke, USA (G-2)
 Captain B. E. Wiggin, USN (ONI)
 Colonel Willis B. Sawyer, USAF (AFCIN-2B2)
 Colonel Floyd E. Dunn, USA (JIG)


SUBJECT : Viet Minh Violation of Armistice

REFERENCES : a. IAC-M-175, Paragraph 2b
 b. ONE Memorandum (29 November)

1. The following Working Group has been designated to review evidence of Viet Minh violations of the armistice:

25X1 Mr. [REDACTED] ONE, Chairman
 25X1 (Code 143, [REDACTED])
 25X1 Mr. [REDACTED] OIR
 25X1 (Code 191, [REDACTED])
 25X1 Mr. George Allen, G-2
 25X1 (Code 131, [REDACTED])
 Lieutenant Commander Robert Loomis, ONI
 (Code 131, Extension 76044)
 Mr. Jack Power, USAF
 (Code 131, Extension 79545)
 Colonel Ward Gillette, Joint Staff
 (Code 131, Extension 55697)
 25X1 Mr. [REDACTED] CIA
 25X1 (Code 143, [REDACTED])
 25X1 Mr. [REDACTED] CIA
 25X1 (Code 143, [REDACTED])

14
 Dec.
 Mem.



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2. The first meeting of the Group is scheduled for
10:00 Monday, 20 December, in Room 132 South Building.



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Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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14 Feb 74

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Proposal for a Survey of NIE Use

1. In view of the fact that we have now had more than four years experience with the production of national intelligence estimates, I believe that it would be worthwhile to conduct an informal survey of the use which our consumers, the planners or policymakers, make of NIE's. Such a survey would ascertain [redacted] in which NIE's are used to [redacted] to make national intelligence estimates responsive to the consumer's needs.
2. I believe that such a survey would facilitate a review of key questions of: (1) whether our NIE's are being circulated on too restricted a basis or more widely than [redacted] sides the NSC are the real ultimate consumers; [redacted] are actually used by these consumers; and (4) the extent to which, as presently written, they meet these consumers needs.

3. I propose to ask the Board of National Estimates [redacted] an informal survey along [redacted] to the IAC, and would appreciate your comments on this approach.

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ALLEN W. DUNN

DIA 1001 12 1974

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

VIETMINH VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1954

1. Attached for information is the report of a working group of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which reviewed evidence of Vietminh violations of the terms of the armistice in Vietnam.

2. The Intelligence Advisory Committee noted this report on 25 January, and authorized and directed its release to the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board.



Secretary

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IAC-D-93/2
31 January 1955

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VIETMINH VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS
THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1954

SUMMARY

Generally reliable reports through 31 December 1954 clearly indicate that the Communists have violated the Geneva Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia with respect to the following:

Vietnam

- a. Failure of the Vietminh completely to relinquish political rule south of the 17th Parallel; failure to allow civilians who so desire to transfer from the Vietminh zone to the other; failure to comply with the prohibition on reprisals against wartime partisans of the French Union. (Article 14)
- b. Failure of the Vietminh to withdraw all of their military forces from the south. (Article 15)
- c. Importing of prohibited categories of military equipment. (Article 17)
- d. Failure to liberate all prisoners of war and civilian internees and to surrender them to the "appropriate authorities." (Article 21)

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Laos

- a. Failure to enforce the cease-fire. (Article 1)
- b. Forced recruiting of Laotians for military service.
(Contravenes the spirit of paras. 3 and 12 of the Joint Conference Declaration.)
- c. Pathet Lao refusal to recognize the full sovereignty of the Royal Laotian Government over the provinces of Ban Xena and Phong Saly. (Inconsistent with the declaration of the Government of Laos acknowledged by the vietminh in paras. 3 and 12 of the Joint Conference Declaration.)

Cambodia

- a. Probable failure of the vietminh to withdraw all of its forces. (Article 4)
- b. Failure to demobilize the Khmer Resistance Forces.
(Article 5)

Other articles of the respective Agreements have been or are now in the process of being substantially implemented or are of a procedural nature designed to establish machinery for the implementation of the agreements and thus are not subject to violations. Accordingly, such articles are not considered in this report.

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I. COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
IN VIETNAM

A. Violations of Article 14

Article 14a and b. Article 14a states: "Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present agreement." Article 14b states that: "Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the grouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it."

1. Two Vietminh areas south of the 17th Parallel, Ham Tan and Xuyen Noc Provisional Assembly Area, and Plaine des Jones Provisional Assembly Area, have up to this time been technically evacuated by

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Vietminh forces in accordance with the Agreement. (Article 15)

There are repeated and consistent reports that in both the Kuyen Hoa and Plaine des Joncs areas, Vietminh military-politico cadres continue, despite the provisions of Article 11b, to retain de facto control of the local administration and to conduct activities designed to maintain the population under Communist control. Although we cannot document this situation with specific or detailed facts, we believe that the Vietminh is continuing to exercise political and administrative control in several areas south of the 17th Parallel other than those designated as assembly areas. Such action clearly contravenes both the letter and spirit of Article 11a and 11b. The ICC for Vietnam has not investigated violations of this nature, which have not formally been charged to the Communists by the French-Vietnam side.

Article 11c. Article 11c states that "each party undertakes to refrain from reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties."

2. The Vietnamese Government publicly charged violation by the Communists of this provision in July and August 1954. Despite the fact that there appears to be no record of investigation of such

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charges by the ICC in this instance, there is a strong presumption on the basis of all reports received that the Vietminh is in fact inflicting reprisals against individuals within its zone whenever political considerations so dictate.

Article 1A(d). Article 1A(d) states that: "from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wishes to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district."

3. The greatest number of reported violations of this provision concern restrictions imposed by Vietminh authorities in the Catholic areas of the Tonkin Delta (primarily the dioceses of Phat Diem and Bui Chu in the southeastern section of the delta) on the movement of Vietnamese who desire to evacuate to the south. Usually reliable

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[redacted] intelligence reports indicate that, beginning in October, elements of three regular infantry divisions, in addition to local regional forces, were blocking by force the movement of refugees in

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the south zone of the delta. These and voluminous reports from Catholic and other sources indicate that the Vietminh has been preventing and continues to prevent evacuation of people from the delta by the following methods:

- a. Intimidation and force. Refugees encounter roadblocks and soldiers who refuse them permission to pass, children are separated from parents and leaders of groups are arrested, departing boats are fired upon, and armed Vietminh junks patrol the coastal waters to prevent escape by sea.
- b. Barring refugees from transportation. Almost all travel in the Tonkin delta requires water transportation, but Vietminh officials control passenger boats, ferry boats, and bridges and prevent their use by refugees. Trucks, buses, and bicycle-carts are forbidden to carry refugees.
- c. Economic penalties. A would-be refugee is not allowed to sell his property but must forfeit all except that which he can carry.

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4. Investigation by the ICC of specific instances of violations of this article has often been hampered by a rigid procedure which involves, among other regulations, notification of the local authorities before an ICC team appears on the scene. Accordingly, by the time ICC teams reach the area of reported violations, the power of intimidation has been exerted and the ICC team has great difficulty in finding individuals who will speak freely of the Vietminh violations.

5. An example of the operating difficulties of the ICC is contained in one of several reports of the [redacted] 25X1 ICC which have been given to US officials on a highly confidential basis. According to this report, of 17 November 1954, several ICC mobile teams visited Phat Diem in early November following reports that many thousands of persons desired to go south. Investigation on the spot revealed an "abnormal situation and a concentration of people." Local Vietminh authorities, however, had no procedures for processing applications and were apparently unwilling to give the ICC teams all desired assistance. As a result of this investigation, however, the ICC announced publicly that the "abnormal" situation had

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been brought under control and that "people wanting to exercise the right of freedom of movement are now getting the requisite permits and other facilities as laid down in Article 14d."

6. As late as December 1 confidential [redacted] reports still reported substantial impediments to refugee movement by the Vietminh. ICC mobile teams in the Phat Diem area reported that the local Communist authorities were interpreting instructions in the narrowest fashion. Vietminh officials were reported using such technical devices to obstruct the movement of refugees even in the presence of the ICC representatives as: (a) refusal to issue evacuation permits except in an applicant's village of residence; (b) refusal to process applications before transport facilities were available; and (c) replacing evacuees in transit by "fake" refugees who then claimed they were forced to go south.

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7. On the basis of all reports from [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] sources on this subject, there can be no question that the Vietminh authorities have violated and continue to violate Article 14d. The extraordinary number of complaints and detailed descriptions of Vietminh restrictions on freedom of movement indicates a continuous and deliberate policy on the part of the Vietminh to prevent free movement from their area to the south.

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B. Violation of Article 15

Article 15 provides for the disengagement of the combatants, and transfers of all military forces, equipment, and supplies of each party from the regroupment zone of the other party, in accordance with carefully defined schedules and procedures.

8. Numerous reports have been received indicating that the Vietminh is leaving substantial numbers of trained military personnel in South Vietnam. The Vietminh reportedly has attempted to cover this violation by filling out the ranks of units to be evacuated with new and untrained recruits. Although specific instances of this violation cannot be substantiated with the information at hand, and although the ICC has not attempted to investigate reports of this nature, it is almost certain that the Vietminh is not evacuating all its military manpower from the south and is accordingly violating Article 15 of the Agreement. This conclusion is further supported by frequently reported discoveries of arms and ammunition caches by French and Vietnamese units occupying the areas from which Vietminh military forces have been formally withdrawn.

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C. Violation of Article 17

Article 17 states that, with certain limited and rigorously defined exceptions involving only replacement of worn-out or used-up equipment, the "introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, ammunition, and other war material, such as combat aircraft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armored vehicles, is prohibited."

9. Reliable intelligence reports received through French sources clearly indicate that a considerable amount of Chinese war material has been moved into North Vietnam from Communist China since the Armistice. Virtually all of this movement occurred via the uninspected points of Cao Bang and Dong Dang on the Sino-Vietnam border. Illicit receipt of war materials reached a peak in late July and August and continued at a reduced rate at least through mid-October. Shipments of non-prohibited material, such as gasoline and quartermaster supplies, are continuing at a relatively high level. Since the entry into force of the Agreement, the Vietminh are known to have received illegally more than 150

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D. Violation of Article 21

Article 21 provides for the liberation and repatriation within 30 days of the cease-fire of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by either party, and for their surrender to the appropriate authorities of the other party.

12. Initial difficulties in the implementation of this article appeared to have been overcome by an early intervention of the ICC, which allowed the exchange of prisoners of war and internees to be "officially" continued to 4 September 1954. By that date, the Vietminh claimed to have returned 11,882 prisoners (537 officers and 11,345 other military persons), of whom 8,082 were of European or African origin, 5 of US origin, and 3,795 of Vietnamese origin. [redacted]

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[redacted] however, claimed that only 11,706 had in fact been released by the Vietminh. Discussions between the two commands on the exchange of further groups of prisoners and internees, particularly those of Vietnamese origin, continued intermittently after September 4. No further reports of significant exchange or of release by the Vietminh were received.

13. A 4 November report of the [redacted] stated: "It is an accepted fact that both sides are still holding

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POW's and were engaged in a process of bargaining for the exchange of further groups. One party in the Joint Commission submits a list of persons which it is claimed are still held by the other. This leads to the submission of similar lists by the other side and, when agreement is reached, some people are liberated on a reciprocal basis." The Vietminh returned only a few of the Vietnamese Army personnel captured by them during the course of the war. Although some of those not formally returned are either still interned as "politically dangerous" or have been clandestinely released after indoctrination, the major portion have been removed from the category of prisoners of war and integrated into the Vietminh forces. The facts to substantiate this conclusion are almost impossible to obtain, however, particularly since the French have not been anxious to publicize them in their apparent continued hope that the Vietminh would be more flexible if no publicity attended this matter.

II. COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN LAOS

14. Certain violations with respect to Laos do not fall strictly within the purview of any specific article of the Agreement. They do,

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however, contravene the spirit of certain paragraphs of the Joint Conference Declaration. Accordingly, these violations will also be discussed below.

A. Attacks against Laotian forces. (Inconsistent with Articles 1 and 2 which provide that the commanders of the armed forces shall enforce the cease-fire and that the cease-fire is effective on 6 August.)

15. Small-scale attacks by Pathet Lao forces against Laotian Army forces have taken place since the cease-fire. These attacks have been confined in large part to the northern provinces where the largest concentrations of Pathet Lao are located. These attacks have occurred as recently as late December. The Laotian Government has filed protests with the ICC, which has been unable to move quickly to the scene of reported attacks.

B. Forced Recruitment of Laotians. (Inconsistent with paras. 3 and 12 of Joint Conference Declaration.)

16. As early as 27 August 1954, the Laotian Government protested to the Joint Commission for Laos that Vietminh units in Laos were forcing young men in villages to join Vietminh units and move to northern Laos for military training. On 21 September 1954 a US source

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reported that "official Franco-Lao figures estimate the number of Laotian men and women conscripted by the Vietminh since August 20 totaled 3,050 by September 3, 3,500 by September 13, and over 4,000 by September 20. Those conscripted came from all provinces, including the immediate environs of Vientiane." During the week of 12 December 1954, the ICC mobile team at Luang Prabang received corroborative evidence of forced recruitment by the Vietminh and the Pathet Lao from three Pathet Lao deserters. There is also reliable evidence that the Vietminh has been avoiding established check points in its evacuation from Laos, probably for the purpose of concealing the movement outside Laos of Pathet Lao forces or newly conscripted Laotians.

D. Pathet Lao Attempts to Usurp Jurisdiction in Sam Neua and Phong Saly. (Inconsistent with Laotian Declarations and paras. 3 and 12 of the Joint Conference Declaration.)

17. The Pathet Lao have publicly acknowledged the authority "in principle" of the Laotian Government over the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. In practice, however, they have not allowed the Royal Government to send its administrators or the International Commission to inquire fully into the situation and the activities of the Pathet Lao there.

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shall apply to: (a) the armed forces and military combatant personnel of the French Union; (b) the combatant formations of all types which have entered the territory of Cambodia from other countries or regions of the peninsula; (c) all the foreign elements (or Cambodians not natives of Cambodia) in the military formations of any kind or holding supervisory functions in all political or military, administrative, economic, financial or social bodies, having worked in liaison with the Vietnam military units.

20. In view of the lack of reliable estimates of the number of Vietnamese and other non-Cambodian Communist troops present in Cambodia at the time of the signing of the accord, it is impossible to estimate conclusively the degree of Communist compliance with, or violation of, this article. The Vietminh officially reported that they intended to evacuate 4,050 troops from Cambodia. USARMA, Phnom Penh, reported on 21 October that 2,800 persons had been removed to South Vietnam. This total coincided fairly closely with a [redacted] estimate of 2,685 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia as of July 1954. A Canadian member of the ICC, however, reported the total number of evacuees at only approximately 2,400. Although the Cambodian

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Government and [redacted] believe that Vietminh cadres remain in Cambodia, no formal protest has been made to the ICC, and that body is officially satisfied that the provisions of the article have been met by the Vietminh.

B. Violation of Article 5

This article states that the "two parties shall undertake that within 30 days after the cease-fire order has been proclaimed, the Khmer Resistance Forces shall be demobilized on the spot."

21. No third party witnessed the demobilization of the Khmer Resistance Forces (KRF) by Vietminh military units in Cambodia, which allegedly occurred on or about 20 August 1954. The Vietminh units which were subsequently evacuated from Cambodia did not carry extra arms, and no armament belonging to the Khmer Resistance Forces has ever been surrendered to any authority in Cambodia. On 25 August 1954 the Cambodian Government delivered a documented protest to the ICC on the failure of the Vietminh command in Cambodia to disarm the Khmer Resistance Forces in accordance with the Agreement. Not a single former member of the KRF has yet reported to the Cambodian authorities

to receive his identity card which will permit him to vote in the forthcoming Cambodian elections, thus suggesting that KRF members have in fact not been demobilized.

IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSIONS


22. The International Commissions in each of the three countries are operating under a number of restrictions, some of which are due directly to the provisions of the accords, and others to such factors as limited personnel, inadequate investigating and control facilities, language barriers. Methods of operation are being formulated only gradually as occasions arise. The composition of the ICC makes unanimous agreement almost impossible to achieve on certain questions.

23. From its very first establishment in Hanoi in early August 1954, the ICC received numerous petitions and complaints from private individuals. The task of investigating these soon became overwhelming. In dealing with these complaints, therefore, the ICC felt that it had no choice but to request, as a first step, that the "parties concerned" themselves carry out the preliminary investigation, since it was obvious that the ICC was not equipped to deal with the numerous cases

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likely to arise. The alternative, for the ICC to undertake the investigations, "would have implied a lack of faith in the two parties" and would have "required an expansion of the ICC services and personnel which were well beyond its present possibilities."

24. This ICC decision created difficulties. If a complaint were referred to the Vietminh authorities, the ICC would have no method of ensuring that the persons initiating the complaint were not penalized. Furthermore, if one side or the other delayed its reply or replies that there were no problem or that the problem was exaggerated, the ICC again would have no recourse. In order to undertake an investigation of such a reply, the ICC first has to agree that one is desirable. Even when agreement is obtained, the local authorities have to be given notice before an investigating team can visit the area. The results are usually disappointing. The



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nor of effective investigation of answers received from the Vietminh authorities.

25. Such problems arise particularly in connection with alleged violations of Article 14d of the Vietnam accord. The ICC has the choice of uncritical acceptance of assurances given by the Communists, or the almost impossible task of carrying out an effective investigation in an atmosphere of terror and deceit.

26. The ICC in Vietnam has a limited number of fixed and mobile teams, each of which has been carefully consigned to specific areas. In contrast to arrangements in the south, movement of teams in the north are restricted and may be arranged only after adequate notice to Vietminh authorities. Even when inquiry teams are sent into a rural area, the practical difficulties involved are formidable and include inadequate means of transportation and communication in a tropical country, the language barrier, and the subtle means of pressure on the local inhabitants developed by Vietminh agents.

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1 March 1955

Addenda to IAC-D-93/2

1. Since the publication of the IAC working group paper IAC-D-93/2, "Viet Minh Violations of the Geneva Agreement through 31 December 1954," several additional violations have been noted, as follows:

a. Nine piston-engined aircraft--five fighter-type and four liaison-type--were sighted in early January at Bach Mai airfield, the [redacted] military airfield at Hanoi. The sighting was made by [redacted] and later confirmed by the senior [redacted] in North Vietnam. The aircraft were presumed by [redacted] to be Chinese Communist. (Violation of Article 17 of the Vietnam Agreement)

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b. The first violation of the Laotian border by a Viet Minh unit occurred on 31 January when an understrength battalion moved into northern Laos, apparently to reinforce Pathet Lao units. (Violation of Article 6 of the Laos Agreement)

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c. Viet Minh possession of tanks, and the utilization of these tanks in a special support division for infantry forces, has been accepted by [redacted] Haiphong. The tanks were sighted by three separate sources, including a recently [redacted] (Violation of Article 17 of the Vietnam Agreement)

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2. Inasmuch as the dates of receipt of the aircraft and tanks are not known, and may in fact have been prior to mid-October, the conclusions reached in Paragraph 9 of IAC-D-93/2 are not necessarily changed. It still appears that the flow of illicit military aid from China declined considerably after the peak months of July and August 1954 and that, in mid-October, the aid pattern changed to an emphasis on non-prohibited items.



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IAC-D-93/1
19 January 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Vietminh Violations of the Geneva

Agreements through 31 December 1954

1. This confirms my telephone request of 19 January, that the IAC take the following action on the report of the Working Group on Vietminh Violations of the Geneva Agreements (IAC-D-93):

- a. Approve the Report for dissemination to interested departments and agencies of the US Government, particularly the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board.

- b. Approve the release of the Report []

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2. If prior approval can be gotten by telephone, it will not be necessary for the IAC to convene on the 25th.

3. Please note that at this time we are deferring consideration of the recommendation of the Working Group that it be authorized to continue in operation. This is not an urgent matter and can be deferred until the next meeting of the IAC.

4. Please telephone your concurrence (or non-concurrence) in the above recommendations to the Secretariat by close of business Friday, 21 January.



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Secretary

IAC-D-93/1
19 January 1955

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Special Supplement to
IAC-D-93/2
31 January 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Vietminh Violations of the Geneva

Agreements through 31 December 1954

1. This is a Special Supplement to the basic report of the working group of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which reviewed Vietminh violations of the terms of the armistice in Vietnam.

2. The basic report, classified Secret, was given wider circulation than has been given this Supplement.



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Secretary

Special Supplement to
IAC-D-93/2
31 January 1955

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IAC-D-93
(Supplement)
17 January 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Supplementary Data on Vietminh

Violations of the Geneva Agreements

1. The attached paper, a Special Intelligence Supplement to IAC-D-93: "Vietminh Violations of the Geneva Agreements through 31 December 1954," is circulated for consideration at an early meeting of the IAC.

2. This paper was prepared by a working group set up to document evidence supporting the conclusion that the Vietminh have violated the terms of the armistice in Vietnam (see IAC-M-175, para. 2b, and ONE memoranda dated 29 November 1954 and 14 December 1954).

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[redacted]
Secretary

Special Distribution

IAC-D-93
(Supplement)
17 January 1955

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IAC-D-93
17 January 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Vietminh Violations of the Geneva

Agreements through 31 December 1954

1. The attached paper was prepared by a working group set up pursuant to IAC direction to document evidence supporting the conclusion that the Vietminh have violated the terms of the armistice in Vietnam (see IAC-M-175, para. 2b, and ONE memoranda dated 29 November 1954 and 14 December 1954).
2. A Special Supplement is being circulated through separate channels.
3. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early meeting of the IAC.

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[Redacted]
Secretary

IAC-D-93
17 January 1955

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14 January 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

FROM : IAC Working Group on Vietminh Violations of the
Geneva Agreements

SUBJECT : Summary of Working Group Report and Recommendations

Reference: IAC-M-175, para. 2b

SUMMARY

1. On the basis of all available intelligence, it is obvious that the Vietminh has violated, as a matter of deliberate policy, the spirit and letter of the Geneva Agreements. Through its violations the Vietminh has increased substantially the capabilities of the regular army in North Vietnam and has retained a significant capability for political and para-military operations in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Major violations have occurred as a result of the fact that the Vietminh has:

- a. Augmented the material strength of its armed forces by importing prohibited categories of military equipment from Communist China;

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- b. Failed to evacuate all military personnel from South Vietnam and Cambodia;
- c. Continued to exercise administrative and political authority in areas under the de jure authority of the Governments of South Vietnam and Laos;
- d. Failed to permit the free movement of refugees;
- e. Failed to observe the cease-fire in Laos.

2. Although we are certain that the violations listed above, and others of lesser significance, have occurred or are still taking place, the nature of the evidence is such as to make difficult the offering of final "proof." However, information from all sources, including confidential reports [redacted]

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[redacted]
"firm," is sufficient to provide convincing evidence of all major categories of Vietminh violations.

3. [redacted] sufficient information concerning Vietminh violations to support strong protests to the ICC. However, they have made few such protests because of political considerations and because of the need to protect the security of their sources.

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4. There are, moreover, great difficulties involved in obtaining an "official" verdict on protests lodged with the International Control Commissions operating in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In general, the Commissions have taken a "neutral" posture, predicated on the view that they are in Indochina to settle and resolve differences rather than to publicize or propagandize the allegations or charges of either side. Their ability to investigate has been hampered by inadequate staffing, by limitations imposed on their freedom of movement, and by the necessity to reach agreement within the Commission on the need for action in any situation. To date, the ICC's have not reported any "violations" of the Geneva Agreements.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

- L. That the IAC note the attached Report and approve its circulation to all interested Departments of the US Government.
2. That in view of the continuing problem of Vietminh violations, and of the continuing importance to the US of this problem, the IAC approve the continued function of the Working Group. The Group requests authority to keep under constant scrutiny the intelligence on Vietminh violations and to report, perhaps quarterly, or when otherwise deemed necessary, to the IAC.

The following individuals are now members of the Working Group:

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[Redacted] Chairman

Mr. George Allen, G-2
Lt. Comdr. Robert Loomis, ONI
Mr. Jack Power, USAF
Col. Ward Gillette, Joint Staff

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VIETMINH VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS
THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1954

SUMMARY

Generally reliable reports through 31 December 1954 clearly indicate that the Communists have violated the Geneva Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia with respect to the following:

Vietnam

- a. Failure of the Vietminh completely to relinquish political rule south of the 17th Parallel; failure to allow civilians who so desire to transfer from the Vietminh zone to the other; failure to comply with the prohibition on reprisals against wartime partisans of the [redacted] (Article 14) 25X1
- b. Failure of the Vietminh to withdraw all of their military forces from the south. (Article 15)
- c. Importing of prohibited categories of military equipment. (Article 17)
- d. Failure to liberate all prisoners of war and civilian internees and to surrender them to the "appropriate authorities." (Article 21)

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Laos

- a. Failure to enforce the cease-fire. (Article 1)
- b. Forced recruiting of Laotians for military service.
(Contravenes the spirit of paras. 3 and 12 of the Joint Conference Declaration.)
- c. Pathet Lao refusal to recognize the full sovereignty of the Royal Laotian Government over the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. (Inconsistent with the declaration of the Government of Laos acknowledged by the Vietminh in paras. 3 and 12 of the Joint Conference Declaration.)

Cambodia

- a. Probable failure of the Vietminh to withdraw all of its forces. (Article 4)
- b. Failure to demobilize the Khmer Resistance Forces.
(Article 5)

Other articles of the respective Agreements have been or are now in the process of being substantially implemented or are of a procedural nature designed to establish machinery for the implementation of the Agreements and thus are not subject to violations. Accordingly, such articles are not considered in this report.

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I. COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
IN VIETNAM

A. Violations of Article 14

Article 14a and b. Article 14a states: "Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present agreement." Article 14b states that: "Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the grouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it."

1. Two Vietminh areas south of the 17th Parallel, Ham Tan and Xuyen Noc Provisional Assembly Area, and Plaine des Joncs Provisional Assembly Area, have up to this time been technically evacuated by

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Vietminh forces in accordance with the Agreement. (Article 15)

There are repeated and consistent reports that in both the Kuyen Hoc and Plaine des Joncs areas, Vietminh military-politico cadres continue, despite the provisions of Article 14b, to retain de facto control of the local administration and to conduct activities designed to maintain the population under Communist control. Although we cannot document this situation with specific or detailed facts, we believe that the Vietminh is continuing to exercise political and administrative control in several areas south of the 17th Parallel other than those designated as assembly areas. Such action clearly contravenes both the letter and spirit of Article 14a and 14b. The ICC for Vietnam has not investigated violations of this nature, which have not formally been charged to the Communists by the French-Vietnam side.

Article 14c. Article 14c states that "each party undertakes to refrain from reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties."

2. The Vietnamese Government publicly charged violation by the Communists of this provision in July and August 1954. Despite the fact that there appears to be no record of investigation of such

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charges by the ICC in this instance, there is a strong presumption on the basis of all reports received that the Vietminh is in fact inflicting reprisals against individuals within its zone whenever political considerations so dictate.

Article 14d. Article 14d states that: "From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wishes to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district."

3. The greatest number of reported violations of this provision concern restrictions imposed by Vietminh authorities in the Catholic areas of the Tonkin Delta (primarily the dioceses of Phat Diem and Sui Chu in the southeastern section of the delta) on the movement of Vietnamese who desire to evacuate to the south. Usually reliable

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[redacted] intelligence reports indicate that, beginning in October, elements of three regular infantry divisions, in addition to local regional forces, were blocking by force the movement of refugees in

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the south zone of the delta. These and voluminous reports from Catholic and other sources indicate that the Vietminh has been preventing and continues to prevent evacuation of people from the delta by the following methods:

- a. Intimidation and force. Refugees encounter roadblocks and soldiers who refuse them permission to pass, children are separated from parents and leaders of groups are arrested, departing boats are fired upon, and armed Vietminh junks patrol the coastal waters to prevent escape by sea.
- b. Barring refugees from transportation. Almost all travel in the Tonkin Delta requires water transportation, but Vietminh officials control passenger boats, ferry boats, and bridges and prevent their use by refugees. Trucks, buses, and bicycle-carts are forbidden to carry refugees.
- c. Economic penalties. A would-be refugee is not allowed to sell his property but must forfeit all except that which he can carry.

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4. Investigation by the ICC of specific instances of violations of this article has often been hampered by a rigid procedure which involves, among other regulations, notification of the local authorities before an ICC team appears on the scene. Accordingly, by the time ICC teams reach the area of reported violations, the power of intimidation has been exerted and the ICC team has great difficulty in finding individuals who will speak freely of the Vietminh violations.

5. An example of the operating difficulties of the ICC is contained in one of several reports [redacted]

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[redacted] According to this report, of 17 November 1954, several ICC mobile teams visited Phat Diem in early November following reports that many thousands of persons desired to go south. Investigation on the spot revealed an "abnormal situation and a concentration of people." Local Vietminh authorities, however, had no procedures for processing applications and were apparently unwilling to give the ICC teams all desired assistance. As a result of this investigation, however, the ICC announced publicly that the "abnormal" situation had

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been brought under control and that "people wanting to exercise the right of freedom of movement are now getting the requisite permits and other facilities as laid down in Article 14d."

6. As late as December 1 [redacted] still reported substantial impediments to refugee movement by the Vietminh. ICC mobile teams in the Phat Diem area reported that the local Communist authorities were interpreting instructions in the narrowest fashion. Vietminh officials were reported using such technical devices to obstruct the movement of refugees even in the presence of the ICC representatives as: (a) refusal to issue evacuation permits except in an applicant's village of residence; (b) refusal to process applications before transport facilities were available; and (c) replacing evacuees in transit by "fake" refugees who then claimed they were forced to go south.

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7. On the basis of all reports [redacted]
[redacted] 25X1
on this subject, there can be no question that the Vietminh authorities have violated and continue to violate Article 14d. The extraordinary number of complaints and detailed descriptions of Vietminh restrictions on freedom of movement indicates a continuous and deliberate policy on the part of the Vietminh to prevent free movement from their area to the south.

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B. Violation of Article 15

Article 15 provides for the disengagement of the combatants, and transfers of all military forces, equipment, and supplies of each party from the regroupment zone of the other party, in accordance with carefully defined schedules and procedures.

8. Numerous reports have been received indicating that the Vietminh is leaving substantial numbers of trained military personnel in South Vietnam. The Vietminh reportedly has attempted to cover this violation by filling out the ranks of units to be evacuated with new and untrained recruits. Although specific instances of this violation cannot be substantiated with the information at hand, and although the ICC has not attempted to investigate reports of this nature, it is almost certain that the Vietminh is not evacuating all its military manpower from the south and is accordingly violating Article 15 of the Agreement. This conclusion is further supported by frequently reported discoveries of arms and ammunition caches by French and Vietnamese units occupying the areas from which Vietminh military forces have been formally withdrawn.

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C. Violation of Article 17

Article 17 states that, with certain limited and rigorously defined exceptions involving only replacement of worn-out or used-up equipment, the "introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, ammunition, and other war material, such as combat aircraft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armored vehicles, is prohibited."

9. Reliable intelligence reports [redacted]

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sources clearly indicate that a considerable amount of Chinese war material has been moved into North Vietnam from Communist China since the Armistice. Virtually all of this movement occurred via the uninspected points of Cao Bang and Dong Dang on the Sino-Vietnam border. Illicit receipt of war materials reached a peak in late July and August and continued at a reduced rate at least through mid-October. Shipments of non-prohibited material, such as gasoline and quartermaster supplies, are continuing at a relatively high level. Since the entry into force of the Agreement, the Vietminh are known to have received illegally more than 150

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pieces of field and antiaircraft artillery, more than 500 mortars, 9,000 automatic weapons, and 500 recoilless weapons, in addition to substantial quantities of ammunition of all types and more than 400 military vehicles.

10. It is difficult for the ICC to detect or investigate violations of this article, primarily because ICC teams have not been permitted to travel freely in the area around the Chinese border where supplies are received. The fixed team at Lang Son reported on 30 September 1954 that reconnaissance of roads was impossible due to restrictions placed on all movements by local Vietminh authorities. Moreover, these teams are too small to cover fully the lengthy and largely inaccessible border zone.

11. The best available US intelligence [redacted]

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[redacted] indicates that the Vietminh army has continued since the Armistice to increase its firepower as well as its combat efficiency and size. The fact that the Vietminh is reinforcing its armed forces tends to confirm the reports that a large amount of war material, quite clearly over and above the allowable categories, has entered illegally into the Vietminh zones despite the system of inspection established under the cease-fire Agreement, and in direct violation of Article 17 of that Agreement.

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D. Violation of Article 21

Article 21 provides for the liberation and repatriation within 30 days of the cease-fire of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by either party, and for their surrender to the appropriate authorities of the other party.

12. Initial difficulties in the implementation of this article appeared to have been overcome by an early intervention of the ICC, which allowed the exchange of prisoners of war and internees to be "officially" continued to 4 September 1954. By that date, the Vietminh claimed to have returned 11,882 prisoners (537 officers and 11,345 other military persons), of whom 8,082 were of European or African origin, 5 of US origin, and 3,795 of Vietnamese origin. []

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[] claimed that only 11,706 had in fact been released by the Vietminh. Discussions between the two commands on the exchange of further groups of prisoners and internees, particularly those of Vietnamese origin, continued intermittently after September 4. No further reports of significant exchange or of release by the Vietminh were received.

13. A 4 November report []

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[] "It is an accepted fact that both sides are still holding

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POW's and were engaged in a process of bargaining for the exchange of further groups. One party in the Joint Commission submits a list of persons which it is claimed are still held by the other. This leads to the submission of similar lists by the other side and, when agreement is reached, some people are liberated on a reciprocal basis." The Vietminh returned only a few of the Vietnamese Army personnel captured by them during the course of the war. Although some of those not formally returned are either still interned as "politically dangerous" or have been clandestinely released after indoctrination, the major portion have been removed from the category of prisoners of war and integrated into the Vietminh forces. The facts to substantiate this conclusion are almost impossible to obtain, however, particularly since the [redacted] have not been anxious to publicize them in their apparent continued hope that the Vietminh would be more flexible if no publicity attended this matter.

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II. COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN LAOS

14. Certain violations with respect to Laos do not fall strictly within the purview of any specific article of the Agreement. They do,

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however, contravene the spirit of certain paragraphs of the Joint Conference Declaration. Accordingly, these violations will also be discussed below.

A. Attacks against Laotian forces. (Inconsistent with Articles 1 and 2 which provide that the commanders of the armed forces shall enforce the cease-fire and that the cease-fire is effective on 6 August.)

15. Small-scale attacks by Pathet Lao forces against Laotian Army forces have taken place since the cease-fire. These attacks have been confined in large part to the northern provinces where the largest concentrations of Pathet Lao are located. These attacks have occurred as recently as late December. The Laotian Government has filed protests with the ICC, which has been unable to move quickly to the scene of reported attacks.

B. Forced Recruitment of Laotians. (Inconsistent with paras. 3 and 12 of Joint Conference Declaration.)

16. As early as 27 August 1954, the Laotian Government protested to the Joint Commission for Laos that Vietminh units in Laos were forcing young men in villages to join Vietminh units and move to northern Laos for military training. On 21 September 1954 a US source

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reported that "official Franco-Lao figures estimate the number of Laotian men and women conscripted by the Vietminh since August 20 totaled 3,050 by September 3, 3,500 by September 13, and over 4,000 by September 20. Those conscripted came from all provinces, including the immediate environs of Vientiane." During the week of 12 December 1954, the ICC mobile team at Luang Prabang received corroborative evidence of forced recruitment by the Vietminh and the Pathet Lao from three Pathet Lao deserters. There is also reliable evidence that the Vietminh has been avoiding established check points in its evacuation from Laos, probably for the purpose of concealing the movement outside Laos of Pathet Lao forces or newly conscripted Laotians.

D. Pathet Lao Attempts to Usurp Jurisdiction in Sam Neua and Phong Saly. (Inconsistent with Laotian Declarations and paras. 3 and 12 of the Joint Conference Declaration.)

17. The Pathet Lao have publicly acknowledged the authority "in principle" of the Laotian Government over the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. In practice, however, they have not allowed the Royal Government to send its administrators or the International Commission to inquire fully into the situation and the activities of the Pathet Lao there.

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18. It is quite clear that the continued retention by the Pathet Lao of de facto control of these two provinces is a violation in spirit and letter of the Geneva Agreements, which recognized Laos' full sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction. This remains true despite the fact that at Geneva the Government of Laos announced that it would promulgate measures to provide for "special representation" in the Royal Administration of the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua during the interval between the cessation of hostilities and the general elections of the interests of "Laotian nationals who did not support the royal forces during hostilities."

19. At present, the International Control Commission in Laos is trying to resolve this question by sponsoring direct negotiations between the Royal Government and Pathet Lao representatives.

III. COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN CAMBODIA

A. Probable Violation of Article 4(1)

The article states that: the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel 7 outside the territory of Cambodia

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shall apply to: (a) the armed forces and military combatant personnel of the [redacted] (b) the combatant formations of all types which have entered the territory of Cambodia from other countries or regions of the peninsula; (c) all the foreign elements (or Cambodians not natives of Cambodia) in the military formations of any kind or holding supervisory functions in all political or military, administrative, economic, financial or social bodies, having worked in liaison with the Vietnam military units.

20. In view of the lack of reliable estimates of the number of Vietnamese and other non-Cambodian Communist troops present in Cambodia at the time of the signing of the accord, it is impossible to estimate conclusively the degree of Communist compliance with, or violation of, this article. The Vietminh officially reported that they intended to evacuate 4,050 troops from Cambodia. USARMA, Phnom Penh, reported on 21 October that 2,800 persons had been removed to South Vietnam. This total coincided fairly closely with [redacted] estimate of 2,685 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia as of July 1954. A

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[redacted] however, reported the total number of evacuees at only approximately 2,400. Although the Cambodian

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Government and [redacted] believe that Vietminh cadres remain in Cambodia, no formal protest has been made to the ICC, and that body is officially satisfied that the provisions of the article have been met by the Vietminh.

B. Violation of Article 5

This article states that the "two parties shall undertake that within 30 days after the cease-fire order has been proclaimed, the Khmer Resistance Forces shall be demobilized on the spot."

21. No third party witnessed the demobilization of the Khmer Resistance Forces (KRF) by Vietminh military units in Cambodia, which allegedly occurred on or about 20 August 1954. The Vietminh units which were subsequently evacuated from Cambodia did not carry extra arms, and no armament belonging to the Khmer Resistance Forces has ever been surrendered to any authority in Cambodia. On 25 August 1954 the Cambodian Government delivered a documented protest to the ICC on the failure of the Vietminh command in Cambodia to disarm the Khmer Resistance Forces in accordance with the Agreement. Not a single former member of the KRF has yet reported to the Cambodian authorities

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to receive his identity card which will permit him to vote in the forthcoming Cambodian elections, thus suggesting that KRF members have in fact not been demobilized.

IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSIONS

22. The International Commissions in each of the three countries are operating under a number of restrictions, some of which are due directly to the provisions of the accords, and others to such factors as limited personnel, inadequate investigating and control facilities, language barriers. Methods of operation are being formulated only gradually as occasions arise. The composition of the ICC makes unanimous agreement almost impossible to achieve on certain questions.

23. From its very first establishment in Hanoi in early August 1954, the ICC received numerous petitions and complaints from private individuals. The task of investigating these soon became overwhelming. In dealing with these complaints, therefore, the ICC felt that it had no choice but to request, as a first step, that the "parties concerned" themselves carry out the preliminary investigation, since it was obvious that the ICC was not equipped to deal with the numerous cases


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likely to arise. The alternative, for the ICC to undertake the investigations, "would have implied a lack of faith in the two parties" and would have "required an expansion of the ICC services and personnel which were well beyond its present possibilities."

24. This ICC decision created difficulties. If a complaint were referred to the Vietminh authorities, the ICC would have no method of ensuring that the persons initiating the complaint were not penalized. Furthermore, if one side or the other delayed its reply or replies that there were no problem or that the problem was exaggerated, the ICC again would have no recourse. In order to undertake an investigation of such a reply, the ICC first has to agree that one is desirable. Even when agreement is obtained, the local authorities have to be given notice before an investigating team can visit the area. The results are usually disappointing. The

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
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nor of effective investigation of answers received from the Vietminh authorities.

25. Such problems arise particularly in connection with alleged violations of Article 14d of the Vietnam accord. The ICC has the choice of uncritical acceptance of assurances given by the Communists, or the almost impossible task of carrying out an effective investigation in an atmosphere of terror and deceit.

26. The ICC in Vietnam has a limited number of fixed and mobile teams, each of which has been carefully consigned to specific areas. In contrast to arrangements in the south, movement of teams in the north are restricted and may be arranged only after adequate notice to Vietminh authorities. Even when inquiry teams are sent into a rural area, the practical difficulties involved are formidable and include inadequate means of transportation and communication in a tropical country, the language barrier, and the subtle means of pressure on the local inhabitants developed by Vietminh agents.



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This report is based on information available through December 10, 1954.

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Abstract

The Hungarian Communist regime is currently beset by major difficulties growing out of the attempt to remedy past failures of the economy through a shifting of some economic emphasis to agriculture and consumers' goods. The aim of thereby eliciting a greater economic effort from the population has so far not been achieved, due to popular disbelief and antagonism toward the regime's promises and methods. Moreover implementation of the revised course has been plagued by intra-Party disagreements and by misunderstanding and obstructionism within the bureaucracy. Shifts in regime leadership roles have resulted and are likely to continue from time to time, though there are no indications that these will lead to any radical replacement of the present group of leaders. The problem of the regime is essentially one of effecting a program and making the economy work, rather than one of enforcing the basic police and administrative controls over an unwilling population.

The agricultural program on which promises of improved living standards were based has remained largely unimplemented, while many of the changed plans for industry have not actually been put in effect. Agricultural improvements scheduled for 1954 were delayed by weather difficulties, as well as peasant distrust of the regime. In the industrial sector, stresses and strains have multiplied as a result of the failure of the inflexible bureaucratic apparatus to effect a smooth transition to the new course. Difficulties have been so serious as to necessitate a further drastic cut in 1954 targets, with new over-all output goals apparently below the 1953 level. Neither the projected investment shifts nor the proposed shift from capital goods production to that of consumers' goods and agricultural equipment has actually been implemented.

The consumers' goods program basic to the regime's bid for popular support also has been largely a failure, in spite of an improvement in market supplies in the wake of the "new course" announcement. Hungary's chronic foreign exchange shortage, intensified by the disappearance of traditional agricultural export surpluses has lent added urgency to the need for improvement in performance.

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THE CURRENT SITUATION IN HUNGARY

Current difficulties in which the Communist program is involved in Hungary grow out of the basic problem which has beset the regime from its start. This is the problem of overcoming the ingrained hostility of the population to Communist programs and methods. In the period 1949-53 this basic problem was exacerbated by the regime's attempt to carry out an industrial development program too ambitious for the capacities of the country, and by its ill-advised agricultural policies. In the summer of 1953 the government announced a revised economic program apparently modifying the stress on development of heavy industry in favor of agriculture and consumption. This shift was designed to deal with the basic problem by taking some of the pressure off the population, allowing the latter some relief from depressed living standards and thereby eliciting from the people a greater economic response.

Politically, the carrying out of this revised program has meant (1) the necessity of overcoming widespread misunderstanding, disagreement and obstructionism within the party and state apparatuses, so as to get these elements to accept and carry out the new policy, and (2) the attempt to reduce apathy, tension and hostility among the population at large and to convince them that their interest lay in cooperating with the program. Economically, it has meant the need to channel more resources into agriculture and consumers' goods industries so as to bolster the incentives of the population. To date very little progress has been made toward achievement of these aims.

I. POLITICAL SITUATION

A. Regime

Within the regime, the 1953 shift of policy has intensified latent disagreements and rivalries and produced a measure of instability that appears likely to continue for some time to come. The Party has admitted the existence of disputes in the Central Committee between anti-"new course" doctrinaires and pro-"new course" moderates, which reached a showdown in October in which the latter appear to have gained the upper hand. Such disputes are likely to continue. However, the resultant disharmony and ideological confusion within the Party leadership appears to constitute more of a drag on the efficiency of the regime than a threat to its over-all stability and security.

Both the top and the middle-level leadership organs have undergone shake-ups and are likely to undergo further ones. For the most part, however, these are likely to be as undramatic as those which have already occurred since the inauguration of the revised course -- reflecting, for

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example, an accelerated rise of a few younger non-Jewish leaders and a limited come-back of relatively minor older ones, as well as some redistribution of roles among the top leaders. The type of intra-party crisis leading to a major ideological showdown and purge does not appear to be indicated at the present stage.¹ Probably the most conspicuous change that might occur would be the shelving at last of Rákosi, who despite seeming ups and downs has so far held onto his position as nominal head of the Party. The regime's pointed stress on "collective leadership" since Stalin's death, and repeated denunciations (in which Rákosi has joined) of the "one-man" type of rule which Rákosi has exercised in the past, may well be signs that he is going to be eliminated from his paramount position. Nevertheless, for the time being he still appears to have the dominant voice in the regime. If, however, he should be shelved it would not produce significant repercussions on the regime. It would in fact relieve the regime of a particularly unpopular character.

B. Population

With regard to the population, the difficulty of the regime is mainly one of obtaining compliance and positive cooperation, rather than any substantial threat of active popular resistance. Despite intensive propaganda the Party has failed so far to convince the people that new promises made under the revised program of 1953 will be kept or that it is in their interest to put forth more economic effort under present circumstances. In an attempt to break down popular indifference and contempt the regime has gradually redoubled its pressures and exhortations during the past year, even appealing to nationalist traditions that it formerly denounced. Its latest device to foster at least an appearance of growing support has been the revival of a People's Patriotic Front in which the trade unions, churches, youth and women's organizations and all other official mass agencies are compelled to serve in unison with the Party as an over-all instrument of propaganda and channel of responsibility toward the state. By thus yoking all other front agencies more closely with the Party, the regime apparently hopes to put across the concept that Party policy is the popularly inspired program of the nation, and that the responsibility for any failures will rest with the people. The indications are, however, that this approach makes little impression on the entrenched antagonism and distrust of the population. Significantly, even the Party youth organization, the repository of the regime's highest hopes for the future, has failed to respond to

1. No major ideological deviation has been charged in the Party since the Rajk case of 1949. No top-ranking Communist has been purged a la Rajk during the four-year interval between his execution and the imprisonment of General Pétér in 1953. No significant individual Communist has defected to the West.

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the regime's program and has not yet become an important source of future intellectual cadres for the Party. After six years or more of intense indoctrination and disciplinary pressure, youth continues to be widely affected with cynicism and apathy.

Despite general popular apathy toward regime measures and disaffection toward Communist and Soviet rule, there is little active resistance and little opportunity for such resistance to develop. The controls maintained by the regime's security apparatus, which have undergone no impairment or essential changes, are adequate to prevent the spread of any important organized resistance movement. Unorganized resistance has so far taken the form only of occasional scattered acts. There have been no reports of major instances of sabotage since several months before the 1953 inauguration of the revised course. Neither the East German riots of 1953 nor the purge of Beriya in the USSR caused any overt or important popular reaction in Hungary. Such relaxation of police controls as has taken place during the past year has not been followed by any noticeable increase in signs of active resistance. The curtailment of the formerly free-wheeling State Security Authority (AVH) and imprisonment of its tyrannical chief after the regime's introduction of the revised course has so far had no observable popular repercussions or deleterious effects on the efficiency of police controls.

II. ECONOMIC SITUATION

In the economic field little progress has been made toward the major policy goals as revised 18 months ago. In part this has been due to the population's continuing hostility and its withholding of cooperation. The regime so far has not succeeded in implementing its agricultural plan, carrying out projected investment shifts, or shifting industrial emphasis sufficiently from heavy engineering industries to basic materials, consumers' goods and agricultural equipment. The entire economic program was hampered during the first half of 1954 by weather conditions. An unusually hard winter caused transportation tieups and work stoppages in industry and affected agriculture by damaging crops and delaying spring field work. Heavy floods of the Danube River basin in mid-July, preceded and followed by unseasonably heavy rains, interfered with agricultural work at harvest time and again interrupted industrial activities. But resistance from various elements of the population apparently accounted for the largest measure of the economic failures. Included was obstructionism and opposition from some high-ranking economic leaders which has been cited by spokesmen as the main factor for the non-implementation of new course provisions.

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Following a period of uncertainty and argumentation, the economic course originally charted in June 1953 was reaffirmed and intensified in a meeting of the Hungarian Workers' Party Central Committee (October 1-3, 1954) which apparently resolved, for the time being, a long drawn-out debate on the causes and cures of economic ills. At this new affirmation of the "new course," promises were advanced for a greater measure of material incentive and for even more drastic investment and production shifts than had been projected originally.

A. Agriculture

The most conspicuous failure during the past 18 months has been in the agricultural program which is recognized as basic to any appreciable or lasting improvement in living standards. This sector continues to be hamstrung by the identical difficulties which had been responsible for its stagnation in the past and which the new program was designed to correct -- namely, inadequate investment and lack of cooperation on the part of the peasantry. Agricultural improvements planned for 1954 as part of the comprehensive three-year agricultural development program launched in December 1953 were delayed not only by weather difficulties but also by non-implementation of investment and mechanization plans and by the failure of the authorities to win the peasants' confidence through efforts at conciliation. As a result, over-all production, particularly of bread grains, has been below expectations despite claimed increases in sown acreages.

By the end of September 1954 agriculture admittedly had received only 50 percent of scheduled investments (it is not clear whether this proportion refers to the whole year or only to the nine-months quota). In view of this lag agricultural investments during 1955 are to be kept at the level scheduled but not attained for 1954, previously specified at about 3.25 billion forints. At this rate -- not significantly higher than the admittedly inadequate investments of 11 billion forints scheduled for the period 1950-54 under the Five Year Plan or the 5 billion forints actually invested during the three years 1951-53 -- the investment goal of 12-13 billion forints for the three year period 1954-56 called for by the agricultural plan, appears out of reach. There have also been admissions that during the first 9 months of 1954 only 51 percent of the tractors ordered and even smaller proportions of other agricultural implements have actually been delivered and that the items supplied have frequently been of inferior quality.

Nor have new course agrarian policies -- despite some significant moves to ease the peasants' burden -- secured the expected larger measure of support in the countryside. Concessions regarding past arrears in compulsory deliveries of farm products and the mitigation of current obligations for a five-year period beginning January 1954, for instance, have not overcome the trouble the authorities have

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chronically experienced in securing compliance with these measures. Encouraged by concessionary moves, peasants have apparently been withholding even larger amounts of produce in the hope that the regime, forced to cancel last year's delivery arrears, will again forgive arrears from current obligations.

The regime has been trying to maintain a precarious balance in its agricultural policy. On the one hand it seeks to stimulate production by offering more material incentives to private peasants, but on the other it feels constrained to limit these incentives sufficiently to avoid political and ideological consequences including jeopardy of the goal of collectivization, which continues to be espoused as the correct policy for the countryside. This conflict of interests has produced considerable uncertainty and argumentation, expressed in an alternate tightening and loosening of the reins which has confused local rural officials charged with putting into effect the government's policies and enhanced the peasant's insecurity and distrust of the government.

Illustrative of such vacillation has been the regime's attitude toward collectivization. The attempt to make individual peasants, who till more than two-thirds of the country's arable land feel secure enough about the future to increase production and marketing, has included assurances that collectivization in the future would be strictly voluntary. In July 1953 an extreme measure was adopted: members of agricultural "cooperatives" were offered the opportunity of disbanding such units or to withdraw from them. This offer evoked such violent and apparently unprecedented response that it was followed, within a week of its announcement, by a series of severe restrictions and an intensive propaganda campaign designed to prevent a serious weakening of the "socialized" sector. Nevertheless, close to 50 percent of all collectivized peasants chose to return to individual farming. Subsequent attempts to draw these peasants back into collectives by making it hard for them to make a living outside had the effect only of holding back agricultural production.

It now appears that the Communists will abstain -- at least in the near future -- from using coercive means and will instead rely on the relative economic advantages granted the "socialized" sector, to further collectivization. Remedial measures formalized at the October 1954 Party Central Committee meeting noted the persistent failure of coercive methods to replace the profit motive as a stimulant to production efforts and called for a revision of the current agricultural price system which had been designed to further the industrial program and discriminated against the peasants. There were also suggestions of a possible further modification of the currently effective delivery quotas so as to permit the peasant to dispose of a larger proportion of his output in the open market.

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The success of these measures will be importantly affected by the ability of the industrial sector to provide agriculture with the needed equipment and with incentive goods which will induce the peasant to increase his efforts and to market his produce.

B. Industry

In the industrial sphere accumulated stresses and strains have multiplied since the inauguration of the "new course." The inflexible bureaucratic apparatus, controlled in part by Party members unsympathetic with any retreat from Hungary's former industrialization program, has proven incapable of effecting a smooth transition to the new program. Long-standing difficulties in planning and in the allocation of resources have been intensified by the new program and its lack of firm direction. The cumbersome system of materials allocations, already taxed by chronic short supply of basic materials, was incapable of coping with sporadic production shifts. As a result, some factories developed more pressing shortages even than in the past while others accumulated stocks of unneeded materials. Factory managers, reluctant to accommodate themselves to the new order and to shift from the production of capital goods to consumers' goods and agricultural equipment, frequently disregarded government directives concerned with such changes. A softer official attitude encouraged infractions of laws and violations of labor discipline. Waste and lack of attention to quality factors assumed -- by official admission -- unprecedented proportions.

Perhaps the most revealing indication of the extent of industrial difficulties was the failure to attain the new reduced goals for over-all investments and industrial production, and the need to effect further severe cuts in plans during 1954.

There is evidence that the originally scheduled increase in industrial production of 4.5 percent over 1953 -- modest as it was in comparison with the 11.8 percent growth claimed for 1953 -- was replaced in the spring or summer by a new plan that apparently scheduled a reduction from the 1953 level. This would be the first year since the inauguration of Communist style planning in the area that any satellite has admitted an interruption of the steady upward climb of the production index. Among evidences that a decline is in prospect for the year as a whole are the following: the official statement that manufacturing industries, the output of which had apparently declined in the first half year, claimed fulfillment of their plan for the third quarter by 100.5 percent on the basis of an increase of only one percent over the corresponding period of the preceding year; and the admission that per capita output in industry during the first eight months of the year was 3.3 percent below that of the similar 1953 period. As these months have been characterized by a substantial reduction in the industrial labor force, total production may have declined at an even higher rate than indicated by the per capita figures.

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There is gathering evidence that few of the "new course" provisions for industry have actually been put into effect. The projected investment shifts away from heavy industry have gone largely unimplemented with this sector still enjoying priority as against agriculture and light industry; the same applies to the production of capital equipment as against that of consumers' goods and agricultural equipment. Planned 1954 total investments, originally set at a level 14-18 percent below those of 1953 were said to have been cut again by 17 percent during the third quarter of the year, suggesting that the new planned total may now amount to only 11,5 billion forints or 30 percent less than last year's investments. If, as had been indicated, the pre-existing investment pattern has been continued within this reduced total, allocations to the newly favored sectors -- agriculture and light industry -- may actually have been smaller than they were before the new program was launched. Such investment cuts as have taken place appeared to be a de facto recognition of the failure to reach specified targets rather than a device for freeing resources for other purposes. Illustrative of such reductions, hailed as an expression of the regime's concern for popular welfare but in fact a necessity forced upon it, are the suspension of the Budapest subway construction and the postponement of a number of other large projects.

The extent to which the old pattern of production has been continued was illustrated by the admission that the 1954 plan for a 16 percent increase in the production of consumers' goods and a simultaneous two percent drop in capital equipment -- in itself inadequate to bring about a drastic change in industrial structure -- had not been accomplished. Nor had the proposed shift of attention, within heavy industry, toward basic materials been implemented. The depressed status of these industries and the ensuing possibility of a recurrence of last winter's coal shortage -- which contributed to industrial difficulties during that period -- was implicit in the admission that the lag of coal production below plan had increased from 300,000 tons in mid-summer to 450,000 tons in mid-October, and, according to unconfirmed reports, had risen to as much as 1,000,000 tons in early December.

Full details of the further industrial shifts contemplated under the revised program adopted in October 1954 have not been revealed, but it has been indicated that in 1955 output of consumers' goods and agricultural equipment are to increase by 90 and 200 percent, respectively over this year's level. As very little headway has been made in these sectors, the projected increases would be but a tardy first step toward the alleviation of long-standing shortages of these items. The development of these industries is to be fostered by a revision of the system of wages and allocations designed to eliminate the bias toward heavy industry and by a temporary reduction of the turnover tax applicable at factory levels so as to put operations on a profitable basis. In an effort to mitigate some principal sources

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of cost and inefficiency, the administrative apparatus has been drastically cut and factory managers have been vested with a greater measure of authority and responsibility. Under the new system, only basic plans of a given enterprise will be centrally established with the determination of how to implement their tasks left largely to local managers.

C. Consumers' Goods and Housing

The consumers' goods program, basic to the regime's bid for popular support, has been largely a failure. There was an initial improvement in market supplies in the wake of the announcement of July 1953, effected by the release of government stocks and the utilization for consumption of funds originally earmarked for other purposes. This was, however, neither sufficiently broad nor of a sufficiently lasting nature to provide a real incentive to the labor force. Nor did the larger supplies of durable consumers' goods which were to act as stimuli for agricultural production materialize. Such consumers' goods as have been put on the market were frequently of such inferior quality that they went unsold. Also a matter for complaint is the record of the housing program which had completed by September 30, only 13,000 of the 40,000 dwelling units planned for the year. The year's unsatisfactory yields of breadgrains and persistance of long-standing meat and fats shortages, despite a claimed all-time high in pig stocks, portend little alleviation for the near future. Nor is there much in past industrial performance to give encouragement to a significant improvement in consumers' goods supplies.

There have been attempts to streamline the bureaucratic network of trade and services and to improve local supplies by encouraging local artisans whose licensing requirements have been repeatedly eased, and by transferring the management of local enterprises from central authorities to local councils.

D. Labor Force and Attitudes

Labor's response to new course promises has been scarcely more encouraging from the regime's point of view than that of the peasantry. The launching of the new program was greeted by an upsurge of infractions of labor discipline and a drop in productivity. These persisted as workers became increasingly disillusioned with the government's failure to make good on its promises of higher living standards and better labor protection. The specter of unemployment raised by large scale labor layoffs in August and September 1954 so intensified the negative attitude of the population that the regime was forced to announce, in the wake of the dismissals, apparently unplanned pension increases and emergency measures to aid the unemployed.

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There has been little cooperation on the part of workers with the regime's attempt to relocate labor to labor short sectors of the economy. Thus, the lay-offs of administrative personnel, resorted to as an economy measure and affecting upward of eight percent of the white-collar force in government and nationalized enterprises, have had little effect on persisting labor shortages in agriculture, mining, and construction, as many of the job opportunities in these fields call for manual types of work for which the bulk of the dismissed have neither training nor inclination.

There is also little evidence that the government has been successful in its efforts to lure back to the countryside a sizeable proportion of the approximately 200,000 peasants who during the period 1949-52 left the farms for industrial employment. Nor has there been any correction of the poor housing conditions and other social shortcomings which have been largely responsible for the high labor turnover in mining.

E. Foreign Trade Problems

Hungary's chronic foreign exchange shortage and the disappearance of the traditional agricultural surpluses have lent added urgency to the need for improvement in the output of industrial products, which now make up the bulk of her exports. These problems may also effect the structure of future agricultural output programs, since recent policy statements, admitting the bleak prospects for improving grain and livestock products output, recommend concentration on luxury agricultural exports requiring little investment, eg. goose livers, poultry, wine, and paprika.

Qualitative shortcomings and non-observance of delivery schedules has hurt the foreign market for Hungarian industrial goods, while creation of new agricultural exports would entail some delay. At the same time, maintenance of domestic market supplies in the face of lagging agricultural and consumers' goods programs has necessitated imports of food and consumers' goods. For instance, the price reductions for meats and fats effected in the spring of 1954 were preceded by imports of livestock and lard. Hungary was also forced this year to buy 100,000 tons of wheat from France to fulfill export commitments to Austria and replenish domestic stocks.

The urgency of improving export possibilities exists both in regard to possibilities for trade with the non-bloc world and in connection with the intra-bloc trade which has come to make up the bulk of Hungary's foreign trade. If, as both current Hungarian and

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Soviet theoretical discussions suggest, Hungary's abandonment of more extreme aspects of her pre-1953 industrialization program is to be compensated by increased dependence on her bloc trading partners for products of heavy industry, Hungary will have to make substantial improvements in export availabilities from its existing heavy industrial establishments and re-develop light industrial and agricultural export lines as well.

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Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500110001-3
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IAC-D-92
16 December 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

There is enclosed a copy of OIR Report No. 6771 "The Current Situation in Hungary." These reports were made available by Mr. Armstrong and are being circulated to the members for information pursuant to the action taken by the IAC at its meeting on 14 December. (IAC-M-178, item 3)



Secretary

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IAC-D-92
(Members only)
16 December 1954

Intelligence Report

No. 6771

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN HUNGARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Office of Intelligence Research

Prepared by
Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe
December 14, 1954

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY